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"[There is a] frequent reluctance of lay persons to communicate
their deep seated opinions in a cogent and emphatic
1
manner .
"I might ....
I really don't know what I'2think. I might. I just
might not believe in capital punishment."
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1. State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
2. Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 641, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1978) (juror response to question
whether she would vote against death penalty regardless of evidence). The court was divided on
whether this juror was qualified to sit in a capital case. Compare id at 636, 573 S.W.2d at 625
(juror Young) (striking juror because she could impose death penalty under no circumstances)
with id. at 644,573 S.W.2d at 629 (Howard, J., dissenting) (expression of mere general objection to
capital punishment not decisive ground upon which to strike juror).
References to one of several jurors referred to on a page are hereinafter indicated by the
name of the juror in parentheses.
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I. Introduction
For fifteen years, despite major developments in the constitutional
status of the death penalty3 and substantial revisions in state death pen3. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
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alty statutes, 4 one issue has remained common and critical in virtually
every capital trial in the nation: whether veniremen opposed to capital
punishment may serve on the jury. Prosecutors and defense counsel
alike have attached great importance to the treatment of such veniremen, on the common sense assumption that a juror's attitude towards
the death penalty is likely to affect his or her choice of penalty. Pretrial
voir dire questioning of prospective jurors regarding their opinions
about capital punishment is a standard and vital part of almost all capital cases.
This issue became a question of constitutional law in 1968 when
the Supreme Court decided Withersoon v. Illinois.5 An Illinois statute
at that time provided for a challenge for cause against any prospective
juror who had "conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or
.. . [was] opposed to the same."' 6 The Illinois Supreme Court construed the statute to authorize the exclusion of any juror who "might
hesitate to return a verdict inflicting [death]."' 7 In Witherspoon itself,
forty-seven veniremen had been successfully challenged for cause on
the basis of their attitude toward capital punishment. 8 In overturning
the death sentence imposed by the resulting jury, the Supreme Court
reasoned that because of the discretion accorded the jury in fixing the
sentence, each juror's attitudes towards the death penalty necessarily
and properly played a role in his or her decision. A sentencing jury,
the Court held, "can do little more-and must do nothing less-than
express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death." 9 A panel limited to men and women without reserva(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
4. These revisions were necessitated by the decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), which held unconstitutional statutes that gave juries standardless discretion to decide
whether a convicted defendant would live or die. Almost all state death penalty statutes were of
this type when Furman was decided in 1972. See e.g., Note, Competency ofJurors Who Have
ConscientiousScruplesAgainst CapitalPunishment,8 WASHBURN L.J. 352, 354 (1969) (noting that
degree of opposition to capital punishment sufficient for disqualification varies greatly, even
within a jurisdiction). For two years Maryland forbade the exclusion of any juror because of his
or her beliefs regarding capital punishment. 1967 Md. Laws ch. 500, repealedby 1969 Md. Laws
ch. 408, § 1; see Brice v. State, 264 Md. 352, 361-62, 286 A.2d 132, 137 (1972) (noting change in
Maryland law).
5. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4
(1977 & Supp. 1984); see Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512 n.l.
7. People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 150 N.E.2d 100, 103, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 887
(1958).
8. 391 U.S. at 514.
9. Id. at 519. The Court subsequently upheld the applicability of Witherspoon to death
penalty statutes that provide standards to guide the exercise of jury discretion. Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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tions about capital punishment would apply standards representative,
not of the community, but of "a distinct and dwindling minority."' 0
The Court concluded that a death sentence could not be carried out if
the jury that imposed it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause
merely because they were opposed to capital punishment."
Many commentators erroneously predicted that Witherspoon
would lead to the de facto abolition of capital punishment.' 2 Others
thought the decision would have little impact. But there seemed to be a
tacit consensus that, whatever its impact on the outcome of capital
cases, Witherspoon'srequirements were clear' 3 and could be applied in
a relatively simple and straightfoward manner, 14 perhaps necessitating
only that a single additional question be asked of prospective jurors.' 5
This Article assesses, in light of fifteen years of judicial experience
under Witherspoon, the meaning and impact of that decision and the
practical and legal problems that arise in its application. The analysis
draws heavily on actual voir dires reported in published opinions and
considers the problems that judges and attorneys face when attempting
to distinguish jurors who cannot be excluded under Witherspoon (commonly referred to as "death-qualified" jurors) from jurors who may be
excluded for cause. Part II discusses the ways in which Witherspoon
altered the law regarding jury selection in capital cases and considers
10. 391 U.S. at 520. The Illinois system created "a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a
man to die." Id at 521. The Court characterized the sentence as being the result of a "hanging
jury," id at 523, and noted that a penalty decision must not "be made on scales. . . deliberately
tipped toward death," id at 521 n.20.
11. Id. at 522. The petitioner in Witherspoon urged that a jury from which all scrupled jurors
had been removed would be biased in favor of the prosecution on the question of guilt or innocence, but the Court found insufficient empirical evidence to support this contention. Id. at 51618. But cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968) (decided same day, held Witherspoon was of no relevance to case in which defendant had not been sentenced to death).
12. See, e.g., Note, Prospective Jurors and Capital Punishment, 29 LA. L. REv. 381, 386
(1969); Comment, TowardAssuringFairTrialsin CapitalCases: Some Reflections on Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 340 & n.60 (1969); 3 GA. L. REv. 234, 239 (1968); 30 OHIO ST.
L.J. 421 (1969); 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 93, 97 (1968); 21 VAND. L. Ruv. 864, 871 (1968). Justice
Black, dissenting in Witherspoon, suggested the majority might be attempting to abolish capital
punishment "by making it impossible for States to get juries that will enforce the death penalty."
391 U.S. at 532. Prior to Witherspoon, a number of state court decisions had predicted that such
abolition would occur if scrupled veniremen could not be kept off juries in capital cases. See
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 576, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 246, 207 N.E.2d 536, 542 (1965); State v. Juliano, 103 N.J.L.
663, 671, 138 A. 575, 580 (1927).
13. See Comment, Unlawful Discrimination in Jury Selection-Witherspoon and Related
Cases, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 73, 74 (1969).
14. See Note, ConstitutionalLaw-CapitalPunishment and the Challengefor Cause, 23 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 631, 642 (1969) (after one year lower courts were "experiencing little difficulty in
the application of the Witherspoon doctrine").
15. See, e.g., Note, ConscientiousObjectorsto the DeathPenalty--Can They Be Excludedfrom
the Jury?, 23 Loy. L. Rav. 604, 611 (1977); 3 GA. L. Rav. 234, 241 (1968); 14 VILL. L. Rav. 125,
130 (1968).
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the theoretical and practical importance of its insistence that the disqualification of any excluded juror be "unmistakably clear."1 6 Part III
describes the wide variety of juror responses to questions regarding
their positions on capital punishment and assesses the legal problems
posed by those responses. Part IV analyzes in light of those responses
the nature of the inquiry required by Witherspoon, exploring both the
problems that have arisen in framing adequate questions and the explanations needed to assure that the replies elicited are accurate and
meaningful. This Article proposes a new method of questioning scrupled jurors that would implement Witherspoon in a more straightforward and administrable manner.
II.

The Principles of Witherspoon

Many of the difficulties that trial and appellate courts have encountered in attempting to comply with Witherspoon appear rooted in
an inability or unwillingness to understand the basic holding of that
decision and the manner in which it altered then-existing standards.
This section first delineates the fundamental Witherspoon standards
governing the exclusion for cause of a venireman in a capital case and
then contrasts the traditional approach to exclusion with that now required by Witherspoon.
Witherspoon contains neither a single, clear comprehensive statement of the circumstances under which a juror can constitutionally be
excused, nor a Miranda -like official question to be asked of each
venireman. The penultimate paragraph in Witherspoon includes a
statement that on its face seems most like a rule:
Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried
out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by
excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction.' 8
This is a deceptively simple formulation, however, for it does not indicate what more than "general objections" a venireman must express
before he or she can be excluded from the jury. The requirements of
Witherspoon must be gleaned, not from this general statement, but
from the Court's condemnation of several specific aspects of the Illinois
jury selection process and of the theory that appeared to underlie that
process. Such an analysis reveals six distinct but interrelated principles
16. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. 391 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added).
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that were violated by the lower court in Witherspoon and that, taken
together, provide the standard by which the testimony of a scrupled
venireman must be assessed.
A.

Insufficiency of General ScruplesAgainst CapitalPunishment

Witherspoon makes clear that the decision to exclude a juror must
be based only on the juror's statements about how he or she will vote at
the penalty phase, rather than on testimony about his or her beliefs or
scruples. 19 Prior to 1968, most states that authorized the imposition of
capital punishment permitted exclusion of jurors merely because they
opposed the death penalty or had conscientious scruples against it.20
Witherspoon is most widely understood to have condemned this practice and to have substituted how a juror will vote for what2 1the juror
believes as the constitutionally approved subject of inquiry.
19. The opinion indicates that under certain conditions a state may exclude for cause a juror
who would "automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment," id. at 522 n.21
(emphasis in original), and notes that at the trial, veniremen who said they did not believe in
capital punishment "were excluded without any effort to find out whether their scruples would
invariably compel them to vote against capital punishment," id at 515 (emphasis added).
20. See Untreinor v. State, 146 Ala. 26, 33, 41 So. 285, 287 (1906) ("opposed to capital punishment"); Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325, 327 (1867) ("fixed opinion against capital punishment");
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 575, 305 P.2d 1, 7 (1956) ("opposed to the death penalty"), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); Johnson v. State, 48 Ga. 116, 118 (1873) ("conscientiously opposed to
capital punishment"); State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 628, 243 P. 359, 361 (1925) ("conscientious
scruples against the death penalty"); Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 263, 34 N.E. 972, 975 (1893)
("conscientious scruples against affixing the death penalty"); Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 405
S.W.2d 956, 957 (Ky. 1966) ("conscientious scruples against returning the death sentence"); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 246, 207 N.E.2d 536, 542 (1965) ("conscientiously opposed
to capital punishment"); Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 754, 178 So. 579, 581 (1938) ("conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment"); State v. Hayes, 262 S.W. 1034, 1035
(Mo. 1924) ("scruples against fixing the death penalty"); State v. Louie Won, 76 Mont. 509, 518,
248 P. 201, 204 (1926) ("conscientious scruples against inflicting the death penalty"); State v.
Reynolds, 43 N.J. 597, 603, 206 A.2d 750, 753 (1965) ("conscientious scruples against capital punishment"); People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302, 320, 93 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1950) ("opposed to capital
punishment"), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1951); State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 318, 152 S.E.2d 453,
467 (1967) ("conscientious scruples or beliefs against the infliction of the death penalty"), rev'd
mere., 403 U.S. 948 (1971); State v. Leland, 190 Or. 598, 623, 227 P.2d 785, 796 (1951) ("conscientious scruples against capital punishment"), a/i'd,343 U.S. 790 (1952); Commonwealth v. Bentley,
287 Pa. 539, 544, 135 A. 310, 312 (1926) ("conscientious scruples against the imposition of the
death penalty"); Sawyer v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 557, 559, 47 S.W. 650, 651 (1898) ("conscientious
scruples in regard to the infliction of the death penalty"); State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 419, 126 P.
286, 288 (1912) ("conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty"); State v.
Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 335, 88 P.2d 440, 442 (1939) ("conscientious scruples against the death
penalty"); see also Comment, Jury Challenges, CapitalPunishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 295-96 (juror may be disqualified if he or she "states some scruple against capital punishment); Comment, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 210, 214-15 (1968) (noting the
"varying degrees of opposition to the death penalty" found in a "true cross section" of the community). The "conscientious scruple" standard was so well established that the trial judge in the
Witherspoon case was not satisfied if a juror said he or she would never vote for the death penalty,
but pressed the juror to say he or she had such scruples. Brief for Petitioner at Apps. 2, 8, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
21. See infra note 24.
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This aspect of Witherspoon has important implications not only
for the criteria for juror exclusion, but also for the type of evidence
necessary to satisfy that standard. Jurors who have "conscientious
scruples" are doubtless more likely to automatically vote against capital punishment than those without such scruples. If the existence of a
rigid refusal to vote for the death penalty could be inferred merely
from evidence that a juror did not believe in the death penalty, this first
Witherspoon requirement would be meaningless. In Witherspoon itself
the state argued that an indication of conscientious scruples was sufficient proof that a juror would not vote for capital punishment, even
when it would be appropriate under the law and the court's instructions. 22 It was precisely that kind of casual evidentiary inference that
Witherspoon expressly condemned: "[I]t cannot be assumed that a juror who describes himself as having 'conscientious or religious scruples'
against the infliction of the death penalty. . thereby affirms that he
could never vote in favor of it .... 23 Witherspoon's refusal to permit
such an inference rejects one of the primary theoretical foundations of
the old rule that disqualified jurors who had conscientious scruples.24
22. 391 U.S. at 518-19 (state attempted to justify the jury selection procedure by arguing that
those with serious reservations about the death penalty "cannot be relied upon" to return a verdict
of death in a proper case).
23. Id. at 515 n.9.
24. The nominal holding noted supra, text accompanying note 21, is as much about evidence
as it is about standards; it forbids excluding a juror because he or she "voiced" or "expressed"
opposition to the death penalty, a prohibition that necessarily bars exclusion because of an asserted broader finding (e.g., that the juror would never vote for capital punishment). See, e.g.,
People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302, 320, 93 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1950) (stating that "a declaration by
a venireman that he is opposed to capital punishment. . . is some evidence of his predisposition
against the death penalty") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1951); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 208, 280 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1972) (noting that Witherspoon and its progeny
"rejected the theretofore common, statutory and usually irrebuttable presumption that a person
who expresses a fixed opinion against or claims he does not believe in capital punishment is not
capable of properly acting as a juror in a capital case"). An amicus brief in Witherspoon filed on
behalf of California and 23 other states urged: "Implied bias is bias conclusively presumed in law
to arise from the existence of some fact which can be reasonably assumed to give rise to actual
bias... . [G]rounds for challenge on account of implied bias.., commonly include, in capital
cases, scruples against the death penalty." Brief for the People of the State of California at 22,
Witherspoon.
The majority's assumption that not everyone opposed to capital punishment would automatically vote against it was disputed by Justice Black in a dissenting opinion. That dissent is noteworthy because it articulates so fully the premise rejected by the Court:
A person who has conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment will
seldom if ever vote to impose the death penalty. This is just human nature, and no
amount of semantic camouflage can cover it up.
. . . Scruples against the death penalty are commonly the result of a deep religious
conviction or a profound philosophical commitment developed after much soul-searching. The holders of such scruples must necessarily recoil from the prospect of making
possible what they regard as immoral.
. . . If we are to take the opinion literally, then I submit the Court today has
decided nothing of substance, but has merely indulged itself in a semantic exercise. ...
ITIhe practical effect of the Court's new formulation of the question to be asked state
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B. PartiallyScrupled Veniremen
Witherspoon forbids the exclusion of veniremen who would vote
against the death penalty in some cases but not in others. This limitation is implicit in the statement that a state may exclude only jurors
who would vote against capital punishment "without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial";2 5 a juror who would favor
the death penalty only for some particular crime, however uncommon
or bizarre, would have to consider the evidence in a case before imposing sentence. Witherspoon also states explicitly that veniremen cannot
be excluded for cause "simply because they indicate that there are some
kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital
' 26
punishment.
This holding in Witherspoon overturned the practice generally
prevalent before 1968. Prior to that year, every state and federal court
that had considered the question had held that veniremen who were
opposed to capital punishment for certain crimes, 27 or under particular
juries will not produce a significantly different kind of jury from the one chosen in this
case.
391 U.S. at 535-39 (Black, J., dissenting). Several commentators agreed with Justice Black's view
that, because scrupled jurors would necessarily vote against the death penalty, the difference between asking jurors whether they "opposed capital punishment" and whether they "would never
vote for capital punishment" was purely semantic. See 3 GA. L. REv. 234, 240 (1968); 21 VAND.
L. REv. 864, 869 (1968).
Subsequent studies have confirmed the accuracy of the majority's view. In a 1968 Gallup
poll, almost half of those who described themselves as having "conscientious scruples" said they
would vote for the death penalty in at least some cases. Goldberg, Toward Expansionof Witherspoon: CapitalScruples, Jury Bias, and the Use of PsychologicalDatato Raise Presumptionsin the
Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53, 63 n.30 (1970); see Comment, Witherspoon-Will the Due
Process Clause FurtherRegulate the Imposition of the Death Penalty?, 7 DuQ. L. REV. 414, 423
n.66 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Due Process]. A 1971 Harris poll showed that 38% of
the population was opposed to capital punishment, but that only 23% was prepared to state that
they would never vote for it. White, The ConstitutionallnvalidityofConvictionsby Death-Qualfied
Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1178 n.12 (1973). It seems fair, therefore, to conclude that a
substantial proportion of respondents opposed to capital punishment nonetheless would vote for it
in at least some cases. Similar results have been obtained in other detailed surveys. See
Goldberg, supra, at 61 (42% of subjects with conscientious scruples voted for the death penalty in
at least one hypothetical case); Jurow, New Dataon the Effects ofa "Death Quaified"Jury on the
Guilt DeterminationProcess, 84 HARV. L. REv. 567, 583, 599 (1971) (of 73 respondents opposed to
the death penalty, 51, or 70%, would impose it in a few cases); Comment, Due Process, supra, at
423 (Duquesne survey) (61% of those with conscientious scruples would consider imposing the
death penalty).
25. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
26. Id
27. Eg., People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257,258-60 (1852) (juror opposed to capital punishment for
theft but not for murder); Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959) (juror opposed to capital
punishment for rape but not for murder), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960).
In Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461,470, 88 N.W. 789, 791 (1902), the court reasoned that "in order
to render a juror incompetent," it was not required that "his opinions and scruples must be such as
to absolutely forbid him, under any circumstance and under any state of the evidence, from rendering a verdict inflicting the death penalty." It was sufficient that a juror had "opinions or
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circumstances, 28 could be excluded from the jury in all cases.29 Witherspoon's disapproval of the practice of excluding jurors with "partial"
scruples was well founded. If a juror could be challenged for cause
merely because he or she was against the death penalty in the circumstances at issue, a prosecutor could describe the particular facts of the
case and demand to know how each venireman would vote at the penalty phase. This actually had occurred in a number of cases prior to
Witherspoon.30 Such a process would stack the deck against a defendant even more egregiously than the jury selection procedure in Witherspoon itself, because jurors would be hand-picked for their willingness
to execute the very defendant on trial. Moreover, if the criteria for
juror selection were based on the particular circumstances of each case,
then veniremen of increasingly mild scruples would be excluded as the
heinousness of the crime decreased. Thus, murder cases of the least
severity, committed by defendants whose actions had otherwise been
above reproach, would be tried by the most death-oriented juries, while
a multiple torture murder of a particularly gruesome sort would be
conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty, such as will bias his judgment, influence him in the consideration of the evidence, and hinder or retard him in arriving at such a
verdict if the evidence warrants it." Id
28. E.g., Horton v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 310, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1899) (juror opposed to
capital punishment except in "a very extreme case"); Thayer v. State, 138 Ala. 39, 43, 35 So. 406,
407 (1902) (juror opposed to capital punishment for murder in the course of a fight); Waller v.
State, 40 Ala. 325, 327 (1867) (juror opposed to capital punishment for whites); Bell v. State, 91
Ga. 15, 16-17, 16 S.E. 207, 207-08 (1892) (juror opposed to capital punishment for 14-year-old
defendant); Abbott v. State, 24 Ga. App. 367, 100 S.E. 759 (1919) (juror opposed to capital punishment for women); Commonwealth v. Nassar, 354 Mass. 249, 256 n.5, 237 N.E.2d 39, 44 n.5 (1968)
(juror opposed to capital punishment did not know how he would react to a case of "great atrocity"), ceri. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969).
29. The most common application of this rule was to jurors who would not impose capital
punishment based on circumstantial evidence. E.g., Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224, 227
(1902); Underwood v. State, 239 Ala. 29, 33-34, 193 So. 155, 159 (1940); Gentry v. State, 191 Ark.
317, 321-23, 86 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1935); People v. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 398, 401-02 (1880); Holland v.
State, 39 Fla. 178, 180, 22 So. 298, 299 (1897); Olive v. State, 188 Ga. 550, 568-69, 4 S.E.2d 221,
232 (1939); Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 433, 434-35 (1853); State v. Stephens, 116 La. 36, 37-38, 40 So.
523, 523 (1906); Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 563-64, 45 A.2d 340, 343-44 (1946); Little v. State,
39 Tex. Crim. 654, 659-60, 47 S.W. 984, 986 (1898); Spick v. State, 140 Wis. 104, 110, 121 N.W.
664, 667 (1909).
Jurors with partial scruples had been excluded even when they did not oppose capital punishment in the type of case being tried. See People v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 535, 66 P. 794, 795
(1901); Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484, 485, 489 (1882). An amicus brief in Witherspoon had
called the Court's attention to the practice of excluding jurors who were willing to impose the
death penalty in at least some cases. Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., and Nat'l Office for the Rights of the Indigent at apps. 2a, 3a,
Witherspoon.
30. See State v. White, 153 La. 300, 302-03, 95 So. 776, 776-77 (1923); State v. Sandiford, 149
La. 933, 946, 90 So. 261, 265 (1921); Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 754-55, 178 So. 579, 580-81
(1938). But see State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 1011-14,3 So. 2d 104, 107-09 (1941) (veniremen may
not be questioned on verdict they would favor in particular circumstances).
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heard by a jury far more inclined against capital punishment. 3 1
C

Willingness to ConsiderAll Penalties

Witherspoon holds that a venireman cannot be excused for cause if
he or she is "willing to consider all the penalties provided by state
law."'32 It is not sufficient that the venireman is inclined to vote against
the death penalty; he or she must be "irrevocably committed . . .to
vote against the death penalty. '33 Prior to Witherspoon, the lower
courts had rarely considered the possibility that a juror initially inclined to vote against capital punishment in all cases might nonetheless
listen to the evidence and arguments of counsel before making a final
decision. It was generally taken for granted that a person with conscientious scruples, which were often equated with a "fixed opinion
35
against capital punishment,"3 4 was unshakable in that opposition. It
is this automatic assumption that a scrupled juror's views are irrevocable that Witherspoon implicitly rejects by holding that a mere willingness to consider the death penalty is sufficient to qualify a venireman.
D.

Willingness to Obey the Law

Whatever the nature and firmness of jurors' opposition to capital
punishment, Witherspoon holds that they cannot be excused if they are
nonetheless willing to carry out the responsibilities imposed by law on
capital juries.3 6 In Witherspoon, the State had argued that the mere
existence of conscientious scruples demonstrated that a juror could not
obey the law,37 but the Court disagreed.3 8 Again, what Witherspoon
condemns is the assumption that scrupled jurors will follow automati31. See People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 739, 464 P.2d 64, 94, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 638 (1970)
(Peters, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972).
32. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
33. Id (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325, 327 (1867).
35. But see Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 2, 106 N.E. 545, 546 (1914) (trial judge
attempted to ascertain whether juror's views were "so firmly held" that he would never vote for
conviction when capital punishment was mandatory). One California decision insisted that a conscientious objection to the death penalty "springs from some internal source of self-knowledge,
which acknowledges no superior, bows to no authority, yields to no demonstration, and is governed by no law; it ignores reason, defies argument, and is unaccountable and irresponsible to all
human tests and standards." People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140, 144 (1857). Although Stewart is
clearly inconsistent with Witherspoon and was disavowed by the California Supreme Court, People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 79-80, 447 P.2d 913, 924-25, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 532-33 (1968), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972), this passage was quoted and relied upon in Harris v. State, 457
S.W.2d 903, 911 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), rev'dmenL, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
36. 391 U.S. at 514 n.7.
37. Brief of Respondent Joseph Woods, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, at 15, Witherspoon
(asserting that "[t]he
very notion of a conscientious scruple is one which implies transcendency
over the demands of law and society").
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cally and exclusively the dictates of their consciences, ignoring the legal
duties and court instructions that all jurors are presumed to heed in
39
other instances.
38. It is entirely possible, of course, that even a juror who believes that capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition could
nonetheless subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to abide
by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State.
391 U.S. at 514 n.7; see also id at 519 ("A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one
who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus
obey the oath he takes as a juror.").
The potential effect of such a sense of duty was illustrated by the voir dire in Witherspoon
itself, where one juror who had stated that she did not believe in the death penalty later said that
she had no conscientious scruples against it after being admonished by the trial judge "not to
forget her 'duty as a citizen.'" Id. at 515. An amicus brief pointed out the willingness of veniremen in other cases to subordinate their personal convictions to their obligations as jurors:
Q. Do you have any conscientious objections against the imposition of the death
sentence?
A. Not if it is the law.
Q. Yes. But you, as an individual, do you feel that you could personally impose the
death sentence in a proper case?
A. In a proper case because it's the law.
Q. Do you entertain any conscientious objections against the imposition of the death
sentence yourself?
A. Because it's the law, and because we live by this law, I feel that the death sentence in
its proper place should be used as a tool of the law.
Q. But regardless of it being the law or not, as an individual do you have any personal
conscientious objections against the imposition of the death sentence?
A. If I could change the law, I would change the law.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Nat'l Office
for the Rights of the Indigent at app. Ia, Witherspoon (quoting the voir dire of juror McCarley in
People v. Arguello). The juror in question was excused for cause because, despite her willingness
to obey the law, she subsequently admitted to having a conscientious scruple against the death
penalty. Id at app. 2a.
39. The lower court decisions prior to Witherspoon were divided on this issue. Some courts
excluded scrupled jurors even though they expressly insisted that they would obey the law. E.g.,
Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325, 327, 331 (1867); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 466, 470, 88 N.W. 789,
790, 792 (1902); State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271, 278, 257 P. 619, 621 (1927); Walter v. People, 32
N.Y. 147, 161 (1865); see Note, supra note 14, at 635. One Florida opinion urged that the
"psychosemantic gymnastics of the order required to separate these jurors' abhorrence of the
death penalty from their ability to independently evaluate the evidence of guilt of a capital crime
were neither realistic nor required." Sims v. State, 184 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1966). Other courts
held that a juror willing to obey the law could not be excused for cause. E.g., Crawford v.
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 311-12 (4th Cir. 1968), vacated, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Stratton v. People, 5
Colo. 276, 277 (1880); Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 298 (1850); Williams v. State, 32
Miss. 389, 395 (1856). Several courts confronted with scrupled jurors simply admonished them to
obey the law. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 2, 106 N.E. 545, 546 (1914). The
differences among these jurisdictions rested in part on a disagreement about whether scrupled
jurors who said they would obey the law were to be believed. Compare State v. Bowman, 80 N.C.
432, 436 (1879) (noting that a scrupled juror would be biased "no matter how much disposed to
discharge his duty"), with Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 395 (1856) (statement by scrupled juror
that he could decide the case on the evidence must be accepted as "conclusive"). Witherspoon
concludes that such jurors must be believed. Some indication of the willingness of scrupled jurors
to obey the law can be gleaned from a survey which showed that only 30% of such jurors would
approve of acquitting a guilty defendant in order to avoid imposing the death sentence. Bronson,
On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death QualijedJury: An Empirical
Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 11 (1970).
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E. Impartiality Regarding Guilt Determination
Although a court may not excuse a juror who demonstrates a willingness to vote for capital punishment, Witherspoon does permit a
court to excuse a juror whose attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent him or her from "making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt."40 This rule had no immediate basis in the practice
prevalent in 1968, because the actual experience of the states was that
scrupled jurors would rarely if ever shrink from convicting a defendant
41
once they knew that they could fix his sentence at less than death.
Witherspoon offers no direct explanation of the relevant standard of

impartiality.
In sum, Witherspoon sets forth two circumstances under which a
juror constitutionally may be excused for cause. A court may excuse
40. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original); see also id at 513 ("The issue before us...
does not involve [the prosecution's right to challenge for cause jurors] who state that their reservations. . . would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to defendant's guilt.") (footnote omitted).
41. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory language, and time
and again the juror replied that he did not entertain such an opinion "as would prevent
him from finding the defendant guilty." Finally, in order to make it clear to the juror
that he was being asked if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to
abandon the statutory language.
People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 576 n.1, 305 P.2d 1, 7 n.l (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957);
see Leigh v. Territory, 10 Ariz. 129, 137-38, 85 P. 948, 951-52 (1906) (juror Thompson); Pitts v.
State, 185 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1966), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626,
627 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960).
The judicially fashioned practice of excluding jurors because of their scruples about voting
for the death penalty arose out of the inadequacy of the preexisting rule, which excluded only
jurors who would not vote to convict capital defendants. See, e.g., Needham v. State, 215 Ark.
935, 938-39, 224 S.W.2d 785, 787-88 (1949); People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257, 258-59 (1852); State v.
Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 627-28, 243 P. 359, 361 (1925); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237,
246-47, 207 N.E.2d 536, 542 (1965); State v. Leland, 190 Or. 598, 624-25, 227 P.2d 785, 796-97
(195 1), af'd,343 U.S. 790 (1952); State v. Riley, 126 Wash. 256, 258-64, 218 P. 238, 239-41 (1923).
In states where the imposition of the death penalty was left to the discretion of the jury, jurors
were asked questions which inaccurately suggested that the death penalty would be imposed automatically if the defendant were convicted. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 61 Cal. 2d 353, 365, 392
P.2d 526, 533, 38 Cal. Rptr. 726, 733 (1964) (juror asked "Do you entertain any such conscientious
opinion or conscientious scruples that would preclude you from returning a verdict of guilt in a
case where the penalty would be death?") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 133, 135, 37 S.W. 586, 586 (1896) (juror asked if he "had such
conscientious scruples ... as would prevent him from finding a verdict of guilty where thepunishment was or might be death") (emphasis added); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 468, 88 N.W. 789, 790
(1902) (juror asked, "[A]re your opinions [on] capital punishment such that would or might preclude you from rendering a verdict of guilty where thepunishmentfor the offense would be death?")
(emphasis added). The use of such misleading questions has become commonplace since Witherspoon.
Ifjurors absolutely committed to voting against the death penalty ordinarily have no qualms
about voting for conviction, it seems even less likely that jurors who are willing to impose that
penalty and who are therefore otherwise qualified under Witherspoon would have difficulty doing
so. Thus, except in the case ofjurors who simply do not understand the sentencing procedure, this
aspect of Witherspoon would seem to be of little practical importance.
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any juror whose conduct at the penalty phase would be affected in each
of four distinct ways. The juror must be shown to have scruples that
(a) would compel the juror to actually vote against the death penalty;
(b) would do so in every case, no matter how heinous, or how different
from the facts of the actual crime with which the defendant has been
charged; (c) are so irrevocable that the juror would not even consider
imposing the death penalty; and (d) would force the juror to consciously disregard his or her legal duty to obey and enforce the law. A
juror may also be excused if those scruples would prevent him or her
from rendering an impartial verdict on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.
F

The Requirement of Unmistakable Clarity

The sixth Witherspoon principle, critical to the vitality of all the
others, is that the evidence adduced by the state in support of its challenge for cause must make it "unmistakably clear ' 4 2 that these constitutional standards have been met. This requirement was evidently
intended to assure that the trial and appellate courts did not merely
assume the existence of the conditions necessary to justify the exclusion
of a juror.4 3 The Court's insistence on unmistakable clarity has its
roots in the record and arguments in Witherspoon itself. Even though
the overwhelming majority of the jurors excused in that case had
merely been asked whether they had conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, the State insisted that Illinois law permitted the
exclusion only of jurors who would never vote for the death penalty,
and that such a standard had actually been applied at Witherspoon's
trial.44 In the face of that contention, the Court apparently understood
42. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
43. "Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position." 391 U.S. at 516 n.9 (emphasis added).
44. Brief for Respondent People of Illinois at 14, Witherspoon. Illinois argued that because
the trial court in questioning one of the first jurors had equated conscientious scruples with an
unwillingness to vote for capital punishment, a statement by any subsequent juror that he or she
indicated that the juror would not under any circumstances return
had such scruples "clearly [sic]
a verdict calling for the death penalty, and any further probing... was unnecessary and would
merely have embarrassed the juror." Id at 15. Cook County officials, in a separate brief, insisted
that "no juror was excused because of mere or philosophical opposition to the death penalty."
Brief for Joseph Woods, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, at 17 n.4, Witherspoon. They urged,
"When a man says he has conscientious or religious scruples against a certain act, he normally
means that he will not perform the act under any circumstances." Id at 14-15. In an amicus
brief, California insisted that its courts excused only jurors who would never vote for capital
punishment, see Brief for the People of the State of California at 21, Witherspoon, a representation
that the Supreme Court may well have realized was palpably inaccurate. The majority opinion in
Witherspoon cited two California decisions, both of which had sanctioned the exclusion ofjurors
merely because of their opposition to the death penalty: People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal. 2d 524, 531,
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that the substantive rules it announced faced a grave and immediate
danger of emasculation by the lower courts. In an atmosphere of casual inferences, cavalier disregard of the actual words of jurors, and uncritical deference to the actions of trial judges, the distinctions required
by Witherspoon would quickly have been obliterated.
Witherspoon was grounded on a fundamental disagreement with
the views then prevailing in the state courts concerning what "scrupled" jurors believed and how those jurors would actually conduct
themselves in the trial of a capital case. State court judges had a long
record of equating what the Supreme Court majority regarded as little
more than the normal qualms of any "right-thinking man" 45 with an
implacable hostility to a verdict of death. The requirement of unmistakable clarity is thus the linchpin of Witherspoon. It is essential both
to preserving the vitality of Witherspoon's other holdings and to implementing the majority's fundamental premise that the disposition of
challenges to scrupled jurors must be based on what those jurors actually say, not on what a judge assumes or infers that the jurors feel,
mean, or might have said had they been asked.
By delineating the minimal constitutional standards that must be
satisfied before a scrupled juror can be excused, Witherspoon has created for the courts that must pass on such challenges a problem unique
not only in difficulty but also in kind. A court asked to decide whether
a particular juror should be permitted to sit in a case ordinarily need
consider only the interest of the party against whom the juror is alleged
to be prejudiced. In assessing a claim that a prospective juror is hostile
to a party-because, for example, of the party's race, religion, or political affiliation-a judge usually does not seek to measure, with precision
or at all, the degree of that bias. Any partiality, any deviation from
perfect neutrality, if based on such impermissible criteria, is forbidden.
Thus, a court need only inquire whether such a factor might influence a
juror's decision; it need not attempt to determine how much influence
that factor is likely to have or whether such influence is certain to oc426 P.2d 900, 905, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332, 337 ("Such [general] doubts are not sufficient to disqualify a
juror so long as he conscientiously believes that he could return a death penalty verdict in a proper
case. . . . What constitutes a proper case is. . .for the juror to decide.") (upholding dismissal of
juror), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 878 (1967), citedin Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515 n.9; People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 882, 423 P.2d 787, 798, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635, 646 (1967) ("conscientious opinions
against capital punishment" sufficient for exclusion even absent showing that such scruples would
interfere with an unbiased determination of guilt or innocence), cited in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
513 n.5. Shortly after Witherspoon was decided, the California Supreme Court recognized that it
had worked a "material change in the law in this state," noting the state's earlier adherence to the
conscientious scruple standard. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 618-19, 447 P.2d 117, 121, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 21, 25 (1968), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
45. 391 U.S. at 515 n.9.
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cur. The mere presence of a forbidden consideration ends the inquiry
and is a ground for exclusion. The law does not recognize any legitimate interest on the part of a party in retaining a juror prejudiced in his
or her favor. Because there are no competing interests at stake, there is
no reason not to err on the side of excluding all jurors about whose
fairness there is the least question. For these reasons, rules have
evolved that sweep aside whole classes of prospective jurors who might
be prejudiced, without any inquiry regarding whether any bias actually
exists. Relatives, personal friends, and business associates of a party
are routinely excluded from juries even though in some instances they
could in fact be fair.
The exclusionary practices employed in capital cases prior to
Witherspoon were of this traditional variety. Conscientious scruples
against the death penalty were simply regarded as another form of
prejudice, like "conscientious scruples" against convicting blacks or
Catholics or Republicans. 46 There were occasional differences among
the lower courts concerning the phrasing of the applicable legal standard, 47 but judges were generally unconcerned about such distinctions.
Any reservations about the death penalty were inherently suspect, and
there seemed little reason to inquire whether that prejudice was in fact
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the defendant. Consequently, in a
close or uncertain case there was no reason not to simply exclude the
48
juror at issue.
46. Justice Black insisted that conscientious scruples be treated like traditional forms of bias,
quoting Justice Story:
To insist on a juror's sitting in a cause when he acknowledges himself to be under influences, no matter whether they arise from interest, from prejudices, or from religious
opinions, which will prevent him from giving a true verdict according to law and evidence, would be to subvert the objects of a trial by jury ....
391 U.S. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 655-56
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868)).
47. See supra note 20.
48. See, e.g., People v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 156 (Pa. 1828). When a defendant
complained that a trial judge had gone too far in excusing a disputed scrupled juror, the state
courts frequently commented that the defendant had no legitimate interest in the inclusion of any
particular venireman on the jury. E.g., Horton v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 310, 319 (D.C. Cir.
1899) ("accused [has] no vested right to have a particular" juror); Commonwealth v. Bentley, 287
Pa. 539, 545, 135 A. 310, 312 (1926) ("The defendant had the legal right to reject jurors called, but
not to select.
...); Commonwealth v. Minney, 216 Pa. 149, 151, 65 A. 31, 32 (1906) (even if trial
court discretion to excuse disputed juror "had been improvidently exercised the prisoner would
not have been injured, for he had no right to the service of any particular juror on his panel").
This argument was advanced without success by respondents in several cases summarily reversed
by the Supreme Court in 1971. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 26, Adams v. Washington, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (reversed as to imposition of
death penalty and remanded for further proceedings) (arguing that "accused does not have a right
to a specific juror under Witherspoon"); Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 12, Ladetto v.
Massachusetts, 356 Mass. 541, 254 N.E.2d 415 (1969), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971). Although
necessarily discredited by Witherspoon, this contention continues to reappear. See, e.g., State v.
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The situation created by Witherspoon is unique because it requires
the courts for the first time to consider competing interests in weighing
a challenge to a venireman. The exclusion of any scrupled juror,
whether protected by Witherspoon or not, benefits a prosecutor seeking
the death penalty. Indeed, if the retention of "death-qualified" scrupled jurors were not detrimental to the state, and thus in the interest of
the defendant, a Witherspoon error would be inherently harmless. But
Witherspoon establishes that a defendant has a constitutionally protected interest in retaining some of those scrupled jurors. Because the
defendant's interest limits the extent to which the state can exclude
these "biased" jurors, a court after Witherspoon is required to ascertain,
not simply whether the juror is "scrupled" or "biased" at all, but
whether the juror's convictions fall on the side of the boundary between "protected" and "excessive" scruples where exclusion for cause
is permissible. Witherspoon thus does more than reduce the number of
jurors who can be excluded; it necessitates far greater precision in assessing a juror's views.
The constitutional requirement of unmistakable clarity means that
in a close or uncertain case the courts are obligated to err on the side of
denying the challenge. Witherspoon's substantive standards compel a
court to make a prediction about how a given juror will act at the penalty phase. This was once assumed to be a simple task, but Witherspoon teaches that that prediction in fact involves several very different
questions. Witherspoon forbids the exclusion of a juror unless what he
Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 688, 213 S.E.2d 280, 285 (1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 903 (1976). Similarly,
one court noted the that defendant was "asserting. . . the right to have on the jury some who may
be prejudiced in his favor." Tuberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962). Alleged trial court errors were regarded as inherently harmless, 303
F.2d at 420 (defendant does not contend "that the jury was prejudiced against him or that it was
not impartial"); United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir.) (defendant "suffers no prejudice
ifjurors, even without sufficient cause, are excused"), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954); Horton v.
United States, 15 App. D.C. 310, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1899) ("What the accused is entitled to is a trial by
an impartial jury. . . . Assuming. . . that error may have been committed in excluding the
three talesmen, what legitimate purpose would be subserved by reversing the judgment and remanding the case for trial before another impartial jury?"), or even as unappealable, State v.
Hing, 16 Nev. 307, 309-10 (1881); State v. Pritchard, 15 Nev. 74, 79 (1880); State v. Larkin, 11
Nev. 314, 325 (1876). During the 151 years before Witherspoon during which scrupled jurors were
excused for cause by American courts (the first reported decision excluding scrupled jurors is
United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868), and references to such
practices in an unreported 1817 New Hampshire trial can be found in Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536,
556 (1843)), there are only a handful of reported instances in which a death penalty was reversed
because of the improper exclusion of a venireman. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140, 143
(1857) (juror opposed capital punishment "on principle" and not because of any conscientious
scruple); Stratton v. State, 5 Colo. 276, 277-80 (1882) (jurors testified they would obey the law);
Smith v. State, 55 Miss. 410, 413-14 (1877) (jurors who "would not like for a man to be hung"
were excused without further inquiry); Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 391-95, 397 (1856) (juror
Norfleet testified he would obey the law).
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or she will do is "unmistakably clear," but does not and could not guarantee that it will in fact be feasible to make reliable predictions of this
sort about the conduct of particular jurors or about jurors in general.
Some kinds of prognostications simply are not possible: it is foreseeable that a thirsty man will drink, but it may not be possible to foretell
his choice of beverage. Whether what scrupled jurors will do will always, ordinarily, infrequently, or never be "unmistakably clear" is not
a legal but a practical question, a question of critical importance to the
meaning and administration of Witherspoon.
III.

Patterns of Juror Attitudes

A refusal to indulge in assumptions about the actual views of jurors toward the death penalty was central to the decision in Witherspoon. In particular, Witherspoon disapproved the presumption that
jurors opposed to capital punishment would never vote for that penalty
of their own volition, or obey the instructions of the trial judge to consider imposition of the death sentence. But Witherspoon's teaching is
not limited to that particular inference; it counsels against any apriori
judicial assumptions about the views of veniremen.
In the course of administering Witherspoon and of attempting to
ascertain how individual veniremen would vote at the penalty phase,
another assumption has emerged that today routinely shapes the conduct of voir dire and appellate disposition of Witherspoon claims: that
each and every juror has a clear, specific, comprehensive, and irrevocable set of standards regarding capital punishment. The responsibility
of the trial court in passing on a challenge for cause is thus thought to
be to unearth or detect those presumed standards. The fact that in
specific cases veniremen fail, indeed refuse, to articulate any such
standards is regarded simply as an obstacle the trial court must overcome in ascertaining the juror's actual position. Courts at times dismiss
49
this failure or refusal as being a result of a juror's inarticulateness.
Other opinions attribute this imprecision to shyness, a "reluctance of
lay persons to communicate their deep-seated opinions in a cogent and
emphatic manner."5 0 One juror who insisted she would make findings
based on the evidence was excused because an appellate court found
5
she would be "unconsciously deceptive."1
49. As one court put it, "[A] layman's responses are frequently imprecise and . . . a trial
judge must penetrate the verbal crust to decide whether the juror is truly able to consider the issue
ofpunishment." State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 247-48, 245 A.2d 20, 25 (1968), rev'dmem., 403 U.S.
946 (1971).
50. State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
51. May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 356 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (discussing Hovila v.
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A study of published post-Witherspoon voir dires, however, indicates that this assumption is unfounded. Just as courts may not assume
that a juror with conscientious scruples would never vote for the death
penalty, so too courts may not simply assume that jurors with reservations about capital punishment have specific views-or any views at
all-about when the death penalty should be imposed. Jurors often
decline to state unequivocally whether they would vote for the death
penalty, not because they do not know how to make such a statement
or because they suffer from some emotional disability, but because they
simply do not have an unequivocal position. Witherspoon does not
authorize or require trial courts to engage in some form of psychological or linguistic analysis to detect attitudes that do not exist, or to demand that a juror make an unambiguous statement that misrepresents
his or her ill-defined feelings. Recognition of the fact that scrupled
jurors often lack firm and clear views regarding the death penalty is
essential to the conduct of a meaningful voir dire and to the proper
application of Witherspoon itself.
A.

UndecidedJurors

1. The Problem of Indecison.-Many jurors respond to an apparently simple question regarding their position on the death penalty
by stating that they "do not know." When questioned about the death
penalty, veniremen assert that they do not know whether they are for or
s3
against it,52 whether they have conscientious scruples regarding it,
54
whether they would ever vote for it or are inclined to vote against it, 5
State, 562 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1135 (1979)), vacated,
454 U.S. 959 (1981).
52. E.g., State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722, 726 (La. 1977); Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass.
541, 542 n.1, 254 N.E.2d 415, 416 n.1 (1969),rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Patterson, 28
Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (juror Fedrick), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972);
Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598, 608 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (juror Cox), vacated, 428 U.S. 907
(1976). The differences between the most commonly used phrases, "I don't know," "I can't say,"
see, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 84, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 628 (1970) (juror
Rogers), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 443, 452 P.2d 232, 246
(1969) (en banc) (juror Fujii), rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971), and "I am not sure," see, e.g.,
People v. Vaughn, 41 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969)
(en banc); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968), rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 946
(1971); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (juror Barbour), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 988 (1977), may reflect some distinction in the depth of the jurors' indecision, but it is
nonetheless equivalent language for the purposes of the Witherspoon inquiry.
53. E.g., State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980) (juror Curbeam).
54. E.g., People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1090 n.15, 458 P.2d 479, 496 n.15, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 567, 584 n.15 (1969) (en banc); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Ky. 1980) (juror
Correll), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978) (en banc) (juror Fitzmorris), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Adams v. Washington, 76
Wash. 2d 650, 679, 458 P.2d 558, 575 (1969) (en banc) (jurorChapman), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947
(1971).
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whether they can conceive of a case in which they would vote for it,56
57
or whether their bias against it could be overcome in a proper case.
They cannot say if they have an open mind about the choice of penalty,58 if they would consider the full range of punishments provided by
the law, 59 if they would consider imposing the death penalty,60 if they
would hesitate or be unable to obey the law, or if they would refuse to
sign a death verdict if selected foreman. 61 Jurors asked about their
states of mind are unable to describe their ability to participate in a
capital case, to deal with the death penalty, or to live with themselves if

they voted for

it.62

Juror indecision is not limited to such general questions. Jurors
respond in the same way when asked if they could impose the death

penalty in some specific situation. 63 In response to inquiries suggesting
55. Eg., People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 413 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 125 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186,
189 n.3 (1969) (en banc) (juror Krokoski).
56. Eg., Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 247 (rex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (juror Ryan), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980).
57. E.g., May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 356 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane), vacated, 454 U.S.
959 (1981).
58. E.g., People v. Osuna, 70 Cal. 2d 759, 769, 452 P.2d 678, 683, 76 Cal. Rptr. 462, 467
(1969) (en bane) (seventh venireman).
59. Eg., Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (juror Johnson).
60. Eg., State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 291, 245 A.2d 181, 196 (1968) (juror Heyser), rev'd
merz. sub nom. Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135,
261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980) (juror Curbeam).
61. Eg., Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1981) (refuse to sign), aff'd inpart,
rev'din parton reh'g, 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406,
412, 455 P.2d 122, 125, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 (1969) (en banc) (juror McClarin) (unable to sign);
State v. Clark, 423 A.2d 1151, 1156 (R.I. 1980) (juror North) (hesitate to sign).
62. E.g., People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 55, 447 P.2d 925, 936, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 544
(1968) (en bane) (juror Fries) (deal with death penalty), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 857 (1969); Russell
v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (juror Kostelnik) ("I don't know
whether I could live with that ....
"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980); Franklin v. State, 606
S.W.2d 818, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane) (juror unable to describe participation), rev'don
reh'g, 606 S.W.2d 845 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
63. Eg., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 84, 83 Cal Rptr. 608, 628 (1970) (en
bane) (juror Rogers) (murder of ten women and children), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 125 n.3, 78 Cal Rptr. 186, 189 n.3 (1969) (en
bane) (juror Krokoski) (if evidence heavily against defendant); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607
S.W.2d 97, 103 (Ky. 1980) (juror Correll) (for AdolfHitler), cert. denied,450 U.S. 989 (1981); State
v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 291, 245 A.2d 181, 196 (1968) (juror Huber) (could impose for rape, but
uncertain about murder), rev'dmem sub nor. Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); May
v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (juror Schlusser) (employer of hired
killer), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (rex. Crim. App. 1978)
(en bane) (juror Fitzmorris) (murder during kidnapping or burglary), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (juror
Baca) (for specific defendant at issue: "I can't say-I haven't any-I don't know what to say
because he is too young for the death penalty").
In Texas, where an affirmative answer to three factual issues results in the automatic imposition of the death penalty, Tex. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1984),
jurors may not know whether their answers would be affected by that consequence, see Grijalva v.
State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 421-23 (rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en bane); Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857,
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that the death sentence would necessarily be imposed if the defendant
were convicted, veniremen often are uncertain whether they would refuse to find the defendant guilty. 64
The Witherspoon inquiry regarding whether a juror will consider
imposing the death penalty in a case calls for a prediction that depends,
in part but not exclusively, on the nature of the juror's present views
regarding capital punishment. 65 Whether what a juror will do will be
"unmistakably clear" is a practical, not a legal question. Some predictions about future human conduct can be made with a high degree of
certainty; in other areas experience teaches that "unmistakable clarity"
is impossible. Except in the most peculiar cases, a juror called upon to
fix the penalty in a capital case will not have a clear, rigid, and detailed
set of rules that can be applied in some mechanical way. If we asked
someone when he or she favored imposition of the death penalty, we
would think it quite peculiar if he or she answered without hesitation:
I would vote for the death penalty in each and every case of murder in the course of kidnapping, rape or armed robbery, murder
of a police officer, murder by a person serving a life term, murder
by a person previously convicted of murder, multiple murder, or
murder for66hire, but would vote against that penalty in every
other case.
We would think it even more strange if, in response to a request for
greater detail, the respondent rattled off definitions of the terms "kidnapping," "rape," "armed robbery," "police officer," and so on. Such
precision, we would reflect, may be found in statutes drafted by lawyers, but ordinary human beings just do not think this way.
A juror's decision about whether or not to impose the death penalty in a particular case, or at all, draws on a number of competing and
860, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (jurors McClay and Ball), cert. deniea 439 U.S. 903 (1978),
whether they could answer the questions fairly, see Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 574 n.l
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror Hamilton), truthfully, see Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d
318, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc), or according to the law and evidence, see Porter v.
State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror Rice), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
965 (1982), or whether they could ever answer all three questions "yes," see Williams v. State, 622
S.W.2d 116, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
64. See Commonwealth v. Mangum, 357 Mass. 76, 79 n.1, 256 N.E.2d 297, 299 n.1 (1970);
State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 166, 548 P.2d 442, 445-46 (1976) (juror Lopez); State v. Monk, 286
N.C. 509, 512-13, 212 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1975); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598, 606 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975) (juror Home), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); see also Watson v. State, 234 So. 2d 143, 144 n.l
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (jurors Stewart and Van Buskirk) (jurors unsure if they could convict
unless jury recommended mercy).
65. A juror noted that these questions seek such a prediction. See State v. Monk, 286 N.C.
509, 513, 212 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1975) ("I don't know how I would feel.").
66. Paraphrase of LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974). These are the circumstances
under which the death penalty was imposed by the statute held unconstitutional in Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 n.3 (1976).
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conflicting values. Jurors for that reason occasionally explain that they
have "mixed emotions" about capital punishment. 67 A venireman
must consider a wide range of questions that bear logically or emotionally on whether capital punishment is ever proper: How terrible a
sanction is the death penalty? How important is it to deter other crimes
by imposing the death penalty in this case? How important is it to
prevent other crimes by this defendant? Is the death sentence for a
murder like killing in self-defense? Is it like killing in a war? How
important is retribution and is any punishment other than death sufficient retribution for murder? What degree of possible error regarding
guilt is tolerable if a defendant is to be executed? Does it matter that
other comparable defendants may not have been sentenced to die, and,
if so, how much does it matter? How important are mercy and
forgiveness?
Virtually all jurors share certain values to some degree. The most
scrupled juror still cares about preventing and deterring other murdersthe most vengeful juror still does not want to execute the innocent.
There are undoubtedly other values that only some jurors would find
relevant. But in the final analysis, the juror, having listed and weighed
the relevant values, must choose among them. While it may be easy to
articulate concern with each of these conflicting values, the choice
among them, as one juror put it, is "kinder harder. '' 68 The simplest
way to assure that no innocent defendant is ever executed is to execute
no one; the best way to assure that murderers commit no further crimes
is to execute them all. The decision in any particular case will necessa69
rily involve a decision to protect certain values and to sacrifice others.
67. E.g., Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Duisen v. State, 441
S.W.2d 688, 689 nA (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (juror Beckman) ("mixed feelings"), vacated, 408 U.S.
935 (1972); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 260, 262 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.) (juror Conner)
("mixed emotions"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (juror Boyd) ("I don't believe in [capital punishment] in a way and in a way I do
believe in it."). One court correctly commented that "most honest and fair minded jurors have
mixed feelings on the subject." Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 128, 617 S.W.2d 347, 349 (1981).
68. Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala.
1977); see also Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("That is hard to say.").
Both cases involved jurors who, after stating that they were against capital punishment but in
favor of convicting the guilty, were asked how they would vote under a mandatory punishment
law.
69. Thus, veniremen favoring the death penalty might explain that it is necessary to deter
violent crime, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 131-35, 617 S.W.2d 347, 351 (1981) (juror Gifford); see Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, The Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing
the MarshallHypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 17 1, 176, or to work appropriate retribution, see id. at
176-77, while veniremen opposing capital punishment may emphasize the difficulty in being absolutely certain of the guilt and culpability of a defendant, see, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 607,
626 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (juror Martin would convict only if she witnessed the crime); Monserate v. State, 256 Ind. 623, 626, 271 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1971) (juror Dalton) ("[I]f I wasn't absolutely
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A juror also may have to choose between distaste for personal involvement in the application of the death penalty and a belief that it is justi70
fied in certain cases.
A juror's decision and a venireman's answers are made substantially more difficult because the judgments involve more than merely
the balancing of conflicting values. The applicability of those values to
a particular case, or to capital cases in general, depends upon a variety
of factual assumptions. A juror who attaches great importance to deterrence may nonetheless oppose capital punishment if he or she believes that executions do not deter crime. 7' A juror opposed to capital
punishment on the belief that it is imposed only on the poor72 might be
willing to impose it on a wealthy defendant. In the contemporary debates concerning capital punishment, disputes about such facts are at
73
least as common as arguments about the values that they implicate.
To ask a juror when he or she would impose the death penalty is
thus to ask, first, about the intensity of commitment to the various
moral and social values at stake; second, about a host of complex factual issues concerning both the criminal justice system and society as a
whole; and, third, for the creation and application of some form of
moral calculus to assess the net impact of these considerations. Human
beings do not ordinarily have tightly organized, internally consistent
ethical systems with a complete store of knowledge, or at least beliefs,
about the real world. Rather, any decision involves a complex array of
conflicting and evolving values, the importance and scope of which
often has not been thought through. The applicability of these values
to a particular situation depends upon facts about which there may well
and properly be uncertainty. Such values are seldom if ever quantified,
and moral judgments are not arrived at mathematically. Life's important decisions are matters of hunch, instinct, and gut reaction. Jurors
who could tell you with relative certainty that they care about human
life, deterrence, protecting the innocent, and punishing similar crimes
in similar ways may often be incapable of giving an answer of the same
sure, I wouldn't want to say yes."); Pierson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(en banc) ("I don't want to be the one that would do it, and then later find that I have made some
grievous error.").
70. See, e.g., Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ky. 1971) ("[I]f I actually
found ... the facts that justified the death penalty I would hate to have to vote for it, yet I would
know I should not vote against it.").
71. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 855 n.8, 457 P.2d 575, 583 n.8, 79 Cal. Rptr.
743, 751 n.8 (1969) (juror Gaines).
72. See, e.g., State v. Aiken, 72 Wash. 2d 306, 350, 434 P.2d 10, 38 (1967) (en banc), rev'd
mem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
73. See, e.g., H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 120-230 (2d ed. 1968) (arguments
for and against death penalty).
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quality about the net impact of these and other values on the application of the death penalty. In short, it will often, if not ordinarily, be
impossible for a scrupled juror to make "unmistakably clear" when he
or she would and would not vote for a verdict of death. 74 As one juror
asked rhetorically, in a question that goes to the heart of current
Witherspoon practices, "[H]ow can anybody know for sure... ?-75
A venireman's decision about whether he or she would ever vote
for the death penalty would be difficult, even were he or she to reflect
on the problem at length. But few people have ever thought about how
they would act as jurors. Many individuals, though not all, 7 6 have
given some consideration to the wisdom and propriety of the death
penalty. As one juror put it, however, "[I]t's different. . . discussing
77
capital punishment and sending someone to the electric chair." Jurors naturally explain their indecision by noting that the issue of
whether they would ever vote for the death penalty presents a problem
that is new as well as difficult. 78 Undecided jurors,7 9 as well as jurors
who have arrived at a tentative position, 80 at times report having con74. Long before Witherspoon, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed, "It would
be difficult, indeed, if not impossible for one-without bias or prejudice in respect of the penalty-to explain in advance of the hearing just what circumstances would induce him to recommend or to insist upon the recommendation of clemency.
...
Funk v. United States, 16 App.
D.C. 478, 489 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 179 U.S. 683 (1900). It is not necessarily easier for a juror
strongly opposed to the death penalty to determine whether he or she would ever vote for the
death penalty than it is for a juror with more moderate reservations to ascertain when he or she
would do so.
75. Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 422 (rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc). The court
responded, "Nobody probably can know for sure." Id
76. See, e.g., Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 398 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) ("I never
thought about it before.").
77. McCorquodalev. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 424 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (jurorWoodlief),affd
in part, rev'd in part, 705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.), affd in part, rep'din parton reh g, 721 F.2d 1493
(11th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
78. E.g., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (juror Boone) ("Well,
since I have never been faced with that before, I could not say definitely 'yes' or 'no,' so I could
not really answer."), a]7'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v. Vaughn, 41 Cal. 2d 406, 413 n.3,
455 P.2d 122, 125 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 n.3 (1969) (en banc) (juror Krokoski) ("I don't know.
I have never been put in that position, and I am not sure that I could make a truthful answer to
that."); Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 70, 243 S.E.2d 510, 515 (1978) ("I have never been posed with
that question. I don't know yet."); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (juror
Schnell) (unsure of how he would vote, "never having before been confronted with the question"),
rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(juror Mize) ("It has never been brought down to that before ....").
79. See, e.g., Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 421 (rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) (juror
who had "studied on it pretty hard since Monday" still "not positive" he could answer the Texas
questions without being affected by the death penalty); State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 679, 458
P.2d 558, 575 (1969) (en banc) ("Well, I have been fighting with myself all weekend. I don't know
if I could hang anybody, to be honest."), rev'dmerz, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
80. See, e.g., State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 438, 452 P.2d 232, 242 (1969) (en banc) (juror
Murayama) (initially indicated no opposition to death penalty, but after "[t]hinking about it
more" was opposed), rev'dmen., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
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sidered the matter since being summoned as jurors. 81 Questioning oc82
casionally reveals a juror still in the process of evolving an answer.
Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel alike recognize that the novelty of the question is often behind a juror's inability to respond in a
83
definitive manner.

Witherspoon is founded on a recognition of the distinction between
whether a person would vote as a legislator to repeal capital punishment and whether he or she would as a juror automatically refuse to
impose the death penalty. Just as one cannot assume that these issues
are the same, so too one may not assume that a juror who has a "policy" position on the death penalty has even considered how he or she
would vote as a juror in a capital case.
When jurors assert that they "don't know" the answer to questions
about their views on capital punishment, they do not mean that there is
an answer--one that the trial court may be able to figure out-but
which (like the weight of the bailiff) may be unknown to them. What
jurors are saying is that no answer exists. Jurors account for their inability to answer these questions by explaining, in the words of one
venireman, that they "haven't really come to any decision." 84 Pressed
81. See, e.g., Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 97,465 P.2d 133, 144 (Collins, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (juror Morris) ('This is a question I have been battling since I came into
the courtroom. It is not something that I really knew, whether I did or didn't [have conscientious
scruples]."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970).
82. One juror, who on the first day of voir dire stated that he could vote for the death penalty, testified on the second day:
I have given the matter more thought. I had never thought about it as being a personal
responsibility in this case. I seem to be going the other way today. Up to this point I had
never thought I was against capital punishment, but for some reason I tend to be drifting
that way.
People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1170, 1178, 459 P.2d 259, 264, 81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 10 (1969) (en
banc). The problem of veniremen who change their stated positions during questioning is discussed infra at notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1090 n.15, 458 P.2d 479, 496 n.15, 80
Cal. Rptr. 567, 584 n.15 (1969) (en banc) (prosecutor) ("I realize that this has been sort of sprung
on you unexpectedly today when you came to jury duty this morning, and I am sure this was
probably the last thing you thought you would probably be faced with.
...
); Jackson v. State,
366 So. 2d 752, 755 n.2 (Fla. 1978) (defense counsel) ("I know we're asking people questions about
what they would do in hypothetical situations that nobody has ever been in before."), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en
banc) (trial judge) ("He's asked you two or three times, lady. I know it's new to you, but can you
do itor can't you do it?"); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (trial judge)
("I realize the difficulty of your position.... So you have never been asked that question
before."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
84. Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 542 n.1, 254 N.E.2d 415, 416 n.1 (1969) (juror
Stapleton), rev'dmenL, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); see also People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1090
n.15, 458 P.2d 479, 496 n.15, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 584 n.15 (1969) (en bane) ("I am not fully decided
yet."); id. ("I just can't make up my mind on it."); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 103
(Ky. 1980) ("I would be undecided.
...
), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Mangum, 357 Mass. 76, 79 n.1, 256 N.E.2d 297, 299 n.1 (1970) ("Well, that's 50-50-I'm undecided in my mind .. ").
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to respond to Witherspoon questions, which force them to choose between a number of important but conflicting values, jurors may request
an opportunity to consider the matter further, remarking, for example,
"I would have to think it over." 85 The problem is not necessarily
solved by a brief moment of reflection; veniremen understandably describe the question as a "hard" one. 86 Thus, while jurors may have
some idea whether they would or would not ever impose the death pen87
alty, they often resist efforts to elicit a definitive statement.
2. The JudicialResponse to Indecision.-The first appeals involving undecided jurors of this kind arose only a few months after 88
Witherspoon. In State v. Mathis, a juror who was asked whether he
would be unable in any case to vote for the death penalty responded, "I
can't definitely say I could or I couldn't." 89 In State v. Forcella, a juror
testified that she was not sure she could send a man to his death for
murder.90 The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of
both jurors on the ground that Witherspoon implicitly required the ex85. State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 463, 212 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 904
(1976); see May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("I couldn't...
give you a yes or a no answer on that without studying it and thinking about it."), vacated, 454
U.S. 959 (1981); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246,261 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("I think I would have
to really think about it."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
86. E.g., Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Monserrate v. State, 256 Ind.
623, 626, 271 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1971); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 463, 212 S.E.2d 142, 144
(1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
87. Examples ofjurors who repeatedly and adamantly refused to give an answer other than
"I don't know" can be found in Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 260 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); see also Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 472 (Ala. Crim App. 1976)
(juror Boone) ("I could not say definitely 'yes' or 'no,' so I could not really answer."), af'd, 352
So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v. Vaughn, 41 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969) (en banc) ("I don't know whether I could go that far. . . I mean, I am
under oath, and I am not positive in my own mind."); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d
20, 26 (1968) ("I can't definitely say I could or I couldn't."), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1977); id. at
249, 245 A.2d at 26 ("There is some doubt in my mind."); Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 421
(rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) ("I cannot say that. . . for certain."); State v. Clark, 423 A.2d
1151, 1156 (R.I. 1981) ("See, this whole thing hassles my head, and it's hard for me to say yes
definitely ....
").
88. Three pre-Witherspoon opinions discuss whether undecided jurors should be excused
under state law; all concluded that they should. See Brewer v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 331, 332, 167
S.W.2d 747, 748 (1943); Sawyer v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 557, 560, 47 S.W. 650, 651 (1898) ("If the
juror himself on his voir dire leaves his qualification in doubt, the court cannot be certain that he
is a qualified juror.
...); Clore's Case, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 606, 615-16 (1851) ("The Court could
not know; and the juror himself. . . did not know [whether] the evidence. . . or his loyalty, or
the obligations of the oath to find according to evidence, would control or overcome the influence
of his conscientious scruples. Such being the state of the juror's mind, it was most proper to
[exclude him].").
89. 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
90. 52 N.J. 263, 291, 245 A.2d 181, 195 (1968), rev'dmenL sub nom. Funicello v. New Jersey,
403 U.S. 948 (1971).
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clusion of scrupled jurors unless their willingness to consider the death
penalty "appear[s] affirmatively."9 1 Certiorari was sought in Mathis
91. The State is entitled to a juror who is impartial, i e., one who is capable of considering whether the death sentence may be meet. Impartiality is a positive attribute. Its
presence must appear affirmatively. If a juror, acknowledging racial, religious, or ethnic
bias against an accused, is unable to say whether he could or could not judge the case on
the merits, he is not an impartialjuror. So here, the State is entitled to ajuror who can at
least assure the court that he will judge.
Mathis, 52 N.J. at 248, 245 A.2d at 26 (footnote omitted); see also Forcella, 52 N.J. at 291, 245
A.2d at 196 ("[T]he record would warrant a finding that the juror could not be found affirmatively
to be impartial, i.e., able to consider the issue of punishment.").
The lower court justifications of the Mathis rule were varied and not fully developed. See
Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1969) (quoting Mathis), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Mangum, 357 Mass. 76,79, 256 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1970) (citing Mathis); Ladetto
v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 545-46, 254 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1969) (citing Mathis), rev'dmem.,
403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 69-70, 269 A.2d 161, 168 (1970) (citing Aathis).
Several decisions insisted without explanation that the state was entitled to a jury composed only
of those who would testify that they could vote for the death penalty. See id. at 56,70, 269 A.2d at
168 ("IT]he State was entitled to more than a juror who is uncertain whether he could vote for the
death penalty."); Rowbotham v. State, 542 P.2d 610, 623 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), vacated, 428
U.S. 907 (1976); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598, 607 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), vacated,428 U.S. 907
(1976); Williams v. State, 542 P.2d 554, 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). A more extreme version of
this argument stressed that the impartiality of a juror could not be determined without a definitive
answer, see Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d
377, 381 (Fla. 1969), vacated,408 U.S. 941 (1972)), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1118 (1981); State v. Ross,
343 So. 2d 722, 726-27 (La. 1977), which apparently was critical because the juror's qualification
had to "appear affirmatively." Implicit in this contention was the assumption that every juror's
scruples were of some specific kind, and that his or her reticence prevented the court from measuring the extent of those scruples against the relevant legal standard.
A second line of reasoning asserted that a juror whose level of hostility to the death penalty
was so great that it prevented the juror from saying he or she could definitely vote for capital
punishment was biased as a matter of law. See e.g., Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 104
(Ky. 1980) (juror who "could not say" if he would vote for death penalty "could not be an impartial juror"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 143, 275 A.2d 721, 731
(1971) ("[A] venireman would not be impartial if he said he did not know whether he could ever
consider a life sentence."); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (juror "unable
to say whether he could or could not judge the case on the merits. . . is not an impartial juror"),
rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
A third explanation was that the mere existence of such indecision justified an inference of
unwillingness ever to vote for the death penalty. See State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 142, 275 A.2d
721,731 (1971) ("[A] trial court may find that a venireman cannot consider the death penalty even
though the venireman states no more than.., a doubt that he could."). The courts following
Mathis were divided in their views on why jurors were answering as they did; the majority acknowledged that jurors were "unable" to answer, see, e.g., Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97,
103 (Ky. 1980) (juror "could not say whether" he could vote for the death penalty), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 989 (1981); State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722, 726 (La. 1977) (juror "unable to answer the
questions"); State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 143, 275 A.2d 721, 731 (1971) (juror "unable to say that
he could consider the death penalty"), because they were undecided or uncertain, see, e.g., State v.
Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 143, 275 A.2d 721, 731 (1971) (juror "uncertain about his ability to consider
the death penalty"); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 70, 269 A.2d 161, 168 (1970) (juror equivocal
"probably because he had not resolved the matter in his own mind"); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598,
607 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (juror described as "uncertain," "undecided," and "unresolved as to
whether he could then assess the death penalty"), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Williams v. State
542 P.2d 554, 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (juror "did not know whether she could apply the
law"). But a minority insisted that at least some of these jurors were "unwilling" to answer, see,
e.g., Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Ky. 1980) (juror "will not give an assurance that
he is able" to vote for the death penalty), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); State v. Ross, 343 So.
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and three of its progeny. 92 The petitioner in Mathis attacked as an
"evasion of the plain command of Witherspoon" the New Jersey "rule
that a venireman must 'affirmatively' demonstrate his 'impartiality'
'93
concerning capital punishment.
The Supreme Court summarily reversed all four of these decisions. 94 The reason is apparent. Witherspoon requires that scrupled
jurors not be excused unless they make it "unmistakably clear" 95 that
they would never vote for the death penalty. But under the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Mathis, the opposite rule prevailed; jurors
whose views were not unmistakably clear were excluded. Each of the
proffered rationales for the state court's decision was manifestly inconsistent with Witherspoon. Mathis placed on the defendant the burden
of establishing a juror's qualifications, in clear violation of Witherspoon's direction that the state establish that disqualification is "unmistakably clear." In holding that scruples sufficient to render a juror
undecided constitute "partiality," Mathis established a substantive criterion broader than the Witherspoon standard, which holds that only
jurors irrevocably committed to voting against the death penalty may
be excused. 96 To the extent that Mathis sanctioned the inference of
such an irrevocable commitment from a juror's indecision, 97 it was
grounded on precisely the kind of assumption condemned by
Witherspoon.98
2d 722, 727 (La. 1977) (juror "unwilling to assure the court that he can be neutral with respect to
penalty"). One case implied that an answer existed but the jurors were hiding it. See Commonwealth v. Mangum, 357 Mass. 76, 79, 256 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1970) (juror "either unable or unwilling to state" whether she could vote for the death penalty).
92. Wilson v. Florida, 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971); Ladetto v.
Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 254 N.E.2d 415 (1969), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v.
Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), rev'dmem. srub nom. Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S.
948 (1971).
93. Supplemental Briefs in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Mathis v. New
Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971). Respondents defended the correctness of the Mlathis doctrine. Brief
of Respondent in Opposition at 8-9, Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). The correctness of that construction was the central issue in each of the three cases. In Wilson v. Florida,the
petitioner attacked the Florida practice of following Mathis, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
11 n.7, Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971), and the respondent relied on the decision in
Mathis, see Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 14, Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
94. Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971);
Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
95. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Despite these Supreme Court decisions, a
number of decisions since 1971 have applied the discredited Mathis doctrine. See, e.g., Brown v.
State, 381 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 1980) (citing Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1969),
vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), which in turn relied on Mathis), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981);
Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 103-04 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied,450 U.S. 989 (1981); State
v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722, 726-27 (La. 1977); Williams v. State, 542 P.2d 554, 570 (Okla. Crim. App.
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The importance of the existence of undecided jurors extends beyond the specific instances in which veniremen actually answer questions with the words "I don't know." There can be no doubt that the
number of jurors who in fact are unsure or undecided exceeds the
number who volunteer that information. There are only a handful of
reported cases in which veniremen were asked by the court or counsel
if they "did not know," and none in which they were told that "I am
not sure" was as acceptable a response as "yes" and "no." On the contrary, it is ordinarily clear to a juror that he or she is expected to give
such a definitive answer, especially because equivocal jurors are ordinarily grilled until they do so, or are instructed by the court that a definitive answer is required.99 When questions are framed to discover
the presence of undecided jurors, the practical impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis will increase substantially.
B.

UncertainJurors

Between jurors who "don't know" how they would vote on capital
punishment and those with crystal clear standards lies another group:
jurors who are prepared to offer a guess or opinion'about how they
would vote, but who are not and do not claim to be sure. 0 0 In the
reported cases in which the number of published juror voir dires is
large enough to provide a meaningful sample, about one-third of all
jurors gave answers in this category.'l0 But for the same reasons that
lead some jurors to insist that they don't know whether they would ever
impose the death sentence, none of these uncertain jurors can define
precisely the likelihood that they would do so. They answer, not with
mathematics, but in ordinary English, whose nuances and ambiguities
may be the glory of Milton and Shakespeare and the lifeblood of contract lawyers, but are often the bane of the judiciary.
1. The Problem of Uncertainty.-The language with which jurors
choose to express this uncertainty varies enormously, but certain terms
1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976). California applied the correct standard prior to 1971, see
People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1090-91, 458 P.2d 479, 496-97, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 584-85
(1969), and North Carolina has applied the correct standard since that time, see State v. Monk,
286 N.C. 509, 513, 212 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1975).
99. See infra notes 318-36 and accompanying text.
100. This problem was noted in Crump, Capital lurder: The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L.
Rev. 531, 542 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549, 565-69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (8 of 22 jurors),
vacated, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Brief for Petitioners at lb-18b, Quintana v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947
(1971) (9 of 13 jurors); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (6 of
17 jurors).
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recur with particular frequency. By far the most commonly used
phrases are "I think" I would never impose the death penalty (eightyseven reported opinions' 0 2 ), "I believe" I would never impose it (fiftysix published opinions 0 3), "I am afraid" I would never impose it
(twenty-two reported cases'°4), and "I feel" I would never impose it
(sixteen reported cases'0 5). A wide variety of other responses occur less
frequently. 106 These answers are given by jurors who ordinarily under102. E.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (per curiam) ("I think I do."); Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1981) ("I don't think"), affd in part, rev'd in part on
reh'g, 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 640, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (juror Harris) (1978) (en banc)
(Howard, J., dissenting); People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 379 n.2, 466 P.2d 961, 970 n.2, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 409, 418 n.2 (1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 912 (1972); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 415
n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969) ("I don't think"); Brown v. State, 381
So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 1980) ("I don't think"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981); Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321, 322 (juror Patterson), 323 (juror Morton) (Ky. 1971); State v. Mathis,
52 N.J. 238, 249, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (jurors North and Hughes), rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 946
(1971); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 209, 280 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1972) ("I think I could go
along with it."); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 125, 126, 127 (juror Tillman), 128, 130 (juror
Oligney) (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (Teague, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008
(1982); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 258 (juror Barton), 261 n.2 (juror Conner) (Tex. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 249-50, 257
S.E.2d 797, 802 (1979) (jurors Henry and Robinson), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1103 (1980). [Ed. Note:
A complete list of such cases as of the end of 1982 is on file with the Texas Law Review.1
103. E.g., Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1981) ("I don't believe"), affd in
part,rev'd in part on reh'g, 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1963) (en banc); Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F.
Supp. 947, 960 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (juror Varney), vacated 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc);
Swindler v. State, 247 Ark. 418, 430, 592 S.W.2d 91, 97 (1979), cert. deniea 449 U.S. 1057 (1980);
People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 379 n.2, 466 P.2d 961, 970 n.2, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 418 n.2 (1970),
cert. denied,406 U.S. 912 (1972); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 357 Mass. 559, 561, 259 N.E.2d
553, 556 (1970); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 891, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (juror Coffey) ("I
don't believe"); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 125, 126 (juror Tillman) (rex. Crim. App.
1981) (Teague, J., dissenting), cert. denied,455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d
834, 835 (rex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied,408 U.S. 940 (1972); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d
421, 438, 452 P.2d 232, 242 (1969) (juror Risvold), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971). [Ed. Note: A
complete list of such cases as of the end of 1982 is on file with the Texas Law Review.]
104. E.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (per curiam); Williams v. Maggio, 679
F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); Burns v. Estelle, 592
F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1979) (juror Mann), aff'd on reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc); Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 922 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (juror Hobbs), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29
(5th Cir. 1970); Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 474 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) ("I'm afraid I would"),
aff'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 785 n.16, 457 P.2d 841, 856
n.16, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 16 n.16 (1969) (en banc). [Ed. Note: A complete list of such cases as of the
end of 1982 is on file with the Texas Law Review.]
105. Eg., Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1979), affdon reh'g, 626 F.2d 396
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 379 n.2, 466 P.2d 961, 970 n.2, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 409, 418 n.2 (1970), cert. denied,406 U.S. 912 (1972); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 249, 245
A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (uror North), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d
116, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Teague, J., dissenting) (juror Tillman), cer. denied, 455 U.S.
1008 (1982); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981) (juror Becker) ("I really feel I could
not."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982). [Ed. Note: A complete list of such cases as of the end of
1982 is on file with the Texas Law Review.]
106. E.g., Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1979) (juror Mitchell) ("suppose"),
af/'donreh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane); Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131
(N.D. Miss. 1981) (juror Duffle) ("guess so"); Mason v. Balkcom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 560 (M.D. Ga.
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stand that the court wants a simple "yes" or "no" reply; undoubtedly
many jurors who are in fact uncertain choose to answer in misleadingly
unequivocal language because the judge clearly prefers such
language.107
All of these uncertain answers indicate that there is some chance
the juror would never vote for the death penalty, and in this regard
such responses differ from the entirely uninformative answers of undecided jurors. There are, however, a number of differences among responses of this type. Some uncertain answers merely describe in a
vague way the odds that the juror would never vote for capital punishment, ranging from "almost sure," "probably," "might," "possible,"
and "maybe" to "very unlikely." Another type of reply offers the
opinion of the juror that he or she would act in a particular way, but
stops short of a statement of certainty. Statements of this kind contain
terms such as "think," "believe," "feel," "reckon," "imagine," and
"doubt." A third category of responses indicates that a particular type
of conduct is possible, but does not assess its likelihood or predict that
it will occur. Thus, 'rm afraid" merely expresses concern that some
specified event may occur; the odds may be high ("I'm afraid the
Republicans will carry Kansas") or low ('m afraid the plane will
crash"). The phrases "I guess" and "I suppose" can represent an opinion based on some information ("I suppose it's too late for the Yankees
to make the playoffs") or can be an entirely whimsical prediction ("I
1980) ("reckon"), rev'd, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1260 (1983);
Woodards v. Cardwell, 303 F. Supp. 690, 694 (S.D. Ohio 1969) ("suppose"), affd, 430 F.2d 978
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971); Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 924 (N.D. Tex.
1969) (juror Speck) ("doubtful"), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970); Swindler v. State, 264 Ark.
107, 129, 569 S.W.2d 120, 132 (1978) (Howard, J., concurring) ("doubt"), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1057 (1980); People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 437, 606 P.2d 341, 348, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313
("most unlikely"), vacated,448 U.S. 903 (1980); People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1090 n.15,
458 P.2d 479, 496 n.15, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 584 n.15 (1969) (en bane) ("almost sure"); id. ("I doubt
very much"); People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 930, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1969)
("possibly"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Watson v. State, 234 So. 2d 143, 144 n.1 (Fla. 1970)
(juror Silverman) ("might"); Monserrate v. State, 256 Ind. 623, 627, 271 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1971)
("almost impossible"); State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 249, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (juror Hughes)
("might"),rev'dmenm, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); id. at 248, 245 A.2d at 26 ("not sure"); State v. Bayless,
48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 91, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1048 (1976) ("doubt"), vacated, 438 U.S. 911 (1979); State
v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1972) ("very improbable"); State v.
Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 210, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1972) ("I guess I would"); Washington v.
State, 568 P.2d 301, 306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("I think maybe it would"); Porter v. State, 623
S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane) (juror Vaughn) ("imagine" so), cert. denied,456
U.S. 965 (1982); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 131 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (Teague,
J., dissenting) (juror Oligney) ("probably"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Grijalva v. State,
614 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("might"); id. at 422 ("How can anyone know for
sure?"); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 158 (Wyo. 1981) ("perhaps"), cert. denied,455 U.S. 922
(1982).
107. There is no reported case in which jurors were told that "probably" or similar language
was as acceptable a reply as "yes" or "no." Were this to occur, the portion of jurors who are in
fact uncertain would undoubtedly be even higher than is now apparent.
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guess the next car we see will be a Ford"). Because of these differences,
a juror could use several qualifications in a single sentence. It is, for
example, not inconsistent to assert that a vote is "possible, but very
unlikely" or to say "I might, but it's doubtful."' 0 8 On the other hand,
an especially uncertain juror could use several qualifications, such as "I
think I probably could" or "I think maybe" I would. 0 9 The California
Supreme Court has pointed out that a "juror's conjectures as to her
possible future views and the juror's actual reaction on presentation of
the facts might not . . . coincid[e].""110
The meaning of "think" and "believe" is particularly important
because of the frequency with which these words are used. In ordinary
English, "think" and "believe" often refer to a conclusion based on
some, usually inconclusive, evidence."I "Think" may also refer to a
mere guess, but "believe" cannot. Thus it would be proper to say "I
think the Cowboys will win the toss of the coin," but not (unless the
game were fixed) "I believe the Cowboys will win the toss." That statements which are qualified by words like "think" and "believe" contain
no assertion of certainty is clear from the fact that it is not the least selfcontradictory to say, as jurors have, "I don't think so, but a fellow
never knows till the time comes."' "12 In the years immediately following Witherspoon, when the exclusion of undecided jurors was mistakenly thought to be permissible, conservative courts unhesitatingly and
correctly described an answer qualified with the words "I think" as
indicative of a degree of uncertainty.'' 3 Although "think" and "believe" do not entirely preclude the possibility that the speaker is certain, that is their normal implication: if a mathematician were asked
108. Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 924 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (juror Speck), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29
(5th Cir. 1970).
109. Id at 922 (juror Dunn) ("think. .. probably"); Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301, 306
(Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("think maybe").
110. People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 407-08, 455 P.2d 122, 125, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189
(1969); see also In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 863, 457 P.2d 565, 568, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1969)
(juror who "didn't think" she could impose death penalty expressed only "tentative doubts").
111.

WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974) defines the term "belief' as a "convic-

tion of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon [especially] when
based on the examination of evidence," but notes that a "belief' may "suggest mental acceptance
without directly implying certitude or certainty on the part of the believer." Id at 101. The
relevant definition of the term "think" is "to have as an opinion," or as an intention or expectation. Id at 1213.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Childs v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
113. See, e.g., State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 249, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968) (juror who testified "I
think I would be unable" and "I think I might be unable" to return a verdict of death excused
under rule regarding undecided jurors), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d
598, 607-08 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (jurors Johnson and Bowers, who testified they did not
"think" they could assess the death penalty, excused because "undecided," "uncertain," and "unresolved" on the subject), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).
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whether one plus one equals two, we would fimd it very peculiar if he or
she responded, "I think so."
The significance of these words is confirmed by the responses of
jurors who, after initially qualifying their answers in this manner, are
asked to explain what they mean. In a number of instances, jurors told
to elaborate on such answers indicate that they could impose or would
consider imposing the death penalty. 1 4 In one Indiana case the following exchange occurred:
Q. Do you, sir, have any conscientious opinion that would preclude you from affixing a death penalty in a proper case?
A. I am afraid it would.
Q. Under any circumstances, you would not do it?
A. Maybe in some circumstances, . . but I'm very doubtful.
Q.

[Clan you concede [sic] any circumstances under which you
might be sitting as a juror, vote for and affix a death
penalty?
A. If I was absolutely certain of the evidence . . . if I wasn't
absolutely sure, I wouldn't want to say yes.
Q.

[I]s there a possibility, upon hearing the proper facts and circumstances, that you might affix a death penalty?
A. I suppose in some cases, maybe I could. Iti would
be very
5
hard for me, though, to make that decision."
114. See, e.g., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 639-40, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1978); Fryrear v.
Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 32 1, 322 (Ky. 1971); see also Scott v. State, 434 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968) (juror who said he didn't "believe" he could take a life subsequently insisted "I
don't say that I wouldn't take another life if the cause granted"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925 (1969).
115. Monserrate v. State, 256 Ind. 623, 626-27, 271 N.E.2d 420, 422-23 (1971). A juror responded similarly in a recent Texas case:
Q. When you say I don't think, what are you telling me, you can't tell me positively
that you can; is that correct?
A. I know there is certain cases you read about them and they are hideous that you just
think, oh, the death penalty would be the only good outcome, but this particular
case, I don't know.
Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553
(1983); see also Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549, 566 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (juror did not "think"
she could agree to the death penalty; asked if she would refuse to convict under a mandatory
capital punishment law, she replied, "Well, I wouldn't want to go that far."), vacated, 408 U.S. 934
(1972). In other cases jurors asked to elaborate on qualified answers have explained that they
were not certain what they would do:
Q. [W]ould you turn down every case?
A. This is where-this is where I am not quite sure myself, because it would have to be
an individual case perhaps. I don't know.
People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 415 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969);
see also Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 755 n.2 (Fla. 1978) (juror who said she did not "think"
she could consider imposing the death sentence later explained she meant she was "pretty sure"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
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Often a qualified statement is contained in the same answer as a clear
acknowledgment of indecision:
I really don't think I could, due to the fact-maybe I don't need
to explain
it, but I just-I don't know, I just don't think I
6
could."1
This uncertainty appears to have its roots in the same problems that
7
explain the existence of undecided jurors.'
There is no reason to doubt that jurors who give such qualified
answers have in fact chosen their answers quite deliberately. Certainly
the insertion of words such as "think" and "believe" is of particular
importance
to jurors who answer other questions with a simple "yes" or
"no." 118 Jurors who once use such qualifications commonly continue
to do so if the question is repeated.", 9 They persist even when directed
by the trial judge to give a simple "yes" or "no" answer:
THE COURT: Well, you say. . . you don't think you could.
That leaves open to possibility that you could. We'd like to
know whether or not you have such a conviction in your
116. Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 247 (rex. Crim. App.) (juror Ryan), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1003 (1980); see also Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("I
don't know. I don't think I can do that."), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3553 (1983); Clark v. State, 264
Ark. 630, 640-41, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1978) ("Well, I don't know. I don't think I could"; "I
might ... I really don't know what I think. I might."); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 128
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("I imagine so; I don't know"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008
(1982); Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) ("Oh, I don't know.
I just-I don't think I could. I just don't think I could."), vacated, 453 U.S. 902 (1981).
117. See supra notes 52-87 and accompanying text. Jurors sometimes explain their indecision
as a result of ignorance of the law:
Q. [I]f the evidence proved to you the man was guilty of capital murder, you could
return such a verdict?
A. I don't think so.
Q.
A.

I want you to tell me what your feelings are ....
Well, I don't think I could. I don't know very much about it, so I don't think I
could.

Q. What do you mean when you say, "You don't think you could do it"?
A. Well, I just don't know very much about the laws.
Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 130 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1008 (1982).
118. One juror, for example, responded as follows:
Q. [W]ould you, as a juror, consider capital punishment as a possible alternative?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Are you morally and religiously opposed to capital punishment?
A. Yes.
Q. And you feel you couldn't bring back a sentence of-the death sentence under any
circumstances?
A. I don't think so.
State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 15-16 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
119. See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 188, 277 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1971) (juror
Funn), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972).
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mind that you absolutely would not or whether you could
consider depending upon all of the
circumstances?
20
A. I don't think I could consider it.'
In one case, after a juror stated she "believed" she never would impose
the death penalty but was not sure she might not in some case, the
prosecutor accused her of inconsistency: "[Y]ou say that you never
would and then turn around and say that you might."' 121 The juror,

who had been picking her words more carefully than the prosecutor
realized, retorted, "I say I don't believe I ever would." 22 When jurors
insist on giving such answers, their own words are a far better guide to
their beliefs than the language of questions posed by the court or
23
prosecutor.
As intriguing as these answers themselves is the fact that in a substantial number of cases the judges and prosecutors couch their questions in similar language. Jurors are often asked, for example, not if
they would never vote for the death penalty, but if they "feel," "think,"
or "believe" that they would or "might" not do so.124 This formulation
120. People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 447 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 769 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 665 n.6
(1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972). The following exchange is another example of such
persistence:
Q. [A]re you stating unequivocally that you could never participate in a jury function
in such a manner that from your verdict ..
a man could be sentenced to die.
A. No, sir.
Q. You never could do so?
A. No, sir, I don't think so.
Q. You say you don't think so. You either can or you can't, Mr. Barton.
A. I don't think I can.
Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 258 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Roberts, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 935 (1977).
121. People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 415 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 127 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190
n.3 (1969).
122. Id (emphasis added).
123. One juror stated she was "doubtful" she could vote for the death penalty, and "afraid"
she could not. People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 492 n.8, 450 P.2d 553, 560 n.8, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161,
168 n.8 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972). When the court asked her, "And it is your feeling
at the present time ... under no circumstances in a proper case would you ever vote for that type
of punishment?," she answered, "Not the death penalty, no." Id
On appeal the California
Supreme Court commented,
[W]hen we examine Mrs. BonsaI's testimony in full context and setting of the voir dire
examination conducted up until the time she was excused, her frame of mind as to the
death penalty is brought clearly into focus. She stated that under no circumstances in a
proper case would she ever vote for the death penalty. We need not attempt to determine whether, upon considering the above seven italicized words in context, the first
three words--"under no circumstances"-dominate the next four.
Id. at 494, 450 P.2d at 562, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The italicized phrase thus analysed was not the
juror's testimony but the court's question; what the juror actually said was "no." Her general
assent to the court's inquiry is significantly less indicative of her views than the far less certain
words that the juror herself chose--"doubtfur' and "afraid"--to describe her state of mind.
124. E.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (per curiam) ("might"); Williams v.
Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("feel"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983);
McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("think"), affd in part,rev'din
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seems to reflect an intuitive understanding by those conducting the voir
dire of the level of uncertainty inherent in this area; questions are
hedged in this way in order to match the imprecision often present in
the juror's mind. It is noteworthy that in over fifty reported opinions in
which questions were framed in this way, there is not a single reported
instance in which a juror replied by insisting that he did not just "feel"
or "believe" he would never impose capital punishment, but was
25
certain. 1
2. The Judicial Response to Uncertainty.-The lower courts are
widely divided about how to deal with answers and questions phrased
in this way. Jurors who qualify their unwillingness to vote for the
death penalty with the words "I think," for example, are retained on
the jury in two states and the Fifth Circuit, but are removed in four
states.' 2 6 Similarly, jurors who use the phrase "I believe" are retained
in two states and the Fifth Circuit, but are excused in at least one
state. 27 A number of jurisdictions refuse to excuse jurors who qualify
part,705 F.2d 1553 (1lth Cir.), affdin part,rev'd inparton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1983)
(en banc); Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 923 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (juror Griflim) ("believe"),
rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970); Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)
(jurors Hobart and Brunson) ("feel"); People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 790, 457 P.2d 841, 860, 80
Cal. Rptr. 1, 20 (1969) (Burke, J., dissenting) ("might"); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 68,
282 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1972) ("feel"); Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301, 306 (Okla. Crim. App.
1977) ("think"); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ("think");
Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) ("believe"), vacated 408 U.S. 934
(1972). [Ed. Note: A more complete list is on file with the Texas Law Review.]
125. If one were to ask a mathematician whether he or she "felt" or "believed" that one plus
one equals two, it would not be surprising if he or she insisted that he or she was positive.
126. Such jurors are retained in California, see People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 843, 608
P.2d 689, 704, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 616, vacated, 449 U.S. 810 (1980); In re Hiliery, 71 Cal. 2d 857,
863, 457 P.2d 565, 570, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1969), in Wyoming, see Hopkinson v. State, 632
P.2d 79, 159-60 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982), and in the Fifth Circuit, see
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1636 (1982). These
jurors are removed in Texas, see White v. State, 523 S.W.2d 104, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(impartiality standard regarding guilt determination), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977), in Ohio,
see State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 267 N.E.2d 806, 808 (1971), in Missouri, see State v.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied,454 U.S. 933 (1981), and in North Carolina,
see State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 137, 261 S.E.2d 803, 810 (1980).
This situation is far from stable, however. California once rejected such jurors, see People v.
Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 380, 466 P.2d 961, 971, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 419 (1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
912 (1972), while Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio once accepted them, see State v. Pruitt, 479
S.W.2d 785, 792 (Mo. 1972); State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 325, 218 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1975); State
v. Watson, 20 Ohio App. 2d 115, 127-28, 252 N.E.2d 305, 315-16 (1969).
127. See Burns v. Estelie, 626 F.2d 396, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (retained); People v.
Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 843, 608 P.2d 689, 703-04, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 617 (retained), vacated
449 U.S. 810 (1980); Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 594, 277 S.E.2d 505, 509 (1981) (retained);
State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 137, 261 S.E.2d 803, 810 (1980) (excused); see also Swindler v. State,
264 Ark. 107, 129-30, 569 S.W.2d 120, 131-32 (1978) (Howard, J., concurring) (retained), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1057 (1980); Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc)
(juror Hawk, "who did not 'believe' she could answer the statutory questions 'yes,"' could not be
excused under Witherspoon), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 903 (1978).
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"probably," "afraid," "feel," "might," "guess," and
their answers with
"most likely"; 28 in other jurisdictions the dismissal of such jurors is
upheld without comment. 129 These divisions stem in part from a failure to recognize that a juror who qualifies his or her answer with a
phrase such as "I think" is not a rare exception speaking in some eccentric manner, but a member of a large group of jurors who refuse to give
unqualified answers. In one of the more bizarre developments in
American constitutional law, whether capital defendants will quite literally live or die now depends on a semantic dispute about the meaning
13 0
of a handful of everyday expressions.
Existing Supreme Court decisions indicate clearly that jurors cannot be excluded if they testify that there is a chance they will not vote
for the death penalty, but fail to state that their refusal is certain. Footnote nine in Witherspoon permits the exclusion of a juror only if he
"states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment."' t3 1 The Court reiterated this requirement in Maxwell v. Bishop'3 2 and Boulden v. Holman.t'3 If an

ambiguous statement of automatic opposition is insufficient ground for
exclusion, it follows a fortiori that a clear statement of a less than certain opposition cannot provide grounds for excluding a juror. If a juror
is not certain of his or her position, there is simply no way that a court
can be certain. Similarly, if a question is hedged in such uncertain language, even the most unambiguous answer is insufficient to excuse the
juror under Witherspoon.'3 4 In Maxwell v. Bishop, a juror who was
128. See, e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1981) ("feel"), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1636 (1982); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 843, 608 P.2d 689, 703-04, 163 Cal. Rptr.
601, 617 (1980) ("feel"; "afraid"; "guess"), vacated, 449 U.S. 810 (1980); People v. Velasquez, 26
Cal. 3d 425, 440, 606 P.2d 341, 350, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 315 (1980) ("most likely"), vacated, 448
U.S. 903 (1980); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 416, 455 P.2d 122, 125-28, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186,
189-92 (1969) ("afraid"); People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 56, 447 P.2d 925, 936, 73 Cal. Rptr.
533, 544 (1968) ("probably"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 857 (1969); State v. Pruitt, 479 S.W.2d 785, 792
(Mo. 1972) ("afraid"; "might"). But see Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 176, 173 S.E.2d 186, 191
(1970) (exclusion on basis of juror's "feelings"), vacated, 408 U.S. 936 (1972).
129. See cases cited supra notes 102-05.
130. On August 10, 1982, Frank Coppola was executed by the State of Virginia following the
imposition of the death penalty by a jury chosen in a manner that would have been reversible
error in California, Wyoming, and Georgia. See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 250,
257 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980). Compare cases cited note 145 with
cases cited notes 126-27.
131. 391 U.S. at 516 n.9 (emphasis added).
132. 398 U.S. 262, 265 (1970).
133. 394 U.S. 478, 483 (1969).
134. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264 (1970) (question qualified by the word
"might"); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1981) (question qualified by the term
"feel"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1636 (1982); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 842-43, 608 P.2d
689, 703-04, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-17, vacated, 449 U.S. 810 (1980); In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857,
863, 457 P.2d 565, 570, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 737-38 (1969).
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asked if his scruples "might prevent [him] from returning such a verdict?" answered "I think I do."1 35 The Supreme Court, emphasizing
the words "might" and "think," found this exchange inadequate on its
136
face to disqualify the juror under Witherspoon.
The lower court decisions sustaining the dismissal of uncertain jurors do so on grounds clearly inconsistent with Witherspoon. Several
decisions hold that such jurors may be excused because their willingness to impose the death penalty is "doubtful."'' 37 This is the same
rationale that was used to bar undecided jurors in Mathis and was sub-

sequently condemned by the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision.' 38 Other opinions permit the excusal of jurors despite the
acknowledged existence of some uncertainty as to how they would
vote. 39 This is clearly contrary to Witherspoon's requirements of unmistakable clarity and unambiguous testimony.' 40 A third approach
holds that courts need not accept a venireman's statement as binding
evidence of his views, but may infer that a juror is certain to refuse to
vote for the death penalty from a statement that he or she might do
135. 398 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. In State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 267 N.E.2d 806, 808 (1971), the Ohio court
cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 n.6
(1969) (juror Hundley), for the proposition that the term "think" was a sufficient basis upon which
to excuse a juror. The Court's later decision in Maxwell demonstrates otherwise. 398 U.S. at 26465. In Witherspoon itself, the Court cited as an example of a voir dire that failed to demonstrate
irrevocable opposition to the death penalty a very similar case in which a juror, asked if his views
"would or might preclude you from rendering a verdict of guilty where the punishment for the
offense would be death?," replied "I think they are." 391 U.S. at 515, n.9 (citing Rhea v. State, 63
Neb. 461, 466-68, 88 N.W. 789, 790 (1894)). In seven of the cases summarily reversed by the
Court in 1971, the petitioners complained of the exclusion of such uncertain jurors. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 31, Childs v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) ("I don't think so"); Brief
for Petitioner at 5, 8, 15, Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (jurors White and Palermo) ("believe"); Memorandum in Support of Claim of Jurisdiction at 16, Pemberton v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 947
(1971) ("think", "believe"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Quintana v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947
(1971) ("think"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Segura v. Patterson, 403 U.S. 946 (1971)
("think"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Whan v. Texas, 403 U.S. 946 (197 1) (juror McCombie) ("think"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-20, Wilson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 947 (1971)
("might," "believe," "think").
137. E.g., Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 357 ('ex. Crim. App. 1968).
138. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 98, 465 P.2d 133, 145 (Batjer, J., dissenting) ("Witherspoon does not require from the prospective juror a law-defying, rebellious attitude, indicating
that he would never vote for the death penalty . . . . Apparently eligibility for exclusion is a
matter of degree."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459,464,212 S.E.2d
142, 144 (1975) (excusal ofjuror proper since his answers were less "equivocal" than those in other
cases), vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 267 N.E.2d 806, 808
(1971) (statement using the word "think" is grounds for excusing juror although it "might be said
to imply some equivocation"); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383 n.2 (rex. Crim. App. 1972)
(juror properly excluded although answers were "not stated as clearly as might be desired" and
"the exact meaning of [the] venireman's answer cannot be ascertained with total accuracy from
the words of his answer alone").
140. 391 U.S. at 515 n.9, 522 n.21.
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so.141 This conclusion is not only unwarranted as a matter of fact, but
is also wholly at odds with Witherspoon's insistence that the excusal of
42
jurors may not be based on such casual inferences.'
Another group of lower court opinions seeks to circumvent the
problem of uncertainty by insisting that these anwers are really clear.
One court held, for example, that "I don't think so" is "common vernacular" for "no,"' 43 and other courts have suggested that jurors have
special ways of talking about the death penalty, and that "I don't think
so" is simply the way a shy venireman says "no." 14 A number of decisions insist that answers of this type communicate their substance in a
way that somehow transcends their literal meaning. 45 Each of these
arguments borders on the absurd. There is absolutely no reason to believe that jurors are speaking some kind of dialect, using special technical terms for capital voir dires, or engaging in a form of metaverbal
communication. Absent persuasive and explicit indications to the contrary, words used by jurors must be presumed to have their ordinary
meanings, and courts should presume that jurors mean what they say.
At best, these arguments suggest that words such as "think" and "believe" have two meanings, referring in some instances to a mere opin141. "[A] trial court may find that a venireman cannot consider the death penalty even though
the venireman states no more than a belief that he could not or a doubt that he could." State v.
Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 142, 275 A.2d 721, 731 (1971); see also Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 932, 939
(Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (jurors indicated "by implication if not fact" that they would not vote for
the death penalty).
142. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933
(198 1); see also Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 381 (rex. Crim. App. 1972) (interpreting juror's
use of the word "believe" to clearly mean that she would not impose death penalty).
144. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.) (en banc) (lay persons frequently reluctant "to communicate their deep-seated opinions in a cogent and emphatic manner"), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 933 (1981); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (answers qualified with "I think" and "I believe" were "only lacking in force"); State v. Aiken, 74 Wash. 2d 421,
428, 452 P.2d 232, 236 (1969) (jurors who said they did not "think" or "believe" they would vote
for the death penalty were merely "meek or modest"), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
145. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 754-55 (Fla. 1978) (where juror repeatedly
qualified her opposition to the death penalty with "I think" and at one point explained she meant
"pretty sure," the court found that "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she would vote
against death regardless of the facts presented or instructions given"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516, 526-27 (Tex. Crim. App.) (testimony of juror who did
not "believe" she would vote for the death penalty "makes it clear" she would never do so), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 207, 257 S.E.2d 784, 787-88
(1979) (juror who didn't "think" and "fear[ed]" she would not vote for capital punishment "revealed" a determination to vote against it in every case).
In some instances the meaning that these courts find to be "clear" is one that falls short of the
Witherspoon requirements. See, e.g., State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459,466, 212 S.E.2d 142, 146 (1975)
(answers "displayed an unequivocal reluctance to render a guilty verdict"), vacated, 428 U.S. 904
(1976); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 250, 257 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1979) (statements that
jurors did not "think" or "believe" they would vote for the death sentence "sufficient to communicate an unmistakably clear commitment against the death penalty"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103
(1980).
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ion and in others to certain knowledge. Were that the case, uncertain
jurors still could not be excused, for their answers would then be equivocal,1 4 6 and ambiguous answers cannot provide a constitutional basis
for excusing scrupled jurors. If the prosecution fails to elicit an answer
whose sole literal meaning meets the Witherspoon standards, it must
inquire further,1 4 7 rather than rely on some form of appellate exegesis.
When the prosecution fails to satisfy its Witherspoon burden, the courts
may not engage in speculation about how a juror would have responded to a further question that was never asked.148
C. Vacillating Jurors
The third major category of juror responses in capital voir dires
consists of veniremen who give different answers to the same or similar

questions.

49

The reported decisions contain transcripts of the testi-

mony of more than one hundred such jurors.150 Some jurors change
their answers only once or twice; others, under protracted questioning,

alter their positions as many as ten times.' 5 ' Appellate courts have
often recognized this problem when it occurs in a particular voir
dire; 52 those courts are undoubtedly more sensitive to the phenomenon
146. Answers hedged with phrases such as "I think" are occasionally described as "equivocal"
or "ambiguous." People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 841, 608 P.2d 689, 703-04, 163 Cal. Rptr.
601, 615, vacated,449 U.S. 810 (1980); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 16 (Mo.) (en banc) (Seller,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
147. "If the prosecutor does not get an unequivocal response, then he is not entitled to have
the venireman dismissed for cause." State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 16 (Mo.) (en banc) (Seller, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
Further questioning is not usually permitted once a juror gives a disqualifying answer. See
infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
148. That such speculation underlies lower court opinions is starkly illustrated by the assertion
in one case that "[i]f specifically asked, we have no doubt whatsoever that each juror would reply
that he could not, in view of his fixed opinion against capital punishment" vote for the death
penalty. Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 932, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978);see also Bums v. Estelle, 592
F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1979) (how juror would have answered question about impact of the
death penalty on her deliberations was "mere speculatio[n]"), a/Idon reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.

1980) (en bane).
149. At times, the questions are quite different, and the apparently conflicting answers are in
fact entirely consistent. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
150. See Appendix, infra p. 1079.
151. E.g., Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 125-28 (rex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (11 changes
in position), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 352-57 (rex. Crim.
App. 1981) (en banc) (nine changes in position), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981).
152. Eg., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 399 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Randall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("vacillating" responses), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553
(1983); Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 101, 617 S.W.2d 6, 10 ("contradictions"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1093 (1981); Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 314, 595 S.W.2d 934, 936 (juror "equivocated repeatedly"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980); Rowbotham v. State, 542 P.2d 610, 623 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975) (juror "vacillated"), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168, 175 (rex.
Crim. App. 1979) (juror "wavered in her position"), vacated, 453 U.S. 902 (1981); Matthews v.
State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) ("inconsistency" of answers), cert. denied, 408
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of vacillating jurors than to that of uncertain jurors because it is easier
to overlook or disregard the "probably" in "probably no" than to ignore conflicting responses to the same question. As with undecided
and uncertain jurors, the failure of the courts to understand the frequency with which vacillating jurors appear and to recognize the patterns of their vacillation has prevented the evolution of a coherent
account of why jurors act this way, or of a sensible judicial response to
the problem.
1. VacillationPatterns.-The phenomenon of vacillating jurors is
considerably more complex than that of undecided or uncertain jurors.
Vacillation involves not a single answer to a single question, but a pattern of answers to a number of questions. The questions may differ in
phrasing or even substance and may be intermingled with explanations
by court or counsel of the law or of relevant facts. The remarks of
counsel, although cast in the form of questions, are often thinly veiled
efforts to persuade a juror to adopt or to abandon a particular position.1 53 At the same time, the number and variety of answers convey
more information about the juror's thoughts than can usually be
gleaned from a simple "I don't know" or an "I think so." Vacillating
answers indicate a widespread and complex uncertainty on the part of
jurors that is analogous to the indecision apparent from the responses
given by uncertain or undecided jurors.
A rough outline of the patterns of vacillation can be seen in the
following table, which compares the initial and "final" answers of vacillating jurors described in reported decisions since Witherspoon. Approximately one-quarter of the jurors returned to their original answer,
and one-quarter shifted their response toward one more favorable to
the imposition of the death penalty. Half of the vacillating jurors gave
a "final" answer that indicated a greater degree of opposition to voting
for capital punishment than had their first statements.

U.S. 940 (1972); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 465,248 S.E.2d 135, 142 (1978) ("inconsistency" of responses), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
153. See infra notes 312-17 and accompanying text.
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VACILLATING JURORS 154
Responses to Inquiries as to When They Would Vote
for the Death Penalty
"Final" Answer
Don't
Know

Probably
Some
Cases

Some
Cases

Initial Answer

Never

Probably
Never

Never
Probably Never
Don't Know
Probably
Some Cases
Some Cases

12
13
13

3
10
3

1
2
1

4
2
0

8
3
1

2
10

5
4

0
3

0
0

0
3

This pattern is unavoidably misleading, however, because the jurors do
not choose which answers are their "last" answers. Jurors are not
asked to reflect on their various responses and give a final firm reply.
Rather, jurors switch their positions back and forth in response to questions by the court and counsel. Their most recent answer becomes their
"final" answer when the court stops the questioning and rules on the
55
challenge.'
The reason large numbers of jurors give vacillating responses is
apparent from another aspect of these voir dires. Of 107 jurors, 54 at
some point in their testimony indicated that they were uncertain of
their position by qualifying their response with the familiar terms
"think," "believe," and so on. Eight jurors remarked on at least one
occasion that they didn't know or were undecided. Thirty other jurors
stated at different points in their testimony both that they were uncertain and that they were undecided.1 56 Thus, 92 of the 107 vacillating
jurors (more than 85%) gave either uncertain or undecided answers, or
both. In the vast majority of cases, jurors who gave vacillating answers
154. This chart summarizes the cases in Appendix, infra p. 1079. The questions posed to
jurors are phrased in widely varying language and often differ in substance as well. For purposes
of conveying an overall picture of the pattern of responses, answers are grouped together
according to whether they indicate that a vote for or against the death penalty is likely or unlikely.
155. For a discussion of the legal significance of the "last" answer prior to the termination of
the voir dire, see infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text. The importance of when the court
ends the questioning is illustrated by the fact that, of the 12 jurors whose first and "last" statements were that they would never vote for the death penalty, 11 had asserted at some intervening
point that they definitely or probably would vote for the death penalty. See Appendix, infra p.
1079.
156. See Appendix, infra p. 1079.
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regarding the death penalty apparently did so because they had no firm

position on capital punishment.
It is hardly surprising that such uncertainty and indecision should
lead to vacillation. Of course, not all undecided or uncertain jurors
necessarily vacillate. Some jurors firmly insist, for example, that they
do not know how they will vote and decline to offer even the most
tentative guess. 157 Others cannot be persuaded to say anything except

that they "think" they would not vote for the death penalty.158 But the
same conflicting values that cause uncertainty and indecision can produce vacillating jurors, who are different because they are still in the
process of trying to decide where they stand. Vacillation is apparent
when the voir dire questions illuminate the thoughts of jurors caught in
the very process of attempting to make up their minds. They describe
themselves as "tossing that in my mind,"' 15 9 "trying to think,' 160 and

"fighting it out with myself.' 161 Occasionally they qualify an answer

by stating that it describes their views "right now"; 162 this suggests that
the answer represents only their latest, perhaps momentary view. Prosecutors unhappy with a juror's initial responses may urge the juror to
think more about the matter in the hope that the juror's next answer
63
will provide a basis for chalenge.'
157. Eg., Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 755 n.2 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979).
158. Eg., People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186,
190 n.3 (1969); see also State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 679, 458 P.2d 558, 575 (1969) ("I have
been fighting with myself all weekend."), rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
159. Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), affd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala.
1977).
160. Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 755 n.2 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
161. People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190
n.3 (1969); see also State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 679, 458 P.2d 558, 575 (1969) ("I have been
fighting with myself all weekend."), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
162. People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190
n.3 (1969); see also People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1969) ("[a]t the present time," "at this time"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); State v. Patterson,
28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (juror Fedrick) ("as the circumstances stand
now"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 937 (1972); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 126 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981) (en banc) ("now"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982). As one juror put it, "I would not vote
for the death penalty, is my feelings now.... I'm willing to listen to the evidence to see what-it
could be different, I don't know." Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(juror Vaughn) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982).
163. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc)
("Now, think about this a minute .... "), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); May v. State, 618
S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("We will take as long as you want."), vacated, 454 U.S. 959
(1981). In State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 282 N.E.2d 568 (1972), a juror said first that he
did not know how he would vote, and then that it was "very improbable" he would vote for the
death penalty. The trial judge, unwilling to accept either answer, instructed the juror: "I will
come back to your name. . . as I conclude the roll. I would like at that time to have from your
conscience a definite statement of whether you can remain and be called as a juror or you cannot." Id. at 69, 282 N.E.2d at 570. When the juror's name was later called, he stated, "I cannot."
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For jurors unsure of their position on capital punishment, it is as
natural to vacillate in the face of repeated questions as it is to answer "I
don't know" or to "guess" at some standard. A person naturally contemplates successively the variety of interests at stake and considers
their importance and applicability, especially when confronted with a
grave decision such as the sentence for a convicted murderer. The juror may lean first this way and then that according to the considerations in mind at any given moment. Differing answers are inevitable
when the decisionmaker's views are sampled at various times during
this process. There is no guarantee that a "final" or firm answer will
ever be reached.
Inconsistent answers are not limited to successive responses to repeated questions. If a juror's thoughts are proceeding rapidly, particularly when the juror is uncertain, contradictory answers may be offered
in reply to a single question. 164 Jurors commonly give a qualified uncertain answer and then back away from even that and assert that they
are undecided. 165 The number of jurors who vacillate in single answer,
however, is small compared to the total number of vacillating jurors.
Much vacillating occurs because of the critical differences between the
questions asked by prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges.
2 The Form of the Prosecution Inquiry.-Prosecutors naturally
seek to frame questions likely to elicit a disqualifying answer from a
scrupled juror; defense attorneys generally attempt to do the opposite.
Court questions in practice tend to favor the state, although it is impossible to say whether this result is intentional. There appears to be no
Id For a discussion of the requirement that undecided, uncertain, or vacillating jurors give a
"yes" or "no" answer, see infra notes 321-33 and accompanying text.
164. This occurs with some frequency. One Texas juror responded, "I guess if all the evidence
was there I could. Oh, I don't know. I just-I don't think I could." Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d
168, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), vacated, 453 U.S. 902 (1981). Another juror, asked if he would
impose the death penalty for a multiple murder, replied, "More or less, yes. I would say that Iwell, I will stick with no again." Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)
(juror Hunt), vacated, 408 U.S. 397 (1972).
165. See, e.g., People v. Osuna, 70 Cal. 2d 759, 769, 452 P.2d 678, 683, 76 Cal. Rptr. 462, 467
(1969) ("1 think I could go into [the penalty phase] with an open mind. I'm afraid what I feel-I
don't know."); Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 70, 243 S.E.2d 510, 515 (1978) ("I believe so. Yes, Sir. I
have never been posed with that question. I don't know yet."); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
455, 488, 248 S.E.2d 135, 154 (1978) ("I guess I possibly could then, I guess. I don't know."), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); see also Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
...
), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3553 (1983). Some of
banc) ("I don't know. I don't think I can.
these jurors revert in the same statement to their original position. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 264
Ark. 630, 641, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1978) (Howard, J., dissenting) ("I might. . . .I really don't
know what I think. I might."); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981) (en banc) ("Probably no, but I really don't know anything about the case. I don't know.
Probably no."); Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("I really don't think I
could. . . . I don't know-I just don't think I could."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980).
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coordinated litigation strategy at work. Lawyers and judges apparently
devise questions in a fairly ad hoc way; sometimes prosecutors inadvertently pose questions that work to the advantage of the defense, and
vice versa. Nonetheless, there are certain approaches that regularly
succeed in moving jurors' responses toward or away from opposition to
the death penalty, and these techniques are an important reason why so
many jurors give inconsistent answers.
The most frequently successful prosecution method for changing a
juror's answer to one that may result in disqualification is the use of an
inaccurate misleading question that frames the inquiry in such a way as
to falsely assert that the answer to it is necessarily the same as, or is
entailed by, an answer that the juror has previously given. The most
striking application of this device, in light of Witherspoon, is to mislead
jurors into thinking that a statement that they do not believe in capital
punishment is equivalent to a statement that they would never vote for
the death penalty:
Q. Do you have any conscientious scruples against the imposition of a death penalty?
A. I don't believe in the death penalty.
Q. You don't believe in the death penalty? By that I take it that
you could not find a death penalty in this case no matter
what the facts were, or in any case?

A. I wouldn't think so.166

Such a sequence of questions is generally used at the beginning of the
voir dire and frequently results in vacillation because answers thus obtained are unreliable. If these jurors are questioned further, they may
well give conflicting responses. 167
A similar approach is used to get an apparently firm answer from
a juror whose earlier replies have indicated some uncertainty:
Q. Can you conceive of a circumstance so bad . . . that you
would purposely vote for a death penalty... ?
A. I don't think so, no.
Q. Are you telling me that you just could not do that?

A. No, couldn't do

it.168

166. Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1971); see also State v. Pace, 80
N.M. 364, 366, 456 P.2d 197, 199 (1969) ("In other words"); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572,
575 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror Chase) ("then I assume"); Matthews v. State, 471
S.W.2d 834, 835 (rex. Crim. App. 1971) ("Do I understand from your answer" and "And do I
understand further, then"), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835, 841
(rex. Crim. App. 1968) ("Do you mean"), vacated, 408 U.S. 934 (1972).
167. This occurred in each of the cases cited supra note 166.
168. Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); see also McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 425
(N.D. Ga. 1981) ("You say"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 705 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir.), afj'd in part,
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The particular ingenuity of this kind of question is that it does not call
for an answer in which a qualification such as "think" or "believe"
could be inserted with the same meaning as in the first answer, but
instead forces the juror to assent to or disagree with the prosecutor's
description of the earlier statement. Here too, if further questioning is
permitted, jurors often revert to their earlier positions. The juror
quoted above, who was led to assert she "couldn't do it," remarked

only a few moments later, "I don't know, I don't think so. I just don't

know."' 169 Responses elicited in this way are manifestly unreliable; to
exclude a juror because of and immediately after 70 such an answer is
to act on the flimsiest of evidence 17 1 and in a manner manifestly inconsistent with Witherspoon's requirement of "unmistakable clarity."
Another technique used by prosecutors is to demand that the juror
rev'dinparton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 474
(Ala. Crim. App. 1976) ("You are saying"), afd,352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); Jackson v. State, 366
So. 2d 752,755 n.2 (Fla. 1978) ("And I glean from that"), cert. denied,444 U.S. 885 (1979); State v.
Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo. 1981) ("I'm understanding from you").
169. Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,440
U.S. 950 (1979); see also State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo. 1981) (juror who answered
"that's right" to question whether she had said she would never vote for the death penalty subsequently stated, "Well, I think I would think about it. But, I don't believe I could come to that
decision [for death].").
This technique can even be employed to reverse a juror's position:
Q. [Tihe fact that it is mandatory death or life, will that affect your, will that affect
you?
A. I don't think so, but may I comment?
Q. Yes, ma'am.
A. I really believe that if a person does something like this he or she should be punished severely but I don't feel that I could, I have a right to say that this person
should be killed.
Q. In other words. . . you are telling me that would affect probably your decision or
deliberations on issues of fact, is that what you are saying?
A. I suppose so.
Bums v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1979) (juror Mitchell), af/don reh'g, 626 F.2d 396
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). A similar result can be achieved by an ordinary leading question:
Q. Now, do you have any religious or moral or conscientious scruples against giving
somebody the death penalty in the proper case?
A. I would say yes.
Q. Yes. You couldn't give anybody the death penalty, could you?
A. No.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 487, 248 S.E.2d 135, 154 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979); see also Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 641,573 S.W.2d 622, 627-28 (1978) (juror led from "I
might" to "No"); People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 199, 449 P.2d 198, 217, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 281
(1969) (juror led from "I don't believe so" to opposition to the death penalty "[u]nder any circumstances"); Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752,755 (Fla. 1978) (jurorled from "I think" to "Yes"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979). Here too, answers obtained in this manner are likely to change under
further questioning. The jurors subsequently changed their positions in Smith, Durham, and
Jackson.
170. See, e.g., McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981), affdinpart,
rev'dinpart,705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.), afl'dinpart,rev'dinpartonreh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (llth Cir.
1983) (en banc); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 641, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627-28 (1978) (Howard, J.,
dissenting).
171. The problem of misleading and leading questions is discussed infra subpart IV(A)(4).
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give a simple "yes" or "no" response. This method is used to force an
undecided juror to take at least some position:
COURT: Do you have such convictions about the death penalty that. . . you would just not even consider it?
JUROR: I really, really don't know. Must I say yes or no right
now?
COURT: Yes, ma'am, I'm afraid I have to have an answer as to
your feelings on this ....
JUROR: I don't believe I would. 172I don't believe I would consider the death penalty.
When jurors are already giving contradictory answers, trial judges may
try to resolve the inconsistency in this way. 173 Unlike the misleading
questions approach, this technique is not used only by prosecutors. In
most cases it is the court, or the court in conjunction with the prosecutor, 17 4 that demands a "yes" or "no" answer. 17 5 In virtually every in172. State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135-36, 261 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1980); see also May v. State,
618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (juror told "[y]ou have to answer" changes from
"I really couldn't decide" to "I don't think I could"), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Exparte
Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror Hamilton) (juror told
she has to answer changes from "I don't know" to "I couldn't"); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464,
471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (juror who initially described himself as a "borderline thinker" finally
responds, after repeated questions, "Well, if it says a yes or not, I would have to say yes, I would
automatically vote against.
...), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); Granviel v. State, 552
S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (juror told "I am sorry to push you, but we need to know"
changes from undecided to statement she "couldn't" vote for death), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977). This technique is also employed to induce jurors to withdraw qualifications they placed in
their earlier answers:
Q. [N]o matter what the testimony was or the evidence was, is it true you could not
return the death penalty?
A. I don't think I could.
Q. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, that's equivocal.
Q. The word you're hung up on is "I don't think." Could you or couldn't you?
A. No, I couldn't.
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); see also
People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6 (1969)
(juror McRae) ("Well, we want to know now."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (juror Fulst) ("could you or couldn't
you?"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); Garcia v. State, 501 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Okla. Crim. App.
1972) ("Either you could or you couldn't.").
173. See, eg., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 318, 264 So. 2d 529, 542 (Crim. App.), rev'd,
288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971) ("Would your feeling against or your opposition to the death
penalty irrevocably compel you to vote against capital punishment. Would it or wouldn't it? One
time you said 'No,' and then you said 'Yes.' I have got to rule on it, and I don't know how to
rule."); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) ("You either can or you
can't."), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
174. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 318, 264 So. 2d 529, 542 (Crim. App.) (court),
rev'd, 288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759,
768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6 (1969) (court), cert.denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); State v. Avery,
299 N.C. 126, 135-36, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980) (court); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181,
187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); May v. State, 618
S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (court and prosecutor), vacated,454 U.S. 959 (1981);
Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (court), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 940
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stance, the effect of this apparently neutral inquiry is to produce a
response more favorable to the prosecution. It may even induce jurors
whose most recent statement was that they could vote for the death
penalty to say that they could not do so. 176 The replies elicited in this
manner, however, are inherently unreliable: in a significant number of
these cases the jurors revert to their earlier positions if further question177
ing is permitted.

Several less common prosecution techniques are also responsible
for juror vacillation. Scrupled jurors have been driven from any willingness to consider the death penalty by questions describing the execution to follow in an explicit or lurid manner. 7 8 Notwithstanding
(1972); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981) (court and prosecutor), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 922 (1982).
175. On several occasions, jurors have indicated they feel an obligation to give a "yes" or "no"
answer even though no question demanding a definite answer appears in the printed transcript.
Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (juror Grady); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W,2d
464,471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 988 (1980). The problems raised by in such
questions are discussed in greater detail infra notes 321-33 and accompanying text.
176. See Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981) (juror changes from "I
guess so" to "No, I don't believe I could" return a verdict that would result in capital punishment);
Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 389, 247 S.E.2d 45, 53 (Hill, J., dissenting) (juror who "guessed he
could give a person capital punishment under some circumstances" later says he "'would not give
it to anybody' under any conditions"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978).
177. See, eg., May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), vacated, 454
U.S. 959 (1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982); see also Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 389, 247 S.E.2d 45, 53 (Hill, J., dissenting) (juror who
said he "would not give [the death penalty] to anybody" says under further questioning that he
"could not say unequivocally that he would automatically vote against the penalty"), cert.denied,
439 U.S. 947 (1978).
When jurors are excused immediately after answering these sorts of questions, e.g., Irving v.
Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981); Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla.
1980); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), ce,!. denied, 408 U.S. 940
(1972), it is impossible to know what would have been revealed by further inquiries.
178. One prosecutor prefaced his voir dire with the following explanation: "I am going to be
asking the jury if they find this man guilty, I am going to ask them to put him in the electric chair
and turn the juice on him until he dies. The shock goes all through him." Clark v. State, 264 Ark.
630, 638, 573 S.W.2d 622, 626 (1978) (Howard, J., dissenting). This image was subsequently used
to change the position of an apparently qualified juror.
Q. You would not automatically vote against it.
A. No, sir.
Q.

I am going to be asking for the death penalty. In Arkansas the death penalty is
carried out by electrocution. Did you know that?
A. Yes, sir, I understand that.
Q. And they hook them up and juice goes all through them like that? Now, could you
voteA. No, sir, I can't.
Id at 642, 573 S.W.2d at 628. Under questioning by the trial judge, the juror subsequently indicated that she would be willing to consider "all the punishments." Id; see also Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (prosecution asks if juror could "return a verdict
that would require a defendant to be electrocuted"), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); Hill v.
State, 371 So. 2d 64, 67 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (prosecution asks jurors if they could "send [the
defendant] to the electric chair"); Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1969) (prosecutor
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Witherspoon's admonition that jurors are qualified if they would consider imposition of the death penalty in any case, prosecutors elicit
from apparently qualified jurors statements that they would not do so
in particular circumstances.1 79 One prosecutor satisfied with the most
recent answer of a vacillating juror admonished him to "stick by your
belief." 180
3. The Form of Defense Questioning.-The most common defense tactic for rehabilitating jurors is to turn their attention away from
the case at hand and toward cases in which the death penalty might
seem particularly appropriate. Sometimes defense counsel can change
a juror's answer merely by explaining that the question concerns
whether the juror would vote for death in any case, not just in the particular case to be tried.18 ' The same effect can be achieved by asking
the juror to imagine an especially heinous crime,' 8 2 or by asking about
asks juror if he could "vote for a verdict of guilty even though it might mean the electric chair"),
vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St. 2d 145, 150 n.1, 249 N.E.2d 897, 901 n.l
(1969) (repeated references to sentencing the defendant "to die in the electric chair"), vacated,408
U.S. 935 (1972); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (court asks jurors if
they could "assess the punishment at death in the electric chair"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
179. Eg., Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (jury Grady) (young defendant); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (murder of only a single victim); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 651, 258 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1979) ("in this case"). Whether a
juror would vote for the death penalty in a particular type of case is not the same question as
whether he or she would ever do so; the extent to which apparently contradictory answers are
answers to very different questions is discussed infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
180. Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
181. Occasionally, questions by the trial judge have the same effect:
THE COURT: I think you just stated that under no circumstances would [you] give
the death penalty. Sir,. . . can you think of any crime, that you would
give the death penalty? We are not asking you about this case,
whatever you know about this case. I am talking about any situation,
can you conceive of any situation in which you would give the death

penalty?
A. Yes, I would. In a situation different from this.
Id In Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (rex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979),
after a juror stated she did not "think" she could vote for death, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: In other words, you could not imagine a case where you could vote the
death penalty?
A. You see, all you people, you people are pushing me so-and, yes; you
could imagine such a case, but it would have to be some case.
Id. at 62. Obviously no inference as to whether a juror would vote for death in any case can be
drawn from his or her refusal to do so "in this case." See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying
text.
182. This approach is demonstrated by the following exchange:
THE COURT: Now, do you have any conscientious scruples which would
preclude you from voting for the death penalty in the
proper case?
A. Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [C]an you envision any case, regardless of how horrible
the facts may be, in which you coul[d] vote for the death
penalty?
A. It is possible, but very unlikely, sir.
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a particular hypothetical crime such as the killing of a baby.1 83 A related approach is to ask jurors if they would vote for the death penalty
if it were necessary to prevent the defendant from "kill[ing] some
more."' 84 This technique appears to hold particular promise for defendants, because, while some jurors may be irrevocably opposed to the
death penalty as a form of punishment, far fewer oppose killing in selfdefense. 185 Like the prosecution techniques, however, the effect of
these inquiries is not necessarily permanent; once their attention is diverted from such horrible cases, some of these jurors state once again
86
that they would never vote for the death sentence.'
Another defense approach is to ask jurors who indicate that they
would never vote for the death penalty if they nonetheless would "obey
the law."'1 87 This inquiry is suggested, if not mandated, by Witherspoon
itself, which declares opposition to the death penalty irrelevant if a ju[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

[There are some cases in your opinion that are of such a
nature that you could participate in voting for a death
penalty?
A. Possibly.
People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 930, 458 P.2d 67, 71-72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127-28 (1969), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); see also People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126
n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969) (evidence "heavily strong against the defendants"); State v.
Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 366, 456 P.2d 197, 199 (1969) ("regardless of how terrible the crime"); Tezeno
v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("no matter how horrible the facts").
183. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 729, 464 P.2d 64, 86, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 634-35
(1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, 62 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); see also Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 129 (rex.
Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (killing of an old woman), cert,. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); id. at 131
(fatal assault involving thousands of stabbings); Hughes v. State 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Crim.
App 1978) (en banc) (burglary-murder by unremorseful defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (killing of several women),
vacated, 408 U.S. 937 (1972). In other cases, questions of this type have failed to move jurors
from their level of opposition to the death penalty. See, e.g., People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 60102, 455 P.2d 776, 779, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 675 (1969) (middle class person hiring gunmen to rob
Brink's truck and kill guards; person killing President for $5 million), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971
(1972); Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Ky. 1980) (juror asked if he would impose
death penalty on Hitler), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981). One commentator has suggested that
such horrible cases would be sufficient to induce any juror to support capital punishment, see
Comment, Death Prone Jurors: The Disintegration of the Witherspoon Rule in Texas, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 288, 292 (1977) ("[A]ny competent defense attorney with an active imagination could,
if allowed, illustrate a crime so heinous that even the most staunch opponent of capital punishment would agree to consider the death penalty as punishment."), but that is clearly not the case.
184. Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 135, 617 S.W.2d 347, 352 (1981).
185. Jurors might be asked, for example, whether they would consider imposing the death
penalty on a convicted murderer who had killed at least one guard a year since he was sent to
prison, if they were convinced that the most stringent security measures would be insufficient to
prevent him from killing still more guards in the future.
186. E.g., Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, 62 (rex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935
(1977).
187. E.g., Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 54, 243 S.E.2d 496, 503 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466, 477 (La. 1981); Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 378
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ("do your duty as a citizen"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982).
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ror will nonetheless comply with and apply the law.18 8 Neither defense
counsel nor the courts, however, in practice offer jurors any explanation of what, if anything, the law requires of them, or of what lawabiding though scrupled jurors are supposed to do at the penalty phase
of a capital case. Nothing these jurors are ordinarily told suggests that
automatically voting against the death penalty will violate the instructions they are to receive. Thus, if they are questioned further, such

jurors may state, apparently oblivious to any inconsistency with their
pledge of obedience to the law, that they would not impose the death
18 9
sentence.
The third common method used to rehabilitate jurors is to ask
whether they would listen to and decide on the basis of the evidence
rather than vote automatically against the death penalty. 190 This approach appeals to the widely held view that a legal dispute should be
resolved, not according to biases and preconceptions, but on its merits.
Appeals to jurors to act on the basis of evidence are naturally coupled
with questions as to whether they would be "fair" or "objective," or
decide the appropriate sentence "honestly" and "truthfully."1 91 But a
188. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
189. See cases cited siupra note 187. In Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979), the juror had reservations about imposing
the death penalty when the killing was not premeditated. She appeared to understand that this
was not the legal rule and thus referred to her willingness to obey the law when asked whether she
would require some evidence of premeditation. Id. Despite the juror's insistence without exception that she would comply with the law, the court found that she "could not follow the law," id.
at 322, a holding from which Judge Roberts properly dissented, Id. at 332-33.
In these cases, as in other instances of vacillating jurors, the questions that jurors are answering are in fact quite different, and thus the answers are not necessarily inconsistent. Under
WMiherspoon, several kinds of questions appear relevant to whether a juror may constitutionally
be excluded. The interrelationship of these questions is discussed infra Part IV.
190. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 318, 264 So. 2d 529, 539 (Crim. App.), rev'd,
288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 639-40, 573 S.W.2d 622, 628-29
(1978) (en banc); Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc); Smith
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 488, 248 S.E.2d 135, 154 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
Repeated use of this question at times produces progressive shifts in a juror's position:
Q. [Prosecutor]... You couldn't give anybody the death penalty, could you?
A. No.
Q.

[Defense] . . . [C]ould you possibly vote for the death penalty in a certain case
depending on what the facts were, depending on what the evidence is in that particular case?
A. I guess possibly I could then, I guess. I don't know.
Q. Depending on what the facts are in any particular case... ?
A. Yes.
Id. at 488, 248 S.E.2d at 135; see also Clark v. State, 264 Ark. at 639-40, 573 S.W.2d at 627-28
(juror's answers evolve from "I don't know" to "I guess so"). One juror who initially said he
would decide the penalty based on the evidence and then said he could not vote for death returned
to his first position when asked if the latter statement meant he would refuse to do so "[r]egardless
of what the evidence showed." Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d at 116, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
191. E.g., Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("fair");
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juror will concentrate on these values only so long as the questioning
focuses on them. In many cases, subsequent interrogation that
refocuses the juror's concern on other issues results in yet another
1 92
change in position.
4. The JudicialResponse to Vacillation.-The most common approach of the appellate courts to a vacillating juror whose "final" statement was a refusal to vote for the death penalty in any case is to hold
that the answer represents the juror's true position. The statement
given by the juror immediately before being excused is characterized as
his or her "ultimate," "eventual," or "final" position.193 The published
transcripts of these cases, however, do not in any way suggest that the
answer upon which the appellate court relied actually represented a
resolution of the juror's vacillation. Instead, the final response is in
every case merely the last statement made before the trial court acted
and is indistinguishable in content or firmness from earlier inconsistent
remarks. Indeed, the appellate decisions rarely contain more than an
194
assertion that the answer on which exclusion is justified was "final."
Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) ("objective"); Vigneault
v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) ("truthfully"); Chambers v. State,
568 S.W.2d 313, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (Roberts, J.,dissenting) ("honestly"), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979).
192. E.g., Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
965 (1982); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 127 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (Teague, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied,455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 829 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
940 (1972); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 488, 248 S.E.2d 135, 154 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979).
193. Eg., Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 314, 595 S.W.2d 934, 936 ("final"), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 938 (1980); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 636, 573 S.W.2d 622, 625 (1978) (en banc) ("fmal");
Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 425, 549 S.W.2d 479, 486 (1977) (en bane) ("ultimate," "eventual");
People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 380, 466 P.2d 961, 971, 95 Cal. Rptr. 409, 419 (1970) (en bane)
("final"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 912 (1972); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 69-70, 269 N.E.2d 161, 168
(1970) ("ultimate"); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc)
("fially"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); see also McCorquodale v. Balkeom, 525 F. Supp.
408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (the "bottom line"), affidinpart,rev'dinpart,705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.),
a/f'd in part, rev'd in part on reh g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1lth Cir. 1983) (en bane); State v. Avery, 286
N.C. 459, 465, 212 S.E.2d 142, 146 (1975) (juror "clarified her position"), vacated, 428 U.S. 904
(1976); Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168, 175 (rex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (juror "reaffirmed
her position"), vacated, 453 U.S. 902 (1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981)
(juror "concluded"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
The practice of attaching conclusive importance to a juror's last answer was criticized by
Justice Teague in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 121 (rex. Crim.
App. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
194. In the one case which notes that the juror, while "slow to reach his conviction ... was
unbending in his resolve to vote against the death penalty," the actual voir dire shows precisely
the opposite. O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 471 (rex. Crim. App. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980). The juror initially described himself as a "borderline thinker" with
"mixed feelings" about capital punishment. In response to a leading question from the court, he
stated that, if forced to answer "yes or no," he "would have to say" he would always vote against
the death penalty. The juror was then asked three times if he would vote for the death penalty,
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Nothing approaching a "repudiation"1 95 of the juror's past answers appears in any of these cases. A rule that treats as controlling the last
words uttered by a juror immediately prior to the trial court's decision
is a rule that gives to the trial court an arbitrary power to exclude any
vacillating juror merely by acting on a challenge as soon as the desired
answer is obtained. 196 The arbitrariness of this approach is confirmed
by the fact that none of the courts applying it to dismiss jurors has ever
used it to reverse a trial court decision that excluded a juror whose socalled "final" answer was that he or she would consider the death
penalty.197
but would do no more than describe the answer he had previously given, an answer he repeatedly
noted was his response if a "yes" or "no" were required, and which he twice qualified with the
words "at the present time": "I believe I stated that--to make a direct answer, I would have to say
"no." "Well, I think I answered that at the present time with a yes or no answer, I said no."
'"Well, to get a direct answer at the present time, I said no." Id. at 471-72.
195. Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane) (Teague, J.,
dissenting) (final answer controlling only if juror "repudiate[s]" his or her prior statements), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
196. In one Arkansas case, the court continued to question a juror after she said, "I don't
know," then "I haven't made up my mind," and then "guess[ed]" she could consider the death
penalty; but as soon as she said "I don't think I could [consider it]" the judge excused her for
cause. Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 640, 573 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1978) (Howard, J., dissenting). In a
Texas case, after a juror had stated three times in a row that he would consider imposing the death
penalty, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Now, if you thought the facts justified it, could you assess the death
penalty in a proper case?
A. Your Honor
THE COURT: You either can or you can't.
A. All right, sir. Then I couldn't.
THE COURT: Get on out. He's disqualified. You are excused.
Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied,408 U.S. 940 (1972).
Summary dismissal of a vacillating juror as soon as he or she gives a disqualifying answer is
common. See, e.g., McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981), af'd in
part,rev'dinpart,705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.), afdin part, rev'dinparton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1lth
Cir. 1983) (en banc); Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 314, 268 S.W.2d 934, 936, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
938 (1980); People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1969),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); cf. Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 131, 617 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1981)
(juror who indicated he would vote automaticallyfor death held qualified as soon as he stated he
would consider voting for life).
197. One year after upholding the exclusion of a juror because her "final position," elicited by
the prosecutor, was a qualified refusal to impose the death sentence, Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312,
314, 595 S.W.2d 934, 936, cert. denied,449 U.S. 938 (1980), the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected
a defense argument "simply to take. . . the last answer given by a juror to counsel, whose questions have a partisan slant, as determinative and final." Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 101, 617
S.W.2d 6, 10, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which in
1972 and 1979 rejected jurors on the basis of their last answers, O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464,
471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); Tezeno v. State, 484
S.W.2d 374, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), upheld in 1978 the exclusion of a juror whose last answer
was "I just can't say" because "her earlier answer to questions left no doubt that she could not
vote to inflict the death penalty," Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(en banc) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979). In Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F.
Supp. 947 (M.D. Fla. 1981), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (lth Cir. 1983) (en bane), the court chose to
disregard a juror's last uncertain answer on the grounds that his first answer was clear. "[T]he
Magistrate.. . found the response ofjuror Varney to be ambiguous when he ultimately answered
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This disregard of qualifying final answers is related to a second
line of cases rejecting vacillating jurors. As one opinion explained:
While it is true that taken by themselves, the answers that
some of the jurors called to serve in defendant's trial seem to be
equivocal or contradictory, taken as a whole, the examination indicates opposition to the death penalty so strong that they could
not vote to impose it regardless of the evidence. 198
Other opinions, in an equally conclusory manner, reject vacillating jurors based on the "overall inquiry" or by viewing the jurors' testimony
"as a whole," "contextually," or "in its entirety." 199 Under this approach it is apparently irrelevant whether the answer relied upon occurred at the beginning, middle, or the end of the voir dire.2z° The
appellate court never explains how it decided which answer represented the juror's "real" position. The only common factual element in
these cases is that the answer asserted on appeal to represent the juror's
"true" feelings is in every reported decision the response leading to the
exclusion of the disputed juror.
The general failure of the courts to develop an objective and predictable standard results from more than an ad hoc practice of ruling
for the prosecution on every record. These decisions, like those concerning undecided and uncertain jurors, proceed on the assumption
that however much a juror may vacillate, he or she actually has a firm,
clear position that the courts must merely discover. Ordinarily the
courts do not bother to explain why a juror having such presumably
'I believe I would.' It must be noted, however, that Mr. Varney first gave an unqualified yes in
... Id. at 962 n.18.
answer to the question.
A 1980 Texas decision concluded that a juror was unqualified even though in her final response she agreed to answer the statutory questions concerning penalty "truthfully to the best of
[her] knowledge," explaining that the apparently innocuous qualifying words "to the best of her
knowledge" rendered her response "fairly useless for purposes of negating the import of her [earier] unequivocal admissions that her fact deliberations would be affected by the mandatory penalties." Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318, 326 (rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc). The court
found that this "qualification" left open the possibility that she would be "[un]consciously deceptive." Id The court in this case was applying the Texas exclusion rule subsequently disapproved
in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
198. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 324, 259 S.E.2d 510, 527 (1979) (emphasis added), ceri.
denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
199. E.g., Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 101, 617 S.W.2d 6, 10 ("overall inquiry"), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1093 (1981); People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 380, 466 P.2d 961, 971, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 419
(1970) ("as a whole"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 912 (1972); Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 70, 243 S.E.2d
510, 515 (1978) ("entirety"); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 324, 259 S.E.2d 510, 526 (1979) ("contextually"), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980); State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 689, 213 S.E.2d 280,
286 (1975) ("contextually"), vacated, 428 US. 903 (1976); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 651, 258
S.E.2d 559, 562 (1979) ("entirety").
200. See, e.g., Davis. v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 381-82, 247 S.E.2d 45, 49 (middle of voir dire), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978); id. at 389, 247 S.E.2d at 53 (Hill, J., dissenting) (middle of voir dire);
Chancy v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (beginning of voir dire); State v.
Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 650-51, 258 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1979) (end of voir dire).
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precise views-views plain enough for judges to discern-would give
inconsistent responses. One opinion suggested rather lamely that a
20 1
vacillating juror "encountered some difficulty formulating answers,"
as if to suggest that she had some kind of language problems. The
courts express no doubt that these jurors do indeed have a discoverable
position. 20 2 Even the appellate courts that find themselves unable to
ascertain such a position persist in the belief that it would be possible to
do so if only more (or better) questions had been asked:20 3 "Once we
determine the inconsistency can be resolved the issue is then one of
method. ' 20 4 Judges, focusing on the statements of one or two jurors,
proceed on the assumption that the question "Would you vote for the
death penalty?" is similar in kind to ordinary questions with which
they are more familiar, such as "Did you kill Smith?" or "Where were
you on the night of April 23, 1973?" But the Witherspoon inquiry is not
factual in nature; it seeks a prediction of future conduct. The overall
pattern of vacillating responses demonstrates that many jurors find this
kind of prediction impossible to make with any degree of certainty.
The current methods of determining the "true" position of a vacillating
juror do not work because the assumption on which they are basedthat "the inconsistency can be resolved"-is erroneous.
Vacillating jurors, in sum, have the same mixed and unresolved
feelings as undecided and uncertain jurors;20 5 under lengthy questioning, they simply manifest their indecision in a different manner. The
ability to elicit a momentary, apparently unequivocal response is a reflection only of the questioner's tactical skills; but the fleeting thought
captured in the court reporter's notes does not reliably establish the
juror's position. Veniremen who lack any firm position are by definition veniremen who do not have a firm commitment to vote against the
death penalty in all cases. Thus, under Witherspoon, they may not be
excluded from a jury.
201. State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 465, 212 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 904
(1976).
202. See Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash.2d 389, 416, 474 P.2d 557, 573 (1970) (Finley, J., dissenting) (critical issue is "[iln whom should discretion be vested to determine the juror's state of
mind").
203. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (case remanded with
instructions to conduct further voir dire "to clearly establish" the "beliefs and views" of the rejected jurors); Lamar v. State, 266 Ind. 689, 700, 366 N.E.2d 652, 658 (1977) (error of trial court in
respecting vacillating jurors was "its failure to pursue the matter further").
204. Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied,408 U.S. 940
(1972).
205. The only lower court opinion to analyze correctly this phenomenon is Judge Randall's
dissent in Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 399 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Randall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3553 (1983).
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A vacillating juror could conceivably announce that although undecided at the beginning of the hearing, he or she had resolved those
doubts and was now "certain" never to vote for the death penalty. Although there is no reported case in which this has occurred, the proper
handling of such a juror has important implications for the problem of
vacillating jurors. If a juror is sufficiently open-minded that he or she
enters the courthouse without a firm opposition to voting for the death
penalty, there is a significant possibility that any "firm opinion"
formed during the voir dire will change again, even though the juror
may at some intermediate point think it unlikely. The fact that a juror
has altered his or her position once during the voir dire is as persuasive
evidence that the position might change again as a statement by the
juror that such a change could occur. Thus, once veniremen have vacillated at all, they should be regarded as uncertain-and thus qualified
for jury duty--even if they subsequently indicate that (at least for the
time being) they are "sure" of a particular position.
The adoption of such a rule would significantly shorten and simplify the voir dire in capital cases. Once a venireman has vacillated, he
or she should be regarded as qualified under Witherspoon, and the
questioning should end.20 6 Further answers would be irrelevant, because nothing the juror could say would eliminate the uncertainty that
he or she had already demonstrated. Similarly, if a juror's first answer
is sufficient to qualify him or her under Witherspoon-whetherbecause
the juror is undecided or uncertain, or because he or she shows a willingness to consider the penalty of death-no further interrogation is
warranted. 20 7 Such a juror subjected to additional questioning would
either persist in giving a qualified answer, or change his or her position
and thereby qualify as a vacillating juror. On the other hand, the significant number of jurors who initially state that they would not vote
for the death penalty, but subsequently change their position, makes it
clear that a court should not summarily excuse a juror because of a
disqualifying initial answer.20 8 The court must instead conduct, or at
least permit, further interrogation in order to test the scope and firm206. This assumes, of course, that the juror has understood the questions posed. Jurors do
occasionally misunderstand a voir dire question. See, e.g., McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F.
Supp. 408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981), af'd inpart,rev'd inpart,705 F.2d 1553 (1 1th Cir.), af/dinpart,
rep'd in part on reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1I1th Cir. 1983) (en banc); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430,
448 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 770 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 666 n.6 (1969) (juror Freitag), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 972 (1972); People v. Bernette, 45 Ill.
2d 227, 232, 258 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1970), rep'd, 403 U.S.
947 (1971); Garcia v. State, 501 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
207. On this basis the first answer given by 75 of the 103 vacillating jurors in the Appendix
should have been deemed sufficient to end further questioning. See Appendix, infra p. 1079.
208. Of the 103 vacillating jurors in the Appendix, 28 initially stated that they would never
vote for the death penalty. See Appendix, infra p. 1079.
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ness of the juror's beliefs. 20 9
IV.

Framing Witherspoon Questions

The variety of jurors' responses to questions concerning their
views about the death penalty makes clear the complexity of the attitudes among which Witherspoon seeks to draw constitutionally significant distinctions. The same complexity that gives rise to these
difficulties in analyzing juror responses also bedevils the process of
framing the questions that jurors are to be asked. Deciding which
questions are permissible, relevant, necessary, and sufficient turns on
two kinds of considerations. The first concerns the requirements of
Witherspoon itself, which dictate the type and quality of information
that must be obtained about a venireman's views before he or she may
be excluded from a jury. The second is the pattern of actual juror responses, which is critical to understanding jurors' answers to various
sorts of questions.
The discussion that follows first considers the types of questions
that are and should be asked regarding a juror's attitude toward voting
for the death penalty, and the instructions and explanations necessary
to assure that the juror understands the required questions. This is followed by an analysis of the comparative roles of trial and appellate
courts in light of the practical and legal questions that arise in passing
on the qualifications of scrupled jurors.
A.

The Witherspoon Inquiry

Witherspoon and its progeny focus primarily on the question of
when a venireman's attitude toward the death penalty permits his or
her exclusion from the jury in a capital case. Many of the difficulties
encountered by the lower courts over the last fifteen years have their
roots in the language of Witherspoon itself. That decision, closely read,
209. The lower courts are sharply divided over the propriety of forbidding defense questions
once a juror has given a disqualifying answer. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 127, 617
S.W.2d 347, 349 (1981) (error to deny defense right "to fully and fairly question the prospective
jurors"); People v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 363, 455 P.2d 395, 399, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 471 (1969) (bar
to defense questions is within trial court discretion), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Geary v.
Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky. 1972) (bar to defense questions after jurors "had disqualified themselves" is within trial court discretion); State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 156, 217 S.E.2d
513, 520 (1975) (defense questions to jurors who are "irrevocably committed to vote against"
death is "a purposeless waste of valuable court time"), vacated, 428 U.S. 903 (1976); Bums v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 278 (rex. Crim. App.) (bar to defense questioning of jurors is error, but
harmless because jurors had stated they would not vote for death), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935
(1977); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (bar to defense questions not
"reversible error" "once a juror has shown without question that he is subject to the State's
challenge").
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does not identify a single issue or delineate a single question that is by
itself dispositive of a juror's fitness. Rather, in loose and somewhat
overlapping language, Witherspoon suggests three distinct determinations210 that must be made before a juror constitutionally may be
excluded:
(1) Whether a juror "would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence
that might be developed at the trial .... -211
(2) Whether a juror is "irrevocably committed, before the trial
[begins], to vote against the penalty of death"2 12 2and
1 3 thus "would
not even consider returning a verdict of death.
(3) Whether a juror can "obey the oath he takes as a juror. '2 14
Courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel2 15 have chosen at will to base
their questions on whichever of these criteria they prefer. Neither they
nor the appellate courts have given any apparent consideration to the
differences that exist among these standards, or to whether, in light of
the actual responses of scrupled veniremen, those differences are of
great, trivial, or varying importance.
The divergent language in the three Witherspoon passages quoted
above is not merely the result of a careless choice of words. It reflects
an intuitive understanding of the complexity of the process by which a
juror decides what penalty to impose in a capital case. These passages
correspond to three distinct ways in which scrupled jurors might arrive
at a decision to vote for the death penalty:
(1) A juror's personal standards regarding when, if ever, the
death penalty is appropriate may sanction its imposition in some
particular category of cases.
(2) Even if a juror's present personal standards preclude imposition of the death penalty in any case, his or her commitment to
210. All these standards are subject to the requirement that the evidence be unmistakably
clear. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
211. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 516 n.9 ("Unless a venireman
states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position.");
id. at 522 n.21 (juror not to be "irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against
the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of
the proceedings").
212. Id.
213. Id. at 520 (emphasis added); see id. at 515 n.9 (it cannot be assumed that a scrupled juror
"would not consider" voting for the death penalty).
214. Id. at 519; see id. at 515 n.9 (scrupled jurors are capable of making "their scruples subservient to their duty as jurors"); see also Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969) ("[I]t is

entirely possible that a juror who has a 'fixed opinion against' or who does not 'believe in' capital
punishment might nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing law.").
215. Apparently because these questions have a higher probability of eliciting a qualifying
answer, in most instances it is defense attorneys rather than prosecutors who ask jurors if they
would obey the law, or could consider imposing the death penalty.
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those standards, if a weak one, might later be modified in a way
that permits a vote for the death penalty. Jurors willing to consider such modifications cannot be said to be "irrevocably committed" to voting against a sentence of death.
(3) Despite an inalterable commitment to personal standards
that would not sanction the imposition of the death penalty, a
juror might be influenced by the oath and legal obligations of a
juror and thus be willing to apply a different standard under
which a verdict of death would be appropriate. In such circumstances the juror could vote for the death penalty although, as a
personal matter, he or she thought the penalty improper.
These distinctions are not merely theoretical. Jurors who testify that
they would not vote for the death penalty may also swear that they
would obey the law.2 16 Similarly, jurors who state that they do not
intend to vote for a death sentence commonly agree that they would
consider doing S0.217
The exploration of each of these three Witherspoon issues involves
its own practical and analytical problems, concerns different patterns
of juror responses, and requires distinct though overlapping explanations and instructions. An understanding of these differences confirms
the correctness of Witherspoon's apparent holding that a juror is
equally qualified to serve in a capital case if he or she meets any one of
the three interrelated standards.
1. The Juror-sPersonalStandards.-- Courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys often ask jurors questions framed to elicit information
about their personal views regarding application of the death penalty.
Often this is done by asking whether voting for the death penalty
would be inconsistent with their private standards. 2 18 The most commonly asked Witherspoon question is whether a juror would ever vote
216. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
218. E.g., Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549, 555 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) ("Could you without
doing violence to your conscience agree to a verdict imposing the death penalty?"), vacated, 408
U.S. 934 (1972); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 843 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("[C]ould you
ever [vote for the death penalty] in keeping with your own religious beliefs and in keeping with
your conscience?"); see also Barlow v. Wainwright, 323 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Fla. 1971) ("Do
you feel that capital punishment is a proper punishment in a proper case?"); Harris v. State, 352
So. 2d 460, 471 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (could juror "with good conscience vote for the electric
chair"), afj'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 69, 243 S.E.2d 510, 514 (1978)
("Could you. . . conscientiously include. . . a death penalty as one of the types of punishment
which could be imposed in the case?"); People v. Lee, 44 Ill. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.E.2d 469, 475
(1969) ("You wouldn't want to give the death penalty, would you?"). Sometimes jurors are asked
when they would impose the death penalty if it were up to them. E.g., State v. Malumphy, 105
Ariz. 200, 203, 461 P.2d 677, 680 (1969) ("Is there any case or any state of facts which would in
your belief warrant the imposition of the death penalty?"); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 445
n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 767 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 663 n.6 (1969) (juror Pobur) ("If it were up to you
...you would not render a verdict for the death penalty?"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972).
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for the death penalty. Although this question is susceptible of a
broader reading, jurors commonly interpret it to be an inquiry about
their present personal standards. 21 9 Answers to such questions, of
course, convey no information regarding either the firmness of the juror's views 220 or the juror's willingness to subjugate those views to the
22 1
requirements of the law.
(a) The "7n any case" inquiry.-Deciding whether to impose
the death penalty in a particular case involves both a choice among
competing values and the resolution of a number of factual issues. Jurors asked whether, applying their personal standards, they would ever
impose the death penalty face the same kind of problem, with one additional difficulty: this question requires jurors to assess how they

would act, not in a single and specified situation, but in every possible
kind of case. Thus, courts and prosecutors frequently phrase their
question, not in terms of whether there "is"or jurors "know of' 2 22 a
case in which they would vote for death, but whether, for example, the
219. The following colloquy suggests, not surprisingly, that judges interpret the question in the
same manner.
Q. (By the Court): Could you answer "Yes" if the evidence supported it, realizing that
the result would be death?
A. Whether I could answer "Yes" and still be against. . . my religious beliefs?
Q. That's the question we're asking.
Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 127-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied,455 U.S.
1008 (1982). Thus, jurors asked if they would vote for the death sentence at times give answers
such as "I believe I just can't bring [a vote for the death penalty] into agreement with my religious
convictions." People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655,
664 n.6 (1969) (juror Zufall), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); see also Swindler v. State, 267 Ark.
418, 430, 592 S.W.2d 91, 97 (1979) ("I don't believe I could [vote for the death penalty] and then
have a clear conscience."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057 (1980); People v. Speck, 41111. 2d 177, 211,
242 N.E.2d 208, 226 (1968) (juror stated he "could not, in all conscience, vote for the death of
another person"), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 140 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) ("I don't think in all consciousness [sic] I could vote.., to inflict death on any
human being."); Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 393 n.2, 474 P.2d 557, 560 n.2 (1970) ("1 just
don't believe that in good conscience I could say that the punishment should be death.").
220. In one case a juror, asked if he could not "in good conscience" vote for the death penalty,
answered, "Yes, at this time." People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr.
123, 128 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972).
221. See People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 404, 466 P.2d 961, 988, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 436 (1970)
(Peters, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[T]he statement 'my religious beliefs would say no' is
susceptible of the interpretation that [the juror] merely has 'religious scruples' against the infliction of the death penalty but that she might be able to set aside those scruples or beliefs."), cer.
denied, 406 U.S. 912 (1972).
222. E.g., Bums v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1979) ("know of'), afj'don reh'g, 626
F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane); Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 575 ('ex. Crim. App. 1979)
("I don't know of anything that could make me agree to the death penalty."), vacated, 453 U.S.
902 (1981); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (juror Norwood) ("[A]re
there any facts or circumstances which would allow you, personally, to bring in a death verdict
?"); id. at 382 (juror Odom) ("Are there any facts that would justify you in. . .voting [for]
death?"); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) ("[I]s there any case in
which you feel you could assess the penalty of death... ?").
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jurors can "conceive" of such a case.223 It does not matter whether the
question is expressly worded in this way, or whether the jurors are
merely asked if they would vote for the death penalty;2 24 in either case,
a juror must in formulating an answer conjure up the sorts of cases

most likely to qualify for capital punishment, and then consider how he
or she would vote. The meaningfulness of this process depends heavily
upon the scope of the juror's imagination 2 25 and the time, if any, allot-

ted for reflection. A juror who, after considering only ordinary robbery, murder, and crimes of passion,2 26 says he or she cannot imagine a
case in which the death penalty would be warranted gives a far less
reliable answer than a juror who also considers mass murder, torture
murder, and other particularly heinous crimes. If a juror is merely
asked whether he or she would ever vote for the death penalty, and if
after a negative answer the matter is not pursued further, a court has
no reliable way of knowing whether the juror considered a wide array
223. E.g., Jackson v. Beto, 428 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir. 1970); Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp.
913, 921 (juror Rhodes), 922 (jurors McCasland, McKinley, and Edwards), 923 (jurors R. Peel,
Cobb, and T. Peel), 294 (juror Speck) (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970); Mack v.
State, 375 So. 2d 476, 491 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (juror Godwin), vacated, 448 U.S. 903 (1980);
Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (juror Johnson); Bums v. State, 556 S.W.2d
270,277 (rex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421,44143, 452 P.2d 232, 244-46 (1969) (jurors Raymond and Weeks), rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
Similarly, jurors may be asked if they can "think of" a case in which they would impose the death
penalty, see, e.g., Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (jurors Jackson,
Culberson, and Robinson) (when asked if they could "conceive of' a proper case, they replied that
they could not "think of' one), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374,
380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), whether they could "imagine" such a case, see, e.g., Fleming v. State,
374 So. 2d 954, 956 n.2 (Fla. 1979) (juror Collier); Curry v. State, 468 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (juror Spurlock), modjmed, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); State v. Music, 79 Wash. 2d 699, 704,
489 P.2d 159, 163 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972), or whether they could "envision" such a
case, see, e.g., People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 930, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1969),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Fleming v. State, 374 So. 2d 954, 956 n.2 (Fla. 1979) (jurors
Collier ("envisualize") and Booth ("envision")); Garcia v. State, 501 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972) ("visualize"); Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
224. In Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en bane), a juror who
stated she could not "right offhand" think of a case in which she favored death replied to the next
question that she would not vote for death. This seems to confirm the common sense belief that,
although the statements "I can think of no case in which I would vote for death" and "I would not
vote for death" are logically different, a juror may treat them as equivalent or conclude that the
latter was necessarily true merely because the former was true.
225. In People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 729, 464 P.2d 64, 87, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 631 (1970), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972), the prosecutor criticized the defense counsel's "prolific imagination"
in conjuring up hypothetical heinous crimes. Without such an imagination a negative answer to
the question "Is there any case in which you would favor the death penalty?" would be
meaningless.
226. A juror who initially stated she would not vote for the death penalty was asked about an
extreme case in which the defendant had killed ten women and children. She responded that she
had "never heard of that type of person" and on further reflection concluded that the death penalty was a question of "degree" and that she would "have to get all the facts" before deciding
whether to impose it. Id. at 725, 464 P.2d at 86, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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of hideous offenses, or whether the juror was merely unable to call to
mind a case warranting the death penalty in the brief moment between
227
question and answer.
Given the impossibility of conjuring up and ascertaining the propriety of the death penalty in every possible kind of case, it is hardly
surprising that jurors express the kinds of uncertainty and indecision
already noted. 228 Militant opponents of the death penalty might think
their beliefs so strong that there could not 229 be a case in which they
would favor the death penalty. But even jurors who are totally opposed to the death penalty frequently arrive at that conclusion only
after considering the kinds of cases in which the death penalty might be

appropriate. Uncertainty is unavoidable here as well, for it is as impossible to consider all cases in formulating one's standards as it is to consider all cases in order to ascertain the nature of one's standards.
Indeed, the differences between those two processes may be more theoretical than real.
Thus, a single question whether a juror believes the death penalty
is ever warranted is a dangerously superficial method of ascertaining
the juror's personal standards. To ask a juror to survey in an instant all
227. We cannot assume that [the juror], when questioned by the trial judge called to mind
that Manson murders and other notorious murders which occurred in her lifetime, resolved in her own mind that such killings were not heinous enough to call for a death
penalty, and because of that mental classification was unable to think any case sufficiently heinous. It seems more likely that on the spur of the moment and under the
tension of voir dire examination no particularly heinous case sprang to her mind.
People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 440 n.l 1, 606 P.2d 341, 349 n.1 1, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 314 n.1 1,
vacated, 448 U.S. 903 (1980).
228. When veniremen are asked, in language that highlights the nature of the question, if they
can imagine a case in which they would favor the death penalty, they at times offer responses such
as, "I think there might be a hypothetical case in which a crime that was so heinous was committed I would consider [the death penalty]. But I have not been able to think of a hypothetical of
that nature." Id. at 437, 606 P.2d at 348, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Another juror answered, "Not
being able to think of enough cases, I can't sayfor sure, but I certainly can't think of any myself
right now .... " People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406, 413, 455 P.2d 122, 125, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189
(1969) (emphasis in original); see also People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 84, 83 Cal.
...), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972
Rptr. 608, 628 (1970) ("I can't think of any circumstances now.
(1972); People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931,458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1969) (a case
in which he would vote for death is "inconceivable" to juror "at this time"), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
972 (1972); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 381-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (juror who could not
"conceive" of case in which she would vote for death, asked by defense counsel if there "could be"
such cases, replied "[Y]es. It's possible, yes.").
Judge Richardson, in a concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Velasquez, has suggested that a venireman can be disqualified if he or she is unable to imagine some particular case
in which he or she believes the defendant would deserve the death penalty. 26 Cal. 3d at 445, 606
P.2d at 353, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 318. This proposed standard is merely a rephrasing of the discredited rule that a juror must be able to state affirmatively that he or she could vote for the death
penalty. See supra notes 17-48 and accompanying text.
229. See Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) ("You do not feel there
could be any facts and circumstances. . . which to your mind would warrant and justify and
render it proper to impose death. . . ?").
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possible cases and answer the question "Can you conceive of a case in
which you would favor the death penalty?" is similar to demanding an
instantaneous response to a question such as "How many people do
you know named Smith?" No answer is ever certain, and a quick
reply may be virtually worthless. Similarly, a negative response to the
query "Could there be a case in which you would favor the death penalty?" like a similar reply to "Could there be a case in which lying is
justified?" may indicate that the respondent is exceedingly principled,
or only that he or she has never thought about the hard cases. It is
difficult to characterize any simple answer to such a question as depicting the venireman's views with "unmistakable clarity" when the response is untested by further inquiries about extreme situations in
which the arguments for the death penalty would be especially strong.
(b) The needfor explanatory instructions.-Regardless of the
detail in which a juror's scruples are explored, several instructions are
essential in order to elicit meaningful answers to the questions. First,
jurors must be told that when the court or counsel asks if there are
cases in which the venireman believes the death penalty is warranted,
they are not asking whether the venireman favors enactment of a death
penalty statute or has reservations or scruples about the death penalty.
Although an attorney learned in the ways of Witherspoon understands
that these inquiries are clearly different, a layman listening to such
questions is unlikely to perceive the distinctions. More importantly, a
juror who is asked the first question is particularly unlikely to realize
that the court or counsel is not asking one of the latter questions. As
one prosecutor noted, "[A]re you for or against [the death penalty] is
the way people usually think about it.' ' 230 It is apparent from cases in
which jurors respond with a full sentence rather than a simple "yes" or
"no" that jurors are often answering this, the wrong question, despite
the wording of the question actually asked. Upon being asked whether
they would vote for the death penalty, consider voting for the death
penalty, or vote to convict the defendant in a capital case, or whether
they could be impartial, jurors often reply "I do not believe in the
death penalty. ' 231 They are not being coy or intentionally unrespon230. Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 843 n.9 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
231. E.g., Mason v. Balkcom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 560 (M.D. Ga. 1980) ("vote for"), rev'd 669
F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1260 (1983); Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 473
(Ala. Crim. App. 1976) ("Well it doesn't make any difference. . . how it is reworded. . . . I still

cannot honestly say with a free conscience [that I] believe in capital punishment."), af/'d, 352 So.
2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v. King, 1 Cal. 3d 791, 799 n.2, 463 P.2d 753, 758 n.2, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401,
406 n.2 (1970) (juror Kirschner) ("vote for"); In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 1016 n.6, 458 P.2d 449,462
n.6, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 550 n.6 (1969) ("impartial"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970); People v.
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sive; they simply do not understand the difference between the question
that has been asked and the question they have answered.2 32 Clearly,
some of the jurors who are answering simply "yes" or "no" mistakenly
believe that they are being asked if they are for or against the death
penalty, and some of them would, notwithstanding their opposition,
vote for the death penalty in certain cases.2 33 For these reasons, a
number of courts have wisely given or required2 34 instructions intended
Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 445 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6 (1969) (juror
McRae) ("impartial"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass.
541, 543 n.l, 254 N.E. 2d 415, 416 n.1 (1969), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (juror Carbone)
("convict"); Glann v. Missouri, 341 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D. Mo. 1972) ("consider"); State v.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 12 (juror Delange), 13 (juror Choate) (Mo.) (en banc) ("consider"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App. 2d 115, 127, 252 N.E.2d 305, 315
(1969) ("vote for"), af'd, 28 Ohio St. 2d 15, 275 N.E.2d 153 (1971).
232. This lack of understanding is illustrated by the following exchange:
Q. [D]o you then entertain such conscientious scruples or opinions that would preclude
you from finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree?
A. I don't believe in capital punishment at all ....
Q. Your answer then, is what to my question?
A. I don't believe in capital punishment.
Q. That wasn't my question.
A. Oh ....
People v. Miller, 71 Cal. 2d 459, 471 n.l, 455 P.2d 377, 383 n.l, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455 n.l (1969),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); see also Peterson v. State, 242 So. 2d 420, 425 (Miss. 1970) (juror
Thompson) (question repeated four times), rev'd, 268 So. 2d 335 (Miss. 1972).
233. E.g., Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981) (juror subsequently
stated she "guess[es]" she could vote for conviction); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 512, 212 S.E.2d
125, 129 (1975) ("I want him to be convicted if he were guilty. I don't know about the death
penalty. I would want him to be punished."); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (juror Chase) (juror subsequently stated she "probably" would not vote for
death but did not "know anything about the case"); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 828-29
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (juror subsequently stated she did not know whether she would vote for
the death penalty).
234. Eg., Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 961 (M.D. Fla. 1981) ("The question isn't
...
whether you believe in capital punishment or not; the question is whether or not you have
such a strong disbelief in it as to make [you] unable. . . to vote [for death] regardlessof what the
evidence might be.") (emphasis in original), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc);
People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 809, 452 P.2d 661, 671, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 455 (1969) (The
grounds for legal disqualification are "not the same thing, by any means, as saying that a person is
disqualiedfromsitting upon ajury because he might not believe in the deathpenalty orfeels that the
law should be changed. If the juror, even having those beliefs, is still willing to. . . vote the death
penalty, under those circumstances your feelings about the death penalty would be unimportant
.... ") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973,
975-76 (Fla.) ("reservations about or conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment" do not disqualify veniremen), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1059 (1980); State v. Theus, 207 Kan.
571, 576, 485 P.2d 1327, 1332 (1971) ("[T]he question is not whether you have scruples against the
death penalty-a sizeable percentage of our population has such scruples, and there's nothing
wrong with having those scruples."); State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 165, 548 P.2d 442, 445 (1976)
("It isn't enough ...

not to believe in capital punishment.

. . . [T]here must be something more

than that, and that is in effect this, that it would be impossible under any circumstances, regardless
of the proof, that you could vote for a verdict of guilty, knowing that. . . it could carry the death
penalty."); see also Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 85, 465 P.2d 133, 136 ("There is a duty upon the
court to make it clear to the prospective juror that opposition to the death penalty or conscientious
scruples against that penalty would be insufficient to disqualify him from service."), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 844 (1970). The court in Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903, 910 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
rev'd mem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971), criticized the Bean requirement as an attempt to achieve a
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to assure that jurors understand the differences between these

questions.
Second, it is essential that jurors be told explicitly that they are not
merely being asked about how they would vote in the particular case
before them. The detailed answers of actual jurors indicate clearly that
they naturally assume they are being asked about that specific case,
even when the questions are framed in more general terms.2 35 It would
not occur to a juror having no knowledge of Witherspoon's requirements that a questioner would have any reason to care about or ask
about how the juror would act in some other case. In some instances,
courts have given explicit instructions or explanations 236 that questions
are not limited to "this case," and in a number of these situations, such
statements have caused jurors to change their answers.2 37
Third, jurors must be told that they are not expected to know, with
certainty or at all, the answers to questions about their personal standards. Many jurors are either undecided or unsure about their positions.
From a Witherspoon perspective, answers such as "I don't know" or
"Yes, but I am not sure" are as meaningful and acceptable as a simple

"yes" or "no." A question which suggests that jurors must, logically or

"highly unrealistic. . letter perfect voir dire examination." Harris'smore casual approach to
Witherspoon was clearly disapproved by the Supreme Court when it reversed that decision.
235. The juror made this assumption in the following exchange: Q. Do you mean, sir, that you could not under any set of circumstances return the
death verdict, sir?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. You don't believe that under any circumstances you could?
A. Not in a particular case such as this, sir. I would say maybe in a case of murder or
something like that.
Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (juror Schmidt), vacated 408 U.S. 934
(1972); see also Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (juror Walton) (juror
assumes court is asking if he could be impartial "in this particular case"), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 479
(Ala. 1977); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 686, 202 S.E.2d 750, 761 (1974) (juror asked if it would
be "impossible under any circumstances" to vote for death responds "Well, for what this is, I'd
have to say yes"), vacated in part,428 U.S. 902 (1975); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575
n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror Chase) ("Probably no, but I really don't know anything about the case.").
236. E.g., Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 924 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (juror Speck) ("Can you
conceive of any case-now, we're not talking about this one.
...), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (1970);
Geary v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 505, 508-09 (Ky. 1972) ("in this case or in any other case");
Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("not in this case, but in
a make-believe case"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 474
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) ("We're not talking about this case."), cer. denied,446 U.S. 988
(1980); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.) ("We are not asking you about this
case, whatever you know about this case. I'm talking about any situation, can you conceive of any
situation in which you would give the death penalty?"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Brief for
Petitioner at 10, Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) ("[W]ould you ever vote the death penaltynot asking in this case but about the worst case you could imagine..
?").
237. E.g., Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 924 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (1970)
(juror Speck); Simmons v. State, 594 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Burns v. State, 556
S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Brief for Petitioner at 10,
Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).

1040

The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors
legally, fall into one extreme position or the other necessarily pressures
them to so respond, even though such an answer may not accurately
reflect their views. 238 Jurors asked a question such as
Do you favor the death penalty in some cases, or do you believe
it is unwarranted in all cases?
will naturally assume that they are to reply by agreeing with the first or
second alternative. They may not be expressly forbidden to imagine

and articulate a third possible reply, but that is hardly sufficient to
render the question balanced. Jurors will normally choose the alternative that is closest to their views, even if that alternative is different
from their actual position. The best way to avoid such difficulties is
both to give an explanatory instruction 239 and to frame the actual question in a manner that recognizes the possibility of an undecided or uncertain answer. 24°
(c) The "Propercase" inquiry.-In a number of instances
courts and counsel seeking to ascertain jurors' views on the death penalty have asked whether they would impose it in "a proper case."
When the court or counsel refers to a "proper case for the imposition of

the death penalty," the jurors naturally infer that there are certain
kinds of cases in which the court or the law directs that the death penalty be imposed 24 1 and in which the jury will be expected to do so regardless of whether it thinks the death sentence is excessive. Thus,
jurors would construe "Would you impose the death penalty in a
proper case?" to mean "Will you vote for the death penalty when the
238. The problem of explicit court directions that jurors answer "yes" or "no" is discussed
infra notes 321-35 and accompanying text.
239. Such an instruction might read as follows:
The questions you will be asked about the death penalty will involve difficult and com-

plex issues that you may not have thought about before. Many people have not made up
their minds about these problems. Some people are inclined one way or the other, but
are not certain. If you are not really sure how you feel, you should tell us that. Don't try
to give us an absolute "yes" or "no" answer ifin your heart you are not certain and need
to think about it some more. In that case you should tell us candidly that you are not
sure.

240. Such a question might read as follows:
We want to know how you feel about whether you should ever vote for the death penalty
in a case. Are you certain there are cases where you would vote for the death penalty,
are you certain you would never vote for the death penalty no matter how horrible the
crime, or are you unsure whether there could be some extreme cases in which you might
vote for the death penalty?
The instruction, supra note 239, should be given before any WZtherrpoon voir dire because veniremen might be undecided about any of the questions they may be asked. Similarly, all questions
should, like the question above, acknowledge that answers such as "I am not sure" are possible
and acceptable responses.
241. In one case in which no explanation had been provided, a juror expressed uncertainty
about "[w]hat the court might feel is proper." People v. Ketchel, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 649 n.6, 456 P.2d
660, 668 n.6, 79 Cal. Rptr. 92, 100 n.6 (1969).
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law requires it, regardless of your personal views?" This construction
stands the intent of the questioners on its head. The Illinois Supreme
Court has correctly concluded that a "proper case" question is insufficient per se as a basis for excusing a juror.242 In several jurisdictions,
on the other hand, the use of the same question has been upheld without comment. 2 43 In California, where most instances of this problem
have arisen, the courts apply an intermediate rule: jurors cannot be
excused for stating that they would not impose the death penalty in a
"proper case" unless they were told that the jury alone decides what is
a proper case. 244
But telling jurors that they are to decide what constitutes a "proper
case" does not solve the problem posed by this question.2 45 Explained
in this manner, "Will you vote for the death penalty in a proper case?"
means "Would you vote for the death penalty in a case in which you
concluded that you should vote for the death penalty? '246 Phrased that
242. People v. Doss, 44 Ill. 2d 541, 549, 256 N.E.2d 753, 758 (1970); see also Myers v. State,
254 So. 2d 891, 895 (Miss. 1971) (Smith, J. dissenting).
243. Eg., Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 921 (juror McDonald), 922 (jurors Hobbs and
Dunn), 923 (jurors Sheppard and Nelson) (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970);
Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549, 565-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S. 934 (1972);
Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va.
31, 34, 235 S.W.2d 320, 323 (1977); see also Note, supra note 14, at 632 n.2, 635 (urging the use of
this question).
244. See People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 515-16, 450 P.2d 564, 575-76, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 18384 (1969). The rule was applied in a number of subsequent California decisions. E.g., People v.
King, I Cal. 3d 791, 796-97, 463 P.2d 753, 757, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404-05 (1970) (question adequately explained); People v. Floyd, I Cal. 3d 694, 726-27, 464 P.2d 64, 85, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 636
(1970) (question adequately explained), cert.denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); In re Lara, 1 Cal. 3d 486,
492-93, 462 P.2d 380, 385, 82 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632-33 (1969) (question not adequately explained);
People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 2d 614, 630-31, 456 P.2d 633, 642-43, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65, 74 (1969)
(question not adequately explained); People v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 779-80, 452 P.2d 650,
656, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 440 (1969) (question adequately explained), a]j'd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Nevada follows the same rule. Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 86-87, 465 P.2d 133, 137, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 844 (1970).
In re Lara also held that, in addition to the required explanation, jurors had to be asked if
they would never vote for death in a proper case. Inexplicably, this requirement was not considered in People v. King or People v. Floyd.
245. The jurors may be told that they are to decide what is a "proper case." E.g., People v.
King, 1 Cal. 3d 791, 797-98, 463 P.2d 753, 757, 83 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1970); People v. Floyd, I
Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 85, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 628 (1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972);
People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 601, 455 P.2d 776, 780, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1969), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 971 (1972); People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 495, 450 P.2d 553, 562, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161,
170 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972). But in People v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 777, 452
P.2d 650, 655, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 439 (1969), afjd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the jury was told only that
it had unlimited discretion to determine the sentence. It is far from certain that this explanation
would have been sufficient to overcome the contrary implication implicit in the phrase "proper
case." There is, in any event, no excuse for asking questions that pose these kinds of difficulties.
246. The circular nature of such an inquiry is illustrated by the following question:
Do any of you entertain any scruples which arise from matters of faith, belief or religion,
or matters of conscience, which would prevent you from returning a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree without qualification [ie., without limiting the penalty to life
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way, and with that instruction, the question is a simple tautology; virtu-

ally by definition jurors vote in whatever way they conclude they
should vote. To a logician the answer to such a question may be clear,
though trivial, but a juror trying to make sense of it ought to be confused. Any juror who construes this question as an inquiry about his or
her views misunderstands its literal meaning. Other constructions the
juror may give to the question, and thus the meaning of his or her
answer, are matters of conjecture. 247 In short, questions and answers
about what a juror would do in a "proper case" are either misleading
or meaningless and should be avoided.
(d) The "pTreclude" or "prevent" inquiry.-Questions that ask
jurors if their scruples about capital punishment would "prevent" or
"preclude" them from imposing the death penalty pose a related problem.2 48 These questions are intelligible, but they are ambiguous in one
inprisonment] if you conscientiously felt that such a verdict was proper under the law
and under the evidence as you understand it?
United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963
(1954).
247. The petitioner in Witherspoon complained that the "[u]se of the amorphous tautology, 'in
a proper case,' confused rather than elucidated the crucial distinction." Brief for Petitioner at 14,
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Such questions were criticized as "practically meaningless" by
Justice Smith in Myers v. State, 254 So. 2d 891, 895 (Miss. 1971) (Smith, J., dissenting). Even
before Witherspoon, the Second Circuit noted that questions of this sort were confusing. United
States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954).
This difficulty is illustrated by the following voir dire, in which a "proper case" question was

spelled out to give it the required meaning:
Q. If you were selected as a trial juror in this case and if at the conclusion of the
evidence you felt that the case warranted, would you have any moral or religious
beliefs which would prevent you from voting for the death penalty?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Is there any case or any state of facts which would in your belief warrant the imposition of the death penalty?
A. No, sir.
State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 203, 461 P.2d 677, 680 (1969). If, as the second answer indicated, there were no cases in which the juror believed the death penalty would be "warranted,"
then there were no cases in which her beliefs could "prevent" her from voting for it. There are
two reported instances in which a juror, after being asked such a proper case question, was told he
was to decide what was a proper case and then was asked the question again. In one case the
juror, who was asked if he would render a death verdict on the proper evidence, changed his
answer from "yes" to "no." State v. Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 1166, 14 So. 143, 144 (1893). In
the other, the juror maintained her position against the death penalty. People v. Bradford, 70 Cal.
2d 333, 346, 450 P.2d 46, 53, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 733 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). Why
they did so, and what jurors mean when they answer these questions, is a matter of sheer
speculation.
248. E.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 237, 599 P.2d 187, 193 (1979) ("prevent"); People v.
Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 930, 458 P.2d 67, 71, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1969) ("preclude"), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 357 Mass. 559, 561, 259 N.E.2d 553,
555 (1970) ("preclude"); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 67-68, 282 N.E.2d 568, 569 (1972)
("preclude"); Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301, 306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("prevent"); State v.
Clark, 423 A.2d 1151, 1156 (R.I. 1980) ("preclude").
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critical respect: they can be understood to inquire whether such
scruples would bar the juror from voting for death in all cases or
249
whether they would merely bar such a vote in some cases.
Such a question also could be interpreted to be an inquiry about
whether a juror's scruples would prevent a death penalty vote in the
case at hand, 250 which is precisely what the prosecution and defense
want to know. What the juror will do in some other, perhaps more
horrible case, is of no importance except to the extent that it affects his
or her qualification to sit in the case at hand. But a juror untutored in
the nuances of Witherspoon would not see the possible relevance of
other cases, and would sensibly and naturally assume that the questioner wants to know what the juror will do in the case about to be
tried.2 51 This is how broadly framed questions are commonly meant
and understood. 252 In light of this common usage, judges and lawyers
are employing English in a somewhat unusual way when they ask jurors if their views would "preclude" or "prevent" them from returning
a death sentence. The only way to be sure that jurors mean that their
249. The ambiguity arises from the vagaries of ordinary English usage. "Prevent" can mean
either to "keep from happening," which could thus indicate a refusal to vote for death in any case,
or merely to "hinder" or "interpose an obstacle," WEaSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 912
(1975), which would leave open the possibility that the juror would so vote despite the hindrance
or impediment. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 2d 614, 631, 456 P.2d 633, 643, 79 Cal. Rptr.
65, 74 (1969). When we say "exercise prevents heart attacks," we do not assert that exercise ensures against heart attacks in all cases, but only that it does so in some. If "prevent" were understood in this sense, every humane juror would aver that he or she had scruples which would (in
some case) prevent a vote for the death penalty.
Courts and counsel in California once commonly asked jurors if their views would preclude a
vote for the death penalty "in a proper case." See supra note 244. The word "a" is ambiguous in
the same critical sense; it could mean "in at least one proper case" or "in all proper cases."
"Preclude" carries more of a suggestion of an absolute prohibition, but it is also defined as
synonymous with "prevent." WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 905 (1975). "Prevent"
and "preclude" were used as synonyms in Commonwealth v. Robertston, 357 Mass. 559, 561, 259
N.E.2d 553, 555 (1970) ("Have you any opinion that would prevent or preclude you from recommending ... the sentence of death. . . ?"). State statutes excusing jurors whose views would
"preclude" them from voting for the death penalty were generally construed as applying to jurors
who would be merely affected by their conscientious scruples. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 66
Cal.2d 482, 498, 426 P.2d 929, 939, 58 Cal. Rptr. 361, 371 (1967) (citing People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d
566, 575-76, 305 P.2d 1, 5-7 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957)); People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d
503, 529, 381 P.2d 394, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 551 (1963) (citing Rfer). A juror who so understood the
term could state that her views would "preclude" returning a death sentence without meaning she
would refuse to do so in every case.
250. Questions have in fact been phrased in this manner. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 568
P.2d 301, 306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) ("Do you think that [qualms about assessing the death
penalty] would prevent you from returning a guilty verdict in the case. . ?").
251. See, e.g., People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 56, 447 P.2d 925, 936, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533,
544 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 857 (1969).
252. If, after noting that shrimp cocktail for two is on the menu, I ask a dinner companion
whether he or she is allergic to shellfish, we both know that my inquiry concerns the specific kind
of shellfish I am considering ordering, and that it would be unresponsive and unhelpful if he or
she replied, "Yes, I am allergic to lobster."
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scruples would preclude them from voting for the death penalty "in all
cases" is to clearly phrase the question in those terms.
2 Revocable JurorStandards.-The fact that a juror has at the
time of the voir dire personal standards that forbid application of the
death penalty does not by itself establish that the juror will continue to
feel the same way and automatically vote against a death verdict after
the trial. Attitudes toward the death penalty are like opinions about
any other subject; some are carved in stone, while others are little more
than passing fancies subject to change at the least provocation. 253 A
state's interest in obtaining a jury that might return a verdict of death is
impaired no more by including jurors tentatively against the death pen-

alty in all cases than it is by including jurors firmly against that penalty
in all but a few situations. As a practical matter, the prosecution has a
far better chance of winning a vote for the death penalty from a juror
with changeable standards than from one adamantly opposed to a
death penalty in the type of case to be tried. The indecision, uncertainty, and vacillation that occur in voir dires make it clear that many
veniremen's personal standards are far from fixed. Witherspoon does
not permit the exclusion for cause of a juror whose standards are revocable, even if he or she has reached a tentative position against the
death penalty. It cannot be assumed that all opposition to the death
penalty is irrevocable; 254 jurors must be questioned expressly about the
5

issue. 25

253. More than a century ago, the California Supreme Court noted that some opposition to
the death penalty is "the result ofjudgment, is tested by reason, defended by argument, and yields
to the decision of an intelligent mind," while other opposition springs "from some internal source
of self-knowledge, which. . . ignores reason, defies argument, and is unaccountable to and irresponsible to all human tests and standards." People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140, 144 (1857); see also
Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903, 911 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (quoting Stewart), rev'dmem., 403
U.S. 947 (1971); cf Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 575 frex. Crim. App. 1979) (juror stated
that nothing anyone could say would make him change his mind, and "I don't know of anything
that could make me agree to the death penalty."), vacated, 453 U.S. 902 (1981).
254. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 70, 282 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1972) (statement
by jurors that they could not vote for death was not sufficient basis to conclude that they would
not consider doing so).
255. Whenever a prospective juror answers that he has a religious conviction or personal
scruple or opinion concerning capital punishment which would render him unable to
return a verdict carrying a death penalty he must be questioned further on the nature of
his beliefs and then be confronted with the question whether his views are so firm or
fixed that he is unable to return the death penalty under any case.
Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 87-88, 465 P.2d 133, 138, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); see also
Brooks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (prosecution, in defending
question on firmness of juror's views, argued that an answer to the question was necessary to meet
the test of Wqitherspoon, and without a response the defendant could argue the jurors' answers
were "vague and ambiguous"), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Cherry v. State, 488 S.W.2d 744,
750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("Under Witherspoon, the State is entitled to determine not only that
the prospective juror will consider the death penalty, but also whether there are circumstances
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(a) The problem of prediction.-The process of argument
and reasoning that may earlier have shaped a juror's attitude toward
the death penalty does not end when the juror enters the courthouse.

Prior to the voir dire, the juror's consideration of the propriety of the
death penalty may well have been fleeting, casual, and untested by argument. 25 6 The juror is nonetheless capable of thinking about the
problem and attempting to resolve the conflicting values at issue until
the moment when the actual penalty vote is cast. In the courtroom
itself the juror will listen to counsel emphasize the facts of a concrete
case and appeal to those personal concerns that militate for or against
the death sentence. In the jury room after the penalty hearing, the juror is likely to be exposed to a debate on capital punishment far more
urgent, and possibly more persuasive, than any that the juror has encountered in the past. 25 7 Those willing to listen to other jurors might
258
well have their opinions changed.
The difficulty of establishing whether the juror's position is irrevocable is compounded by the fact that a venireman is asked what he or
she will do, not now or a few moments hence, but after an unprecedented experience-participation as a juror in a capital case.2 59 For
conceivable under which he could assess such a penalty."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973). But
see Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (once juror has shown without
doubt that he meets Witherspoon test, denial of further questioning is not reversible error).
256. See Gold,A PsychiatricReview of CapitalPunishment, 6 J. FORENSIC SCI. 465, 466 (1961)
("[Tihe average American appears to have only a limited concept of the issue, has done very little
reading on the subject, and has not taken the time to think about it in an objective manner.").
257. See Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 69, at 181-91 (attitudes of subjects toward the death
penalty substantially altered by reading detailed arguments on the subject); see also Billingsley v.
State, 287 Ala. 634, 641, 254 So. 2d 333, 340 (1971) (venireman stated he would "listen to the views
of all of the jurors," but "can't be certain" those views would change his opinion); State v. Eaton,
19 Ohio St. 2d 145, 152 n.l, 249 N.E.2d 897, 902 n.l (1969) (court question to juror Craig) ("[Y]ou
would not talk it over with the rest of the jurors . . .?"), vacated, 408 U.S. 935 (1972).
258. A new fact or argument might bring about such a change in several ways. The relative
weight the venireman gives to two competing values, say deterrence and compassion, might
change. A new value, something given no weight in the venireman's earlier calculations, could
come into play; he or she might, for example, have a change of heart and decide that retribution,
previously thought irrelevant, should be a significant factor in fixing a punishment. Any of the
factual assumptions critical to the applicability of even fixed values could be altered; the venireman might conclude, on further reflection about human nature or his or her own experiences, that
a few well-publicized executions would indeed deter future violent crimes. Veniremen are unlikely to analyze their standards in such detail, but could readily express an intuitive understanding of the extent to which their standards might be altered by further discussion and argument.
Compare Comment,supra note 183, at 296 n.58 ("Well, I don't believe in [the death penalty], but I
might be convinced on it. ...
) (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae at app., Pittman v. State, 434
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)), with Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976) (juror Lipscomb) (juror had a "firm conviction that he wouldn't let anyone talk him out
of'), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); see also Brooks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979) (en banc) ("Is your religious view so strong that nothing can talk you out of them
...?"), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
259. E.g., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460,472-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (juror unsure whether
possibility of capital punishment would affect her decision on guilt because she did not "know
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what will usually be the first time in his or her life, the juror will hear a
firsthand and detailed account of a murder, see both the alleged killer
and the relatives or friends of the victim, and be required to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Of the events that might shape
a person's attitude toward the death penalty, few could have as great an
impact. 260 A judge could to some degree describe to a juror the events
that lie ahead, but even the most talented raconteur could not create in
advance the actual impact of the trial. On the one hand, a juror who
enters the courthouse favoring the death penalty in theory may be horrified at the prospect of voting to kill a real person sitting only a few
yards away; on the other hand, a juror initially opposed to capital punishment may be overcome with anger toward a killer. 26 1 A juror who
reflects on the unknown but possibly traumatic trial that lies between
the voir dire and the decision on the penalty would naturally be shaken
in his or her conviction about what he or she would do after the penalty
hearing. It is difficult to see how a judge or juror could ever be certain
that the experience would not shake the scruples of a juror who insisted
prior to trial that he or she would never vote for the death penalty.
Any attempt to assess the possible impact of the trial on a scrupled
juror would require not only foreknowledge of what would occur at the
trial, but also a detailed understanding of precisely why the juror was
opposed to capital punishment. A juror's view of the death penalty
often derives in part from assumptions about what murders and murderers are like. A scrupled juror may envisage a frightened or impassioned defendant killing a not entirely innocent victim and greatly
regretting his action; a nonscrupled juror might have in mind a remorseless, cold-blooded killer executing without reason the father of
three young children. The facts of the case to be tried may differ substantially from such assumptions. If the juror thinks the death penalty
is applied only to the poor and oppressed, his or her views may change
if the defendant is a rich, white industrialist. If the juror's scruples
derive from a belief that there is some good in everyone, they may be
altered if confronted by a defendant who appears to be completely and
that much about what goes on in a trial"), aff4d 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v. Vaughn, 71
Cal. 2d 406, 414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3 (1969) ("I don't know. I
have never been put in that position, and I am not sure that I could make a truthful answer to
that.").
260. See Jurow, New Dataon the Effect ofa "DeathQualiyfed"Juryon the Guilt Determination
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 567, 594 (1971) (actual service on jury alters jurors' attitudes in favor
of the death penalty).
261. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 27 N.J. 39, 53, 269 A.2d 153, 160 (1970) (juror states he would
never vote for death but later concedes he "might become emotionally charged enough to do so");
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jaggers v. Kentucky, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (juror states he
would not give the death penalty, but that he might "if I get angry enough").
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unalterably evil. Thus, it is hardly surprising that veniremen readily
acknowledge that their views might be altered by actual service on a
jury. As one prospective juror put it, "Facts . . . alter a man's
opinion." 262
(b) The form of the inquiry.-Although courts and counsel
often ask jurors if their scruples or opposition to the death penalty are
irrevocable, 263 the questions are usually in a form that renders an affirmative answer insufficient to justify exclusion under Witherspoon.
Questioners inquire, for example, whether the jurors' scruples are so
264
"firm and fixed" that they would not vote for the death penalty.
This question is worse than irrelevant, for it inaccurately suggests that a
"firm and fixed" opposition to capital punishment laws is the same as a
"firm and fixed" refusal to vote to impose the death penalty. Jurors are
also asked whether their willingness to vote for death could be changed
by the facts.2 65 This question is relevant, but insufficent because it does
not encompass the possibility that the jurors will change their standards
because of arguments by counsel or fellow jurors. The "firm and
fixed" inquiry is also inadequate because a negative answer may mean
262. Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert denied,408 U.S. 940
(1972);seealso People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 790, 457 P.2d 841, 859, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1969)
(Burke, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (juror's opinion was such that "it would take evidence to
remove it"); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Mo.) (en banc) (juror Delange) (juror opposed to
capital punishment later states "maybe circumstances could alter my decision"), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 933 (1981); Bean v. State, 86 Nev. 80, 97, 465 P.2d 133, 144 (Collins, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (juror "did not necessarily believe in the philosophy of an eye for an eye or a tooth for
a tooth"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844 (1970); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31 n.24, Childs v.
North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (juror did not think he could vote for death, "but a fellow
never knows till the times comes").
263. Eg., In re Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 700, 456 P.2d 129, 130, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 858 (1969)
(juror asked if she "feel[s] nothing would" change her conscientious scruples); People v.
Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 78 n.4, 447 P.2d 913, 923 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 531 n.4 (1968) (juror
asked if "firmly convinced" of her "conscientious objection against the death penalty law"), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St. 2d 145, 152 n.l, 249 N.E.2d 897, 902 n.1
(1969) (juror Craig) ("You just simply are unalterably opposed to capital punishment... ?"),
vacated,408 U.S. 935 (1972); cf.Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153, 158, 465 P.2d 394, 396 (1970)
(juror asked if objection to death penalty was a "long standing or an abiding one").
264. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mangum, 357 Mass. 76, 79 n.1, 256 N.E.2d 297, 300 n.1 (1970)
("[Is your [opposition to capital punishment] so firm and so inflexible that if you were satisfied
...that the defendant was guilty, that you would not vote for conviction?"); State v. Mathis, 52
N.J.238, 247, 245 A.2d 20, 25 (1968) (jurors asked if their views were "so firm and fixed" that they
could not vote for death in any case), rev'drmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
265. E.g., Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 491, 501, 186 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1970) (juror asked if
opposition to capital punishment could be changed by "the evidence as you hear it from the
witness on the stand in this case"); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(en bane) (juror asked if unwillingness to participate in a capital case could be swayed by "how
horrible the case or the killing might be"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); State v. Aiken, 75
Wash. 2d 421, 439, 452 P.2d 232, 243 (1969) (en banc) (juror Painter) ("[N]o matter what the
evidence may be, nothing could persuade you to vote for the death penalty?"), rev'd mem., 403
U.S. 946 (1971).
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only that the juror cannot imagine a set of facts that would change his
or her mind.

266

The most common inquiry of this kind is phrased in the language
of Witherspoon itself; jurors often are asked if they would "consider"
voting for the death penalty.2 67 It is difficult to determine precisely
how jurors interpret this question; it is possible that some construe it
narrowly to be simply an inquiry about whether death is one of the
penalties they would consider in the context of their present standards.
Questions that ask directly if a juror's present unwillingness to vote for
death is an irrevocable one 268 are decidedly preferable. But even these
inquiries leave jurors to imagine what it means to have "revocable"
standards; they may be reluctant to deny that their standards are irrevocable because they do not understand what the term means in the
legal context. The preferable approach is to present the veniremen
with a clear choice between two reasonably specific alternative
269
characterizations.
These distinctions help to explain the apparently mysterious although common phenomenon of jurors who state that they will not
270
vote for the death penalty, but that they would "consider" doing so.
266. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 126 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("Can
you think of any set of circumstances where your mind would be changed from the way that you
feel now."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); id at 131 ("Can you imagine any facts or circumstances that would change your mind... ?").
267. Eg., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 3049 316, 264 So. 2d 529, 540 (Crim. App.), rev'd, 288
Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (Ala. 1971); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Mo.) (en banc) (juror
Delange), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Terry, 472 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo. 1971) (en
bane), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135-36, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809
(1980).
268. E.g., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 315-16, 264 So. 2d 529, 540 (Crim.App.) (court
defining "fixed opinion" as being "irrevocably committed" to voting against the death penalty
regardless of the evidence), rev'd, 288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971); People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d
497, 514 n.14, 450 P.2d 564, 575 n.14, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183 n.14 (1969) (juror Blim) (juror asked if
her unwillingness to vote for death is "very firm and fixed in your mind and your heart").
269. Such a question might be phrased as follows: "Will you, before determining what penalty to impose, listen to the evidence and the arguments in this case, or have you already made up
your mind, absolutely and irrevocably, to vote against the death penalty regardless of the circumstances of the case?" See Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 318, 264 So. 2d 529, 542-43 (Crim.
App.) ("[D]o you feel like you... would, under any circumstances, always vote against punishment by death.. . or do you feel you would be able to listen to the evidence and to the law, and
the way everything took place, and ... consider aU of the penalties, without just disregarding any
of them ... ?"), rep'd,288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971); cf People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790,
809, 452 P.2d 661, 671, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 455 (1969) (court instructs veniremen that a juror is
qualified if he "feels that he can have an open mind"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
270. E.g., Williamson v. State, 370 So. 2d 1054, 1060 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (juror "would
listen to the evidence given" but would not vote for the death penalty); State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio
St. 2d 199, 202, 283 N.E.2d 632, 635 (1972) (juror could "liste[n] on the question of the death
penalty" but would not vote for it); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(juror Wallace) (juror would consider death penalty but did not think she could vote for it), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); see also Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 131, 617 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1981)
(juror would consider voting for life but would recommend death).
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It is self-contradictory, or at least very peculiar, 7 1 to say
Under my present standards the death sentence is not a permissible penalty, but in applying those standards I will consider imposing the death penalty,
but it makes perfectly good sense to say
Under my present standards the death penalty is not a permissible penalty, but I will consider changing those standards.
It is the latter statement that jurors appear to be making when they say
that they will consider the death penalty, but not vote for it. This interpretation is confirmed, somewhat indirectly, by the fact that jurors
often qualify a statement of their standards by explaining that those are
their standards "now. '2 72 Jurors who insist on describing only their
"present" standards are not evidencing an irrevocable commitment to
voting against the death penalty; the use of this qualification clearly
signals the tentativeness of a juror's position. 273 Similarly, questions
that ask only what a juror's position is "now," a phrasing often used
when jurors seem reluctant to make firm predictions about their future
conduct, 274 provide manifestly insufficient grounds for disqualification
271. See Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 100, 617 S.W.2d 6, 10 ("To say that one would consider
the death penalty but would not vote for it is nothing more than a play on words and fails the test
of Witherspoon."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981).
272. See supra note 162.
273. This qualification indicates that there is a very real possibility that the jurors' standards
may change; the speed with which that change could occur is illustrated by the following colloquy:
Q. [A]re you against capital punishment?
A. Iam.

Q.

So under no circumstances then would you be able to feel free to return a verdict of
guilty?
A. Not at the moment I wouldn't.
Q. If the evidence is convincing.., that the defendant is guilty, are your convictions
so strong that you could not return a verdict of guilty?
A.

Well, I wouldn't know for sure. I couldn't say, but I have been against capital pun-

ishment, but I don't know how the case would be.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-37, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); see also People v.
Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67,72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1969) (juror's "frame of mind"
at "the present time" is that he could not vote for the death penalty), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972
(1972); People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal. 2d 406,414 n.3, 455 P.2d 122, 126 n.3, 78 Cal. Rptr. 186, 190 n.3
(1969) (juror cannot think of a case "right now" in which she would vote for death); State v.
Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (juror would not vote for death "as
the circumstances stand now"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374,
378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) ("I would not vote for the death penalty, is my feelings
now.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982); Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495,
499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (juror Scruggs) (juror could not conceive of a case in which he would
vote for death but his view in the future might be different), vacated, 408 U.S. 937 (1972).
274. Eg., People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 437, 606 P.2d 341, 348, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313
(would juror "at this point" automatically vote against death except for a very heinous crime),
vacated, 448 U.S. 903 (1980); People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 73, 80 Cal. Rptr.
123, 128 (1969) (is juror "saying at this time" that he would not vote for death), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 972 (1972); People v. Gardner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 855 n.8, 457 P.2d 575, 583 n.8, 79 Cal. Rptr.
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under Witherspoon.
3. ObedientJurors.-Withersoon and its progeny hold that scrupled jurors may not constitutionally be excused for cause if, notwithstanding their opposition to the death penalty, they are willing to obey
and apply the law. No lower court has openly attacked this doctrine by
holding that these obedient jurors may be dismissed. Yet the number
of instances in which scrupled veniremen have been retained on a jury
because of their willingness to comply with the law is extremely small.
There are no reported decisions in which a trial judge retained a
venireman because of such obedience, and there are only three cases in
275
which the dismissal of an obedient juror was reversed on appeal.
The dormancy of this aspect of Witherspoon is easy to explain-jurors
are almost never actually asked if they will obey the law.
(a) The burden of quaiffication.-Although the burden of establishing that scrupled jurors are unqualified falls on the state, prosecutors evidently do not consider themselves obligated to inquire
whether such jurors are willing to carry out their legal responsibilities.
In the fifteen years since Witherspoon, there have been only three reported cases in which a prosecutor actually asked a juror if he or she
would obey the law. 276 Cases in which jurors volunteer unasked that
743, 751 n.8 (1969) (juror Gaines) (would juror's views prevail over court instructions considering
his "present state of mind"); People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 492 n.8, 494, 450 P.2d 553, 561 n.8,
562, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 n.8, 170 (1969) ("[lit is your feeling at the present time. . . under no
circumstances in a proper case would you ever vote for [capital] punishment?") (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (juror
Grady) (could juror vote for death under his "presently" held beliefs); Blankenship v. State, 247
Ga. 590, 594, 277 S.E.2d 505, 509 (1981) ("[Juror] uses the phrase 'right now' which seems to be an
equivocation as to the time at which he might be able to impose the penalty."); Williams v. State,
622 S.W.2d 116, 131 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (juror asked her feelings "right now"), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
275. Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394, 398 (10th Cir. 1968) (juror McCalep) (error to excuse
juror who stated that he would impose death penalty in a proper case "in due respect to the law"),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971); People v. Fain, 70 Cal. 2d 588, 601-02, 451 P.2d 65, 72-73, 75
Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1969) (error to excuse juror who stated she could subordinate her private
beliefs to her duty as a juror); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 140-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
(en banc) (error to excuse scrupled juror who repeatedly stated that she would "follow the law").
It seems probable that some veniremen have been retained by the trial courts on this basis.
Only a fraction of the voir dires conducted each year are ever reprinted in subsequent appellate
opinions, and there would ordinarily be little reason to describe on appeal the testimony ofjurors
who were not excused for cause.
276. Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 429-30, 592 S.W.2d 91, 96-97 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1057 (1980); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598, 606, 608-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), vacated, 428
U.S. 907 (1976); Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 443, 322 A.2d 343, 347 (1974) (prosecution question to juror with conscientious scruples against life imprisonment) ("Is it your position
that no matter what the law in the case would be as the judge instructs you ..
that you could not
follow that law. . . ?"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975).

1051

Texas Law Review

Vol. 62:977, 1984

they would do so are more common.277 Prosecutors ordinarily raise the
issue of obedience to the law only to assure jurors that they have no
particular obligation to do so.278 Such peculiarly permissive remarks
are obviously made to invite the juror to make a statement that will
result in his or her disqualification. Prosecutors who solicit disobedience to the law in this manner are not looking in good faith for jurors
who will comply with state statutes, but are simply trying to exclude
potentially qualified jurors. Prosecutors understandably regard questions 279 that might encourage scrupled jurors to state their willingness
to obey the law as tactically undesirable.
Questions about veniremen's willingness to obey the law usually
come from defense counsel seeking to rehabilitate them.280 Trial

judges do occasionally ask questions of this kind,281 but it is not com277. See, e.g., People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 445 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 767 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr.
655, 663 n.6 (1969) (juror Poboc) ("I know as a juror what my job is. I would have to bring in
whatever the decision in the case was."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); May v. State, 618
S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Chambers v. State, 568
S.W.2d 313, 321, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); State v.
Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 421,445,452 P.2d 232, 247 (1969) (en bane) (juror Tice), rev'dmem., 403 U.S.
946 (1971).
278. If you disagree with the law or if you think in your own mind you couldn't put out of
your mind the way you feel, that's fine .... I know you will obey the law as best you
could, but sometimes our personal feelings, you know, are important to us. However
you feel makes no difference to me.
May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (emphasis omitted), vacated, 454
U.S. 959 (1981); see also Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane)
("Do you agree with the law ... ? In other words, if you agree, fine; if you disagree, that's fine
too."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (rex. Crim.
App. 1981) (en bane) ("All right. Well, that's fine; nobody has any quarrel with you, and we
appreciate you telling us .... Then I assume then from what you're telling me, and this is fine
... that you could never vote to inflict the death penalty."); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 261
n.2 (rex. Crim. App.) ("We wouldn't try to talk you out of your beliefs, or ask you to set them
aside"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
279. The following exchange illustrates this reluctance:
Q. [Defense]: But the question is: Despite your bias or disagreement with that law,
could you follow the law?
[Prosecutor]: I object to that. That is not in issue.
THE COURT: Sustained.
May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 357 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane) (emphasis omitted), vacated,
454 U.S. 959 (1981). In May, the disputed juror favored the death penalty for defendants who
personally did the killing, but not for those who merely hired a murderer. Under Witherspoon, a
juror with such partial scruples is qualified regardless of his or her willingness to obey the law.
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 140-41 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane);
Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 321, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 928 (1979).
281. See infra notes 300-01. But see Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 960 (M.D. Fla.
1981) (trial court questions equate unwillingness to vote for death with unwillingness to do so
where "under the law that should be the legal recommendation"), vacated,715 F.2d 502 (1 lth Cir.
1983) (en bane).
Some trial judges have followed the prosecution's practice of assuring jurors that they have
no obligation to obey the law. E.g., In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 859, 457 P.2d 565, 568, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 736 (1969) (en bane) ("[W]e don't quarrel with anyone who disagrees with our law, of
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mon, and they do not always permit the defense to do so.2 82 Several
appellate decisions disregard Witherspoon's insistence that jurors personally opposed to the death penalty in all cases cannot for that reason
be assumed to be unwilling to obey the law and simply infer such an
unwillingness from a juror's opposition to the death penalty.2 83 These
decisions purport to meet Witherspoon's requirements, not by actually
asking veniremen whether they would obey the law, but by speculating
about what the answers to such a question would have been had it been
asked. Speculation of this kind is clearly impermissible under Witherspoon; there is no reason to assume that jurors who say that they will
not vote for the death penalty in fact have any idea that the law might
2 84
require them to do otherwise.
A number of lower court decisions properly hold that scrupled jurors cannot be excused for cause unless they are asked if they would
course, but it disqualifies you to serve as a juror in this case."); People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 514
n.14, 450 P.2d 564, 574 n.14, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 182 n.14 (1969) ("IT]he Court doesn't expect you to
do any violence to your own personal beliefs ....").
282. E.g., Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 305 (rex. Crim. App. 1970). The rejected defense
questions were: "Could you subordinate your personal view on the death penalty to what you
perceived your duty to abide by your oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State?" and
"[E]ven though you may have conscientious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty
for a crime, could you make those scruples subservient to your duty as a juror and to obey the law
of this State?" Id
283. In Geary v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1972), jurors who were never asked
whether they would obey the law were held to be properly excluded because their statements that
they would not vote for the death penalty "established that their attitude toward the death penalty
would prevent them from observing the instructions of the court in this or any other case where
the possible punishment was death." Id at 508; see also State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 211,
280 N.E.2d 915, 919-20 (1972) (juror's statement that she would "go along with" sentence preferred by other jurors was "substantial" evidence that she "would not be capable of applying the
law," even though she was never told the law required her to make her own decision nor asked if
she would obey the law); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187-88, 277 N.E.2d 201,206 (1971)
(jurors who expressed unwillingness to vote for death penalty, but who were never actually asked
about whether they would obey the law, made it "clear. . .that they could not make their beliefs
subservient to their oath as a juror"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); Ex parle Chambers, 612
S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (appellate court stated that excluded jurors
could not "follow the court's instructions," but voir dire shows they were never asked that question); Hughes v. State, 562 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (juror excused for stating
that he would not vote for death if there were "one iota of doubt," but was neither told that the
applicable legal standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor asked if he would obey that
law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 903 (1978).
284. What veniremen actually say about obeying the law seems at times to be of little importance to the appellate courts. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 22, 222 S.E.2d 308, 316 (proper
to excuse juror who stated both that he would not impose the death penalty and that he would
follow the instructions of the trial court), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Porter v. State, 623
S.W.2d 374, 379 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (juror who testified she did not know if she
could obey the law was properly excused since "she could not be trusted to abide by existing law
or follow conscientiously the instructions of the trial judge"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982);
Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (juror who stated three times,
without equivocation, that she would obey the law, correctly excused because "she would probably ... not follow the law"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979).
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follow the law and state that they would not. 285 Witherspoon itself

compels this conclusion, for it requires the retention of obedient jurors
and forbids an assumption of disobedience from the mere fact that a
juror opposes capital punishment. When jurors who have been told
nothing of their legal obligations are asked if they would always vote
for the death penalty, their answers cannot be interpreted to reveal anything more than what their "personal" preferences would be. 2 86 When
veniremen are told that the choice of penalty is theirs alone and that
the death penalty is not required in any particular case, they will naturally conclude that as jurors they are under no legal duty that might be
inconsistent with those personal views. 287 If actually questioned further, some of these jurors would undoubtedly agree to follow the law,

while others would not; what any particular juror would do is clearly a
matter of speculation. 288 Under Witherspoon, the state bears the burden of establishing that a disputed juror meets the constitutional standard for exclusion. That burden is particularly appropriate here because
the state simply has no legitimate interest in excluding a venireman
who is willing and able to comply with the state law. The fact that
prosecutors apparently think it tactically unwise to ask jurors whether
they will obey the law confims the importance of requiring that this
question be asked.
285. See Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1979) (error to excuse juror without
asking the questions that would show the juror's views regarding capital punishment were "sufficiently unbending to meet Witherspoon standards," including "whether, despite her expressed
convictions, she could put her disbelief aside and do her duty as a citizen"), affd on reh'g, 626
F.2d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (juror "prematurely excused" without questioning that
"might well have . . . revealed that she could lay her personal views aside, follow the court's
instructions, and do her duty"); Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 594, 277 S.E.2d 505, 509 (1981)
(juror's statement that his unwillingness to vote for death was "a personal thing" leaves "a doubt
as to whether he might be able to overcome his personal feelings in order to comply with the
mandates of the law"); cf.Watwood v. State, 389 So. 2d 549, 551 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (citing
Witherspoon in upholding dismissal of juror in non-capital case because of her unwillingness to
convict on the testimony of a single witness, and noting that better procedure would be for trial
judge to ask whether juror "would be able to follow the instructions of the trial judge regardless of
her personal opinions").
286. See, e.g., Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394, 398 (10th Cir. 1968) (juror McCalep) (juror
would obey law although he "personally 'did not go for it' "), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971);
Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 594, 277 S.E.2d 505, 509 (1981) (juror's opposition to the death
penalty "a personal thing"); Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 321, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
(en banc) (juror distinguishes her "personal feeling" from the law, which she would obey), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979).
287. An explanation of'jurors' legal obligations is necessary to ensure that jurors do not think
they are being asked if they would obey a law requiring them to impose the death penalty in a
case in which they thought it inappropriate. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
288. See Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1979) (arguments that scrupled juror
would have refused to obey the law were "mere speculations"; "nothing in her actual answers
forecloses" the possibility that she would agree to do so), afd on reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc).
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(b) Framing the inquiry.-Framing

the appropriate inquiry

is more difficult than concluding that it must be made. The question
most frequently asked of jurors is whether they could or would "follow
the law." 28 9 But without more a juror cannot possibly understand what
this question means in the context of a capital case, and thus a court

could not know what interpretation to attach to the juror's answer.
Scrupled jurors might, for example, assume that there are certain kinds
of cases in which the law requires the imposition of the death sentence,
and that they are being asked if they would vote for it regardless of
whether they felt that the death penalty was the wrong punishment in a
particular case. 2 90 Proceeding under that misunderstanding, some jurors who are in fact qualified to sit, or who even favor the death penalty in certain cases, might nonetheless refuse to agree to "follow the
law." Other jurors might refuse to do so because they simply do not
know what the law requires and thus are naturally reluctant to assent
without first being told to what they are being asked to agree. Other
questions in this area involve similar problems. Jurors are asked if they
would "act under" or "in accordance with" or "accept ' 29 1 the law or
289. E.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978) (trial court inquiry of venireman) ("Do
you feel that you could. . . follow the law. . . ?"); Swindler v. State, 267 Ark. 418, 429, 592
S.W.2d 91, 97 (1979) (prosecutor question) ("[I]f you listened to the evidence and you found that
under our law this was a proper case for the death penalty, then could you follow Arkansas law, or
would you stick to your own personal feelings?"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057 (1980); In re Hillery,
71 Cal. 2d 857, 860 n.I, 457 P.2d 565, 568 n.1, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 n.1 (1969) (court question)
("[E]ven though [capital punishment] is the law, you don't think you could follow the law
?"); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6
(1969) (court question) (juror Locke) ("Notwithstanding your opposition to the death penalty, are
you prepared to follow that law. . . ?"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Peterson v. State, 242
So. 2d 420, 425 (Miss. 1970) (court question) (could jurors "follow the law" and "follow the instructions of the court. . . ?"), rev'd, 268 So. 2d 335 (Miss. 1972); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d
134, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (defense question) (could juror "follow the law and answer [the
statutory] questions based only on the evidence"); cf.Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 64, 67 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1979) (Bookout, J., dissenting) (would juror "follow [his] oath?"); State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 73, 91, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1048 (1976) (juror did not "think" she could "fairly follow the
law"), vacated, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
290. The inevitable result of the trial court's unexplained references to "the law".., was
that [the juror] responded to the examination under the impression that "the law' classes
certain kinds of cases as "proper" for the infliction of the death penalty and that if the
defendant is found guilty of a crime of this class, the jury will be requiredto impose the
death penalty.
In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 860, 457 P.2d 565, 568, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1969) (emphasis in
original) (quoting People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 515, 450 P.2d 564, 575-76, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172,
183-84 (1969) (en banc)); see also Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 396-97, 474 P.2d 557, 562
(1970) (question whether jurors would follow "this law" insufficient "against the backdrop of a
rather terse and somewhat vague explanation of a juror's duties in a capital case").
291. E.g., People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 809, 452 P.2d 661, 671, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445, 455
(1969) (en banc) (jurors told they are qualified if "willing to act under the law as it now exists"),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); Justus v. State, 542 P.2d 598, 606 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975)
(prosecution question) (could juror accept the "instructions of the court?"), vacated, 428 U.S. 907
(1976); State v. Clark, 423 A.2d 1151, 1156 (1981) (court question) ("Wlould you have any hesitation, in voting in accordance with the law and the evidence?").

1055

Texas Law Review

Vol. 62:977, 1984

court instructions, or whether they would oppose the death penalty "regardless of the law,"292 all without being told what the law and the jury
instructions will require. They are questioned about how they would
resolve a conflict between their consciences and the law,2 93 but are
given no explanation of how such a conflict could arise. Some courts
inquire whether jurors could "subordinate" their personal views to the
law, 294 without disclosing the substance of the law to which those views
might need to be subordinated. In other cases jurors are asked if they
would vote for death when the law "requires" them to do so,295 even
though state law in fact does not and constitutionally could not 296 require any such thing.
These difficulties are not merely semantic. Courts and counsel
generally have failed to ask meaningful questions about obedience to
the law because they do not know how to describe what it is that the
law requires a juror to do. Witherspoon itself provides no guidance,
and the Supreme Court has ruled out the possibility that a vote for or
against the death penalty could ever be required. 297 Under a constitutional sentencing statute, the legal obligations of jurors are not substantive, but procedural; they concern not whether jurors are actually to
292. E.g., Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) ("Are your reservations
about the death penalty such that regardless of the law, the facts and the circumstances of the case,

you could not inflict the death penalty... ?").
293. Eg., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (court question) ("You
would go by your conscience rather than the law?"), a'd,352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); People v.
Gardner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 855 n.8, 457 P.2d 575, 583 n.8, 79 Cal. Rptr. 743, 751 n.8 (1969) (juror
Gaines) (court question) ("Is your conviction on the subject so strong that were the Court to
instruct you upon the law, and there to be some conflict between your thought on the subject and
the law, do you feel in your present state of mind that your philosophy might prevail over what
the Court stated as the law?").
294. Eg., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (court question) ("I am
asking you if you would be unable to subordinate your own personal views as to capital punishment?"), af'd,352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973, 975 (Fla.) (scrupled
juror is qualified if he "could nevertheless subordinate his views to what he perceives to be his
duty to abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the state"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059
(1981); Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 54, 243 S.E.2d 496, 503 (1978) (court question) ("Can you
subordinate your personal feelings on the issue of the death penalty as a juror so as to obey the
laws of the state as charged by the Trial Court?"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
295. E.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 960 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (court question)
(would juror vote for death in a case where "the evidence should be such that under the law that
should be the legal recommendation"), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Porter v.
State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 379 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc) (defense question) (Would juror "do
your duty as a citizen and make whatever decision based upon the evidence before you that the
law might require"?), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, 62 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (court question) ("[I]f it became your duty to [vote for the death
penalty], you could not do so?"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979);

f Darden v. Wainwright, 513

F. Supp. 947, 960 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (juror Varney) (juror would not vote for death penalty even
though law required him to do so), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (1lth Cir. 1983) (en banc).
296. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (overturning mandatory death sentence
statute).
297. See id
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vote for or against the death penalty, but only the manner in which
they are to arrive at that decision. Although state sentencing statutes
vary considerably, all impose on jurors three basic "procedural" obligations: (1) to consider the evidence relevant to the choice of penalty;
(2) to give particular weight2 9" to the statutory criteria for selecting the
penalty; and (3) to apply to the evidence and criteria standards that do
not automatically rule out either a life or a death sentence.
These procedural requirements do not, of course, constitute a set
of rules that they could be applied mechanically to determine the penalty in any particular case. State sentencing statutes do not purport to
determine the relative weight to be given to every possible circumstance.299 A juror, even with the aid of a guided discretion statute,
must bring to bear on that decision some personal views about the
comparative severity and propriety of the death penalty and of the noncapital alternative. For example, a juror who thinks capital punishment is extremely severe would require many aggravating factors and a
total absence of mitigating factors before imposing that penalty, while
an enthusiastic advocate of capital punishment would vote for it under
a wider range of circumstances. But a juror who has no opinion about
the severity and propriety of capital punishment can no more make an
intelligent decision about whether to impose the death penalty than a
juror who simply does not know the meaning of the phrase "death
penalty."
Thus, Witherspoon and its progeny are wrong in suggesting that a
scrupled juror could or should simply "lay aside" his or her own standards and obey the law. A juror must use some personal standards in
order to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors that may be involved in assessing the proper penalty. A scrupled juror who undertakes to "obey the law" and "consider imposing the death penalty" is
likely to do one or more of three very different things. First, the juror
may treat his or her preexisting personal standards as tentative in nature. Such a juror might change his or her views because of the arguments of counsel or fellow jurors or because of the particular facts of
the case. Second, the juror might alter his or her values to create some
category of cases in which death is an appropriate penalty. Third, the
298. Although a state may limit the aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death
penalty, it cannot restrict the mitigating considerations that a jury might wish to consider. See
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-05 (1978).
299. The Texas death penalty statute purports on its face to do so. See TEx. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1984). But the Supreme Court has upheld that law
on the assumption that that statute does not mean what it says. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
269-74 (1976).
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juror might try to construct a fresh set of standards that combine in
some way his or her original personal attitude with the statutory criteria, increasing, for example, the importance attached to the aggravating
criteria emphasized by state law.
These nuances, however, are far too subtle and complex to explore
in the voir dire of an actual case. Trial courts need a line of inquiry
that will make sense to an ordinary venireman, as well as to counsel
and judges, and that will conform roughly to the legitimate requirements of state law without resulting in the exclusion of qualified jurors.
These requirements can best be met by asking whether the juror would
consider the death penalty and determine punishment based on the evidence and circumstances of the case, 3° rather than ruling out the death
penalty before the trial and before hearing any witnesses. This inquiry
alone, however, is not sufficient. Jurors also must be told in no uncertain terms that the law and their oaths as jurors require them to determine the penalty in that manner. 30 ' This cannot be accomplished by
casually including in a general question a phrase like "as required by
law." Courts cannot be sure that jurors will focus on every word of a
complex question. More importantly, such a minor insertion is likely
to have far less impact on a venireman than the judge's instructions to
the jury at the end of the trial. Because the issue under Witherspoon is
whether veniremen would, if selected for the jury, obey the court's instructions, they must be informed of their obligations under the law
with the same force and clarity as they would be at the trial. Only if
jurors state, after receiving such a firm and specific explanation of their

300. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 48 Ala. App. 304, 316, 264 So. 2d 529, 540 (Crim. App.) (court
question) ("[WIould you be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law-and that
includes the capital punishment. . .?"), rev'd, 288 Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971); In re Hillery,
71 Cal. 2d 857, 859 n.l, 457 P.2d 565, 567 n.1, 79 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 n.1 (1969) ("[W]ould you
keep an open mind and wait to make up your mind until after you have heard the Court's instructions and all evidence?"); Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (court question) (could juror consider "the full range of punishment provided by the laws") (emphasis
omitted); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 356 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (defense question)
("[C]ould you follow the law and in a proper case consider the death penalty despite your bias?")
(emphasis omitted), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981).
301. There are no reported cases in which this was done. The trial court in State v. Cherry,
298 N.C. 86, 104, 257 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980), refused to instruct
veniremen that they had an obligation to obey the law. A general unexplained admonition to
obey the law was given in State v. Theus, 207 Kan. 571, 576, 485 P.2d 1327, 1332 (1971). The most
specific reported instruction explaining the duties of jurors in capital cases was given in order to
qualify a juror for service. O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en
banc) ("[You have to consider the entire range of punishment and you have to keep an open
mind as to the entire range of punishment ..
"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); see also State
v. Terry, 472 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo. 1971) (en banc) jurors "should set their personal beliefs aside
and consider [the death penalty]"), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
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legal duties, that they will not obey the law may they constitutionally
be excused.
4. Inadequate andMisleading Questions
(a) Sef-disqualfication.-In light of the various difficulties
in obtaining from jurors a description of their views that meets Witherspoon's standards, a number of decisions suggest that rather than at-

tempting to apply those standards to a juror's stated position, trial
judges should merely describe the standards to the juror and let him or
her decide if he or she is qualified. At the trial court level, veniremen
30 2
are occasionally asked if they are qualified to sit as jurors.
This approach is manifestly unsound. The responsibility for assuring compliance with Witherspoon falls on the state, acting through
trial judges, and not upon jurors.30 3 The application of Witherspoon to
the wide variety of juror views raises a host of legal questions; it would
be virtually impossible to instruct a juror regarding the answer to each
302. In Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981), for example, the trial judge stated before voir dire:
The Court will now explain to you the standard by which your qualification to serve as a
juror is measured. The Court will then ask you to search your own conscience and tell
the Court whether, measured by that standard, you feel you are qualified to serve as a
juror.

Id. at 975. Subsequently, the judge asked if a juror knew of any reason why he "should not sit."
Id. at 976.
A number of appellate decisions stress that jurors who were excused fully understood the
applicable legal standard. E.g., Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir. 1968) ("[Tlhe
prospective jurors who were excused were aware that they were dismissed because they would not
even consider returning a verdict of death.
...), rev'd menL, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); Wilson v.
State, 371 So. 2d 932, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("[The trial court made it unmistakably clear to
these prospective jurors that only such jurors who could not or would not impose the death penalty under any circumstances would be excused for cause."); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 429,
452 P.2d 232, 237 (1969) ("[I]t would be wholly unrealistic to assume that each [juror] did not
understand what part their convictions with respect to the death penalty would play in their possible selection as jurors ..
"), rev'drein., 403 U.S. 946 (1971). But none of these cases involves
jurors who were asked if they were qualified; rather, the jurors were asked palpably inadequate
questions, such as whether they opposed the death penalty. Eg., Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d
249, 252 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971). The argument implicit in these cases
seems to be that the jurors disregarded the questions they were actually asked and answered instead the question that should have been asked. In State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 678, 458
P.2d 558, 575 (1969), rev'd memz., 403 U.S. 946 (1971), a disputed juror stated that she did not
"believe in capital punishment" and agreed with the court's assertion that that was "a pretty good
disqualification."
After asserting that all jurors understood the applicable standard, the court
concluded that "[hier remarks when read in conjunction with the total record ofvoir dire proceedings negate any conclusion that she merely harbored doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment." Id. at 679, 458 P.2d at 576. The argument that opposition to the death penalty can be
equated with a decision to never vote to impose the death penalty was expressly urged and rejected inln re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 1017-19, 458 P.2d 449, 461-63, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 549-51 (1969).
The Supreme Court decisions reversing State v. Adams, Segura v. Patterson, and State v. Aiken
necessarily disapprove of this far-fetched suggestion.
303. See, e.g., In re Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 702 n.2, 456 P.2d 129, 131 n.2, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857,
859 n.2 (1969).
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of those questions. Considering the enormous difficulty that state
judges have had in understanding and complying with Witherspoon, it
is inconceivable that laymen untutored in the law could do so. Under
certain circumstances jurors are authorized to apply legal standards to
facts that they themselves must find, but this occurs only when the factual findings are based on evidence adduced in open court and the relevant standards are clearly spelled out. When a juror is asked to apply
some ill-defined standard to his or her own unstated views, however,
only the juror ever knows what those views are. Counsel for the parties
have no opportunity to explore those attitudes, and there is no record
that an appellate court could review. This approach is essentially lawless, an open invitation to veniremen to remove themselves from any
30 4
case in which they would merely prefer not to participate.
(b) Multiple questions.-In some instances, prosecutors or
judges have asked jurors two, three, or even four 3° 5 different questions
in a single query. In such cases it is impossible to know which question
the juror has, answered. This problem is of critical importance when
one of the questions is clearly inadequate for Witherspoon purposes.
Thus, a negative answer to the question
Are you prepared to consider fairly and fully the death penalty
. . . and to impose
it should the facts and circumstances of this
3°6
case so warrant?
may mean that the juror would never vote for the death penalty; or it
may mean only that the juror, although willing to do so in some cases,
believes that his or her scruples preclude a "fair" decision. The
problems of understanding a juror's answer are even greater when opposition to the death penalty would tend to result in a negative answer
307
to the first part of the question and a positive answer to the second.
304. See, e.g., Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 57 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 2d
814, 840, 608 P.2d 689, 703-04, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615, vacated, 449 U.S. 810 (1980); Fryrear v.
Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321, 323 (juror Morton), 324 (juror Blackwell) (Ky. 1971); Justus v.
State, 542 P.2d 598, 609 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (juror Cox), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976); Pierson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (T'ex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
305. E.g., Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 64, 65 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (two questions); People v.
Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1969) (two questions), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (four questions); Peterson v. State, 242 So. 2d 420, 425 (Miss. 1970) (three questions); State v. Noell, 284
N.C. 670, 686, 202 S.E.2d 750, 760 (1974) (two questions), vacatedin part, 428 U.S. 902 (1975);
Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 379 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (four questions), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
965 (1982).
306. Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 78, 179 S.E.2d 76, 84 (1970).
307. See, e.g., People v. Robles, 71 Cal. 2d 924, 931, 458 P.2d 67, 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972).
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(c) Misleading "clarfication"inquiries.-A far more serious
problem occurs when courts and counsel ask questions likely to distort
or give an inaccurate picture of the juror's position. Not only are the
answers obtained in this manner inherently unreliable, but all subsequent answers may be tainted by the resulting misunderstanding, perhaps compounded by a juror's desire not to appear to be vacillating.
The most common technique of this kind is first to ask a juror if he or
she opposes the death penalty, and then, framing the next question in a
manner which suggests that it is identical to the first, to ask if the juror
would always vote against the death penalty. In this way prosecutors
and judges have equated the existence of conscientious scruples about

the death penalty with a refusal to vote for it in any case. 30 8 This ap-

proach has been used to suggest to jurors that they have pledged automatic opposition to the death penalty when they merely said that
voting for the death penalty would "bother" them.30 9 Jurors who have
said they "think" or "believe" they would not vote for death are in3 10
duced in this way to assent to a statement without that qualification.
308. E.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 678 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,455 U.S. 1636
(1982); Geary v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Ky. 1972); Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549,
565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134,
140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
Opposition to capital punishment has also been equated with refusal to vote for it under any
circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. Whisman, 431 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.3 (5th Cir. 1970) (jurors
Young, Ramey, and Hare); Bell v. State, 290 Ala. 218, 219-20, 275 So. 2d 649, 650-51 (1973);
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678,701 n.3, 452 P.2d 329,341 n.3, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 257 n.3 (1969), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); People v. Bernette, 45 Ill. 2d 227, 231, 258 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1970),
rev'dmem, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 208-09, 280 N.E.2d 915, 919-20 (1972); Ex
parte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 574 n.l (ex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc); see also Fleming v.
State, 374 So. 2d 954, 956 n.2 (Fla. 1979) (equating opposition to death penalty with inability to
visualize circumstances in which it should be used); State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 34, 269 A.2d 1, 7
(1970) (equating nonapproval of death penalty with refusal to vote for it), modifled, 60 N.J. 60,286
A.2d 55 (1972). Similarly, a juror's nonbelief in the death penalty is occasionally equated with a
refusal to ever vote for its imposition. See, e.g., State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 324-25, 218 S.E.2d
327, 329-30 (1975); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 843 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (juror
Askey); see also Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 396 (rex. Crim. App. 1971) (juror Crockett)
(statement of nonbelief in death penalty equated with statement that penalty would influence
juror's verdict); Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 392, 474 P.2d 557, 562 (1970) (statement of
nonbelief in death penalty equated with statement that juror would disobey law). In one case, the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals directed a lower court first to ask a juror the following
question: "[D]id you . . . believe in or entertain a belief against the use of capital punishment
. . ?" If the juror answered in the affirmative, the trial court was to ask: "Since you.., have
stated under oath that you do not believe you could impose the death penalty. . . would you be
irrevocably committed to vote against ... an imposition of the death penalty. . . regardless of
the facts and circumstances ... T" Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 64, 65 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (emphasis added).
309. E.g., Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 258 (rex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935
(1977).
310. See, e.g., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 425 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aftrdin
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Jurors are thus misled from one answer to a second very different answer with phrases such as "in other words," or "your answer is
then." 311 Equations of this sort are rarely if ever made between two
questions that are in fact the same; were that the case the second question would be unnecessary.
There are a variety of reasons why misleading questions of this
kind elicit the desired second answer regardless of whether that answer
accurately represents the juror's views. If a judge or prosecutor, a person of presumed expertise and authority, asserts that "I oppose capital
punishment" is the same statement as "I would never vote for the death
penalty," a juror untrained in the law is likely to assume that they
mean the same thing. At the least, a juror might reasonably conclude
that any differences were legally unimportant, although precisely the
opposite is true. Similarly, a juror inclined to qualify a reply with "I
might" might readily dispense with that qualification if a subsequent
question indicated that there was no significant or relevant difference
between the statements "I might never vote for death" and "I would
part,rev'dinpart,705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.), af/dinpart,rev'dinparton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1 1th
Cir. 1983) (en banc); State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 30, 269 A.2d 1, 6 (1970), modified, 60 N.J. 60, 286
A.2d 55 (1972).
311. E.g., Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1979) ("in other words"), af'don
reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 331, 240 S.E.2d 833,
837 (1977) ("your answer is then"); People v. Bernette, 45 Ill. 2d 227, 231, 258 N.E.2d 793, 795
(1970) ("in other words"); Duisen v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) ("in other
words"), vacated, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.1 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981) (en banc) ("in other words").
Other phrasings are commonly employed to accomplish the same end. These include "then I
take it," e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 678 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1636
(1982); People v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 776 n.1, 452 P.2d 650, 655 n.l, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 439
n.1 (1969) (juror Richards), aff'd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d
321, 322 (Ky. 1971) (juror Patterson); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 300 (jurors Osterman, Britt,
and Stelly), 301 (jurors Kent and Burton) (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), "do I understand," e.g., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983);
State v. Laskey, 21 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 257 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1970); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d
834, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d
421,439, 452 P.2d 232, 242 (1969) (juror Painter), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971), "do you mean,"
e.g., Smith v. Whisman, 431 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.3 (5th Cir. 1970) (jurors Penn, Young, and
Ramey); Whisman v. State, 224 Ga. 793, 795, 164 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1968); Geary v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W. 2d 505, 508 (Ky.1972) (juror Shannon), "are you saying," e.g., State v. Artis, 57
N.J. 24, 34, 269 A.2d 1, 8 (1970), modfied, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972); State v. Jarette, 284
N.C. 625, 639, 202 S.E.2d 721, 731 (1974), "are you telling the court," e.g., Burns v. Estelle, 592
F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1979) (juror Tillman), af'd on reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc); Mack v. State, 375 So. 2d 476, 491 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), vacated, 448 U.S. 903 (1980);
Lamar v. State, 266 Ind. 689, 697-98, 366 N.E. 2d 652, 657 (juror Pauley), 658 (juror Essig) (1977);
Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293, 295 (rex. Crim. App. 1975) (juror Guttridge), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1135 (1979), "so you feel," e.g., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)
(juror Walton), a/f'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W. 2d 246,258 (Tex. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977), and "I assume then," e.g., Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.
2d 572, 575 n.1 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane); see also Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d
513, 519 (Ky. 1972) ("So. .. I take it then").
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never vote for death." This technique often conveys the impression
that although the juror has given a proper answer, the court for some
technical reason requires the use of different words. When misleading
questions are employed in this manner, a juror's natural desire to be
accommodating is augmented by a desire to appear to be consistent.
(d) Tailored sequential questions.-A related approach is
simply to ask jurors leading questions. 3 12 This may be done in the
traditionally improper manner by indicating to the juror the answer
that the questioner is seeking.3 13 But the more common practice is to
ask the juror a carefully framed sequence of questions that lead from
opposition to capital punishment to a refusal to vote for the death penalty.3 14 In one case, where a venireman opposed to the death penalty
failed to give a disqualifying answer to the second question concerning
312. The use of leading questions in Witherspoon voir dires was criticized in Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 519 (Ky. 1972) ("We think it the better practice to elicit information
from prospective jurors and not lead them ....
").
313. The following sequence demonstrates this type of leading question:
Q. Do you feel under no circumstances could you ever vote [the death] penalty in any
type of a given case; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
People v. McGautha, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 777 n.1, 452 P.2d 650, 655 n.1, 76 Cal. Rptr. 434, 439 n.1
(1969) (juror Umsted), affd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); see also Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 921
(N.D. Tex. 1969) ("You can conceive of no set of facts ... which would permit you as a juror to
vote and write a death sentence in a case of murder, is that right?"), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir.
1970); People v. Varnum, 70 Cal. 2d 480, 492 n.8, 450 P.2d 553, 560 n.8, 75 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 n.8
(1969) ("And it is your feeling ... under no circumstances in a proper case would you ever vote
for that type of punishment?"), cert.denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 166,
548 P.2d 442, 446 (1976) ("Even before the trial is begun ... you feel it would be impossible for
you to vote guilty, knowing there was a mandatory death penalty connected with it?").
314. This is frequently done with two questions, the second one often leading:
Q. Do you have conscientious scruples against capital punishment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You couldn't vote to bring in a verdict that would cause the judge to have to sentence a man to the electric chair?
A. No, sir.
Alexander v. Henderson, 330 F. Supp. 812, 820 (W.D. La. 1971); see also Smith v. Balkcom, 660
F.2d 573, 575 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 424 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (16 of 19 veniremen who stated they opposed capital punishment indicated they would
never vote for it), affd inpart,rev'dinpart, 705 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir.), af'din part, rev'dinpart on
reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1lth Cir. 1983) (en banc); Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 922 (juror
Moore), 923 (juror Griffin and Sheppard), 924 (jurors Cobb and Blair) (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd,
434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970); Paramore v. State, 251 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(jurors LaBell, Stirman, LeBlane, and Viera); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135, 261 S.E.2d 803,
808 (1980); State v. Carver, 30 Ohio St. 2d 280, 284 n.l, 285 N.E.2d 26, 30 n.1 (1972); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 517, 184 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972). It
may also be accomplished by the use of a three-question sequence. Eg., Morrison v. State, 398
So. 2d 730, 741 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 78 n.4, 447 P.2d 913,
923 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 531 n.4 (1968) (juror Ramirez), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); Goodwin v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 193, 193, 253 S.E.2d 156, 157, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); State v.
Eaton, 19 Ohio St. 2d 145, 150 n.1, 249 N.E.2d 897, 902 n.1 (1969) (juror Willis), vacated,408 U.S.
935 (1972); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 34-35, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1977).
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how he would vote, the court twice reasked, not the second question
alone, but both questions in the same deliberate sequence. 3 15 The
widespread use of this apparently irrelevant initial question about conscientious scruples reflects an intuitive understanding that such sequential questioning increases the likelihood of eliciting a statement of
unwillingness to vote for the death penalty.
This approach would not succeed if it involved obviously distinct
questions with clearly understood differences in their legal consequences, such as
Were you at the Shady Bar on the night of September 26, 1982?
and
Did you kill the bartender while you were there?
But the factual and legal difference between opposition to the death
penalty and a refusal to vote for it are not likely to be apparent to many
jurors. When jurors are asked about the details of their often ill-defined views regarding capital punishment, even the slightest pressure or
encouragement can lead them to give answers that do not accurately
reflect their views, or to assent to the existence of a particular position
when they really have no position at all. Placing questions in the se3 16
quence described above can have such an effect for several reasons.
First, the questioner's demeanor and tone of voice can suggest as effectively as a phrase like "in other words" that the answer to the last question is controlled by the answer or answers the juror has already given.
Second, when the same series of questions is asked of all scrupled jurors in the presence of one another, 317 that pattern may convey the impression that the later questions do not raise different issues but are
merely part of some technical legal routine. Third, by beginning the
questioning with a reference to conscience and religion, rather than, for
example, to a citizen's duty to enforce the law, the questioner highlights
the values likely to elicit the desired disqualifying answer.

315. State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 685-86, 213 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1975), vacated,428 U.S. 903

(1976).
316. The use of sequential questions was criticized in Hobbs v. State, 273 Ark. 125, 129, 617
S.W.2d 347, 349 (1981), on the ground that it was confusing to jurors.
317. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 538, 224 S.E.2d 386, 390 (1976) (holding that
procedure for asking Witherspoon questions does not rise to level of constitutional scrutiny); State
v. Carver, 30 Ohio St. 2d 280, 284 n.1, 285 N.E.2d 26,30 n.1 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 212
Va. 515, 517, 184 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1972). In Mississippi, the lower
courts actually have been instructed to use such sequential questions. Myers v. State, 254 So. 2d
891, 893-94 (Miss. 1971) (citing Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d 589, 593 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 965 (1969)).
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(e) Inducing "unequivocal" answers.-A common technique
that yields misleading or inaccurate answers is to induce or compel uncertain jurors to give apparently unequivocal answers. 318 This approach may also be used before the voir dire begins to prevent jurors
from giving answers that would reveal their uncertainty or indecision.3 19 The most extreme version of this technique requires jurors to

respond to questions, not with words, but by some physical act, such as
raising their hands or standing.3 20 Jurors who are told to stand if they
are unwilling to impose the death penalty and to remain seated if will-

ing to impose that penalty have no way of indicating-unless they are
willing to disregard the court's directions-that they are not sure of

their position.
The more frequently used method of achieving this effect is to
limit the verbal answers jurors may give. Jurors have been told before
the voir dire that they are to answer questions about their ability to
'32
impose the death penalty with the words "I can" or "I cannot."
Often a juror who has already given an uncertain or undecided answer
to some question is directed to respond to the same question in specific
'322 Anwords, by being told, for example, "Ujust answer yes or no.
318. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 399 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (Randall, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (prosecutor stated before questioning that "if you don't know at this
point and you are not able to tell me, then that does not really help me"), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
3553 (1983); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 68-69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 569-70 (1972) (jurors
were told the question that would be asked and were instructed to reply either "I can" or "I
cannot").
320. E.g., McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 423 (N.D. Ga. 1981), af/'d in part,
rev'dinpart,705 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.), affdinpart,rev'din parton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.
1983) (en banc); Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981); Berard v. State, 402
So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); People v. Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 78 n.4, 477 P.2d
913, 923 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 531 n.4 (1968), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); Goodwin v.
Hopper, 243 Ga. 193, 193, 253 S.E.2d 156, 157, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
321. E.g., State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 68-69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 569-70 (1972). A1nderson disapproved of this method of interrogating jurors on the grounds that it would likely interfere with the process of "determin[ing] the real state of their minds." Id. at 70 n. 1, 282 N.E.2d at
570 n.1.
322. State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 651, 258 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1979). Other, similar, admonitions
may be subtly more coercive. See, e.g., Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131-32 (N.D. Miss.
1981) ("Yes or no?"); Wilson v. State, 371 So.2d 932, 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("Just give us
your bestjudgment-yes or no."); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 463, 212 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1975) ("I
just want you to tell me if you could not do that."), vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) ("Could you or couldn't you. . . ?"), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); Garcia v. State, 501 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) ("either
you could or you couldn't"); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) ("The
answers that we need from you are yes or no."), vacated,454 U.S. 959 (1981); Exparte Chambers,
612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.l (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane) ("He's asked you two or three times,
lady ....
[C]an you do it or can't you do it?"); id. at 574 n.l ("I have to get a yes or no answer
from you on each question that we ask."); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 260 (Tex. Crim. App.)
("I need a definite answer. Do you feel like that you could or you couldn't do that?"), certdenied,
434 U.S. 935 (1977); id. at 258 ("You either can or you can't.
...); Matthews v. State, 471

1065

Texas Law Review

Vol. 62:977, 1984

other approach is to admonish the juror not to be so vague, 323 or to
rebuke the juror in a manner which implies that by giving an uncertain
answer he or she has obstinately refused to answer the question at
all.324 A related technique is to advise jurors who give undecided or
uncertain answers that their responses have not provided the court and
32 5
counsel with the information that they "need to know."
The importance of this technique for the application of Witherspoon is greatly increased by the fact that it almost always distorts the
responses of jurors in favor of the prosecution. The vast majority of the
undecided jurors admonished or directed to give a more "specific" answer comply with such instructions.3 2 6 Similarly, most uncertain jurors
change their responses if told that they must not give a qualified answer. 327 In the seventeen reported cases in which uncertain jurors
S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) ("You either can or you can't .. "),cert. denied, 408
U.S. 940 (1972); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 300 (rex. Crim. App. 1970) ("Without qualification you either do or don't ....");State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 443, 452 P.2d 232, 246 (1969)
(en banc) ("Just search your own mind and answer it yes or no."), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971);
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981) ("could you or couldn't you"), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 922 (1982).
323. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 679, 458 P.2d 558, 575 (1966) ("We have to
have a little more definite statement."), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971); see also State v. Mercer,
618 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Mo.) (en bane) ("We need you to be a little more precise."), cer. denied, 454
U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1972) ("I would
like to. . .have from your conscience a definite statement .. ");Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d
246,260 (rex. Crim. App.) ("I need a definite answer."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); cf.State
v. Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 421, 443, 452 P.2d 232, 246 (1969) (juror Pulver) ('You know your own
mind better than anyone else."), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
324. E.g., White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) ("Imust insist you give
us an answer."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977); see also State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135, 261
S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980) ("I have to have an answer."); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex.
Crim. App.) (en banc) ("You have to answer."), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Sf.Davis v. State,
241 Ga. 376, 389, 247 S.E.2d 45, 53 (Hill, J., dissenting) (juror's response "not a full answer"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 947 (1978).
325. Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977); see also Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("[w]e have just got to
know"); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 764 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6
(1969) ("[w]e want to know now"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972). In most instances these
questions and remarks are made by the trial judge, see cases cited supra notes 322-24, thus increasing their impact on the venireman.
326. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Avery, 299 N.C.
126, 135-36, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 463, 212 S.E.2d 142, 144
(1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Anderson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 570
(1972); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572, 575 n.l (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc); Granviel v.
State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 433 (1977); State v.
Aiken, 75 Wash.2d 421, 438, 452 P.2d 232, 242 (1969) (en bane) (juror Frewaldt), rev'dmem., 403
U.S. 946 (1971).
The technique failed to change the position of undecided jurors in Hughes v. State, 562
S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane) (juror McClay), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 903 (1978),
and in Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 261 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935
(1977).
327. See, e.g., Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Miss. 1981); Swindler v. State,
267 Ark. 418,430, 592 S.W.2d 91, 97 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1057 (1980); People v.
Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 446 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 768 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 n.6 (1969) (en banc),
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changed their answers because of this type of questioning, every juror
shifted to a statement of unqualified refusal to impose the death penalty.328 Among the undecided jurors questioned in this way, all who
gave different answers moved to a tentative or firm refusal to vote for
the death penalty.3 29 The implications of this pattern reach beyond
cases in which a court expressly orders jurors to give a "yes" or "no"
answer. The remarks of jurors in a number of cases indicate that jurors
assume, even without such an order, that such simple answers are required. 330 Thus, in the absence of an explanation that the veniremen
need not give "yes" or "no" answers, all juror responses must be re3 31
garded as suspect.
The use of this technique is based in large measure on a view of
Witherspoon that was rejected in 1971 by the Supreme Court when it
disapproved the practice of excluding undecided jurors. 332 Some lower
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (juror
Grady); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State
v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187, 277 N.E.2d 201, 205-06 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913
(1972); Garcia v. State, 501 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d
333, 353 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Exparle Chambers, 612
S.W.2d 572, 574 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane); Grijalva v. State, 614 S.W.2d 420, 422-23
(rex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc); Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 300-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970);
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 159 (Wyo. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
Some uncertain jurors continue to answer equivocally even when questioned in this way. See,
e.g., Irving v. Hargett, 518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d
430, 447, 455 P.2d 759, 769, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 665 (1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972
(1972); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 258 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977);
White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
328. See cases cited supra note 327.
329. See cases cited supra note 326.
330. In several cases jurors expressly based their answers on the assumption that a "yes" or
"no" answer was required. E.g., Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (juror
Grady) ("[Ilf there has to be a cut and dried answer. . . ."); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464,
471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (juror Pfeffer) ("Well, if it says a yes or a no, I would have to say yes
"), cert.
.. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980).
331. There appear to be several reasons why jurors who are pressured to give an unequivocal
response alter their answers in favor of the prosecution. Scrupled jurors strongly opposed to the
death penalty are naturally likely to disapprove of people who support or vote for the death penalty. Capital punishment is not, like wearing loud ties, a matter of individual taste; it is a moral
issue, and if it is evil, then, to some degree, so are those who undertake to carry it out. For
scrupled jurors to assert unequivocally that they would vote for the death penalty would be to
publicly assume a position they may well regard as reprehensible and to make a contingent commitment to do something that they view with distaste if not horror. Undecided jurors forced to
answer "yes" or "no" are asked two questions: first, which response is closer to their actual views,
and, second, whether they would find it more unpleasant to appear as definitely willing or as
definitely unwilling to vote to kill a defendant. Scrupled jurors might lean either way with regard
to the first issue, but almost by definition they are inclined against unequivocal public support for
the death penalty. When a venireman pressured in this way responded, "I would rather tell you
no, I couldn't do it," Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 260 (Tex. Crim. App.) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977), she was not describing her actual or probable views, but the
position with which she preferred to be identified if she had to embrace unequivocally and publicly one position or the other.
332. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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courts have suggested that in order to pass on the qualifications of a
venireman, a court must have "a final clear and unambiguous expression of the juror's views. ' 333 Trial judges pressing for a simple "yes" or
' 334
"no" answer commonly remark that they "need" or "have to get
such a reply. But Witherspoon is not predicated on the assumption that
all jurors are either clearly and firmly willing to impose the death penalty or absolutely unwilling to do so, and it does not require that all
prospective jurors be placed in one of these two categories. Witherspoon holds that only those veniremen who would never vote or consider voting for the death penalty may be excluded; all others, however
uncertain, imprecise, or unstable their views, must be permitted to
sit.335 There is thus no need to "clarify" the views of undecided, equivocal, or vacillating jurors, because their responses are sufficient to place
them in the group that Witherspoon protects from exclusion for cause.
Moreover, it is an illusion to believe that the response to a "yes or
no" question in some sense clarifies a juror's position. One can sensibly demand a "yes" or "no" answer to a question of fact ("Did you kill
Smith?") or to one regarding a present decision ("Do you want dinner?"). But the Witherspoon questions seek a prediction as to how the
juror will act in an unfamiliar proceeding at a later time. These are
questions for which many jurors evidently do not have answers. No
amount of insistence can decrease the respondent's uncertainty. At
most, when asked to give their "best judgment ' 336 about such a prediction, jurors may state their most probable course of action. So long as
they are unsure, however, they must be seated under Witherspoon; their
best guess is simply irrelevant. Given the natural inclination of jurors
to assume that courts want a simple "yes" or "no" answer, it is essential
that trial judges instruct prospective jurors that answers other than
"yes" or "no" are acceptable.
B. Appellate Deference and the Role of the Trial Court
Appellate courts occasionally purport to defer to the decision of
the trial judge instead of actually determining whether the requirements of Witherspoon in fact have been met. This is not a universal
333. State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 36, 269 A.2d 1, 7 (1970), modffed, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55
(1972).
334. E.g., State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981);
State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 135, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 353
(rex. Crim. App.) (en banc), vacated, 454 U.S. 959 (1981); Exparte Chambers, 612 S.W.2d 572,
574 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane); Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 260, 261 n.2 (Tex.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
335. See supra Part i.
336. E.g., Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
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practice, but is instead a technique to which appellate courts at times
resort when the literal language of the voir dire appears to fall short of
the constitutional standards. 3 37 Trial judges, for example, are said to
have a certain freedom or ability to infer the existence of attitudes
never actually voiced by the challenged jurors:
[A] trial court may find that a venireman cannot consider the
death penalty even though the venireman states no
338 more than a
belief that he could not or a doubt that he could.
The degree of deference accorded to the decision of the trial judge varies widely. Some opinions treat that decision as binding,339 while
others express a reluctance to ignore 3 40 to lightly disagree with, 34 1 or to
second guess 342 the action of a judge below. The process of determining the qualifications of veniremen is said to be "within the province of
the trial judge." 343 That judge's determinations are at times regarded
as controlling unless "clearly erroneous" 344 or, in a parody of Wither-

spoon itself, unless the appellate court can say that the juror's disqualification was "not 'unmistakably clear.' 345 Trial court determinations
may be decisive in the absence of "express language to the contrary by
337. Eg., State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 452 P.2d 232, 237 (1969) (en bane) ("[I]t may
be conceded that the voir dire testimony... could, from the standpoint of appellate review, have
...
), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
been more complete and definitive.
338. State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 142, 275 A.2d 721, 731 (1971).
339. E.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 84, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 628 (1970)
("Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the
trial court's determination of his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court."), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 972 (1972); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 452 P.2d 232, 236 (1969) (en banc) ("It
is sufficient. . . if a venireman communicates his views in such a fashion as to clearly convince
the trial judge that his opposition to the death penalty is honest, unyielding, and irrevocable."),
rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971). But see People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 442 n.12, 606 P.2d
241, 247 n.12, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 316 n.12 (questioning rule in Floyd), vacated, 448 U.S. 903
(1980).
340. E.g., Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (appellate court
cannot "unequivocally ignore the actions of those present, in the face of no express language by
the venireman"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
341. Eg., State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248,245 A.2d 20, 29 (1968) ("[The trial judge, who sees
and hears the juror, is better situated than we, and hence we would not lightly disagree with his
judgment."), rev'dmenL, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
342. Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("The [juror's] answers are
plainly contradictory. In such a case, we are reluctant to second-guess the decision of the trial
judge . . . ."); see also McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 408, 525 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
("[S]ome deference is due the judgment of the trial judge, who heard these two jurors as they
stated. . . then reconsidered positions ...."),afd in part, rev'd in part, 705 F.2d 1553 (11 th
Cir.), afj'dinparton reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (lth Cir. 1983) (en bane).
343. Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 546, 254 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1969), rev'dmen,
403 U.S. 947 (1971).
344. State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 188-89, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 913 (1972).
345. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 524, 273 S.E.2d 36, 43 (1980) ("The trial court's
determination that a juror is irrevocably committed to voting against the death penalty will not be
disturbed on appeal unless we can say [it] was not 'unmistakably clear.' "), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1011 (1981); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 250, 257 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1979) (same), cetL
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the venireman. '346
These appellate decisions cannot simply be dismissed as ingenious
attempts to uphold death sentences when the voir dire does not meet
Witherspoon standards. The recurring assumption that every juror in
fact has a specific opinion regarding the death penalty also plays a
role.3 47 If in some cases the words of the "cold record" 34 8 do not permit
an appellate court to determine the nature of an opinion whose existence is conclusively presumed, the only alternative is to leave the deci-

sion to the trial judge. 349 An appellate court is incapable of making or
reviewing such a decision because the transcript before it necessarily
does not contain sufficient information. 350 Under this approach, the
appellate court ignores the possibility that no court can make that determination, that the juror simply does not have a clear position "to
determine."
This abandonment by the appellate courts of their constitutional
responsibilities has predictably led to decisions upholding the exclusion
of jurors whose testimony fell woefully short of the requirements of
Witherspoon. In two 1971 cases in which the propriety of such appel351
late deference to the action of the trial judge was directly challenged,
denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 465, 248 S.E.2d 135, 141
(1978) (same), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
346. Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (trial court decision excusing juror is proof that juror's answer was clear and unambiguous unless there is "express language
to the contrary by the venireman").
347. Not every[one], in the unfamiliar atmosphere of a courtroom, is given to readily
expressing deep-seated opinions or views cogently or emphatically. Nevertheless, the
conscience and convictions of the meek or modest can and usually do run as deep and
unwavering as those of the person inclined to robust expression.
State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 452 P.2d 232, 236 (1969) (en banc), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946
(1971).
348. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 829 (rex. Crim. App. 1979); Hughes v. State,
563 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Tezeno v.
State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
349. As one judge remarked:
With discretion no longer the test, what will be done with the venireman who in one
breath says he cannot under any circumstances vote to impose the death penalty, but in
the next says that he can conceive of a case bad enough to induce him to inflict it, and
then, during a rehabilitative voir dire, concludes both ways again? In whom should discretion be vested to determine theJuror'sstate of mind-an appellate court reviewing the
answers from a typed record or the trial court who sees the juror and hears his answers?
Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 416, 474 P.2d 557, 573 (1970) (Hale, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
350. [The juror] stated that she did not know if she could be a party to the death penalty.
She never resolved the issue, as far as the record shows. The record will never disclose
whether or not [the juror]. . . looked and sounded so concerned about the death penalty
that the Court could reasonably conclude that she could never impose it.
Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 10, Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971).
351. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971)
("There is no place for a judge to exercise his discretion [under Witherspoon] .... "); Brief of
Respondent in Opposition at 43, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) ("Whether.. . in a particu-
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the Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision imposing the
death penalty.352 On the same day, the Court reversed six other decisions that either relied on 353 a presumed determination of the trial
court or were defended on 354 that basis.
Notwithstanding these
lar case, a proposed juror has the state of mind which it is the duty of the court trying the case to
decide .... ").
352. In one case, a juror testified that he had no opinion about the death penalty "one way or
the other." Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 542 n.1, 254 N.E.2d 415, 416 n.l (1969),
rev'drem., 403 U.S. 947 (1971). The Massachusetts Supreme Court, emphasizing that the determination of juror qualifications was a matter for the trial court, concluded: "We see no error in
the determination of the trial judge that the attitude of these three prospective jurors would make
it difficult for them to engage in an unprejudiced determination of guilt." Id. at 546, 254 N.E.2d
at 418. The trial court in fact made no such determination. In State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167,
248 N.E.2d 605 (1969) (citing Witherspoon), rev'dmem., 403 U.S. 946 (1971), the Ohio Supreme
Court reviewed the record, which revealed that two disputed jurors stated that they did not know
whether they could vote for the death penalty and that a third was never even asked, see Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 35-39, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), and held: "IT]he trial court
was fully justified in finding that each of the challenged prospective jurors would not under any
circumstances ever vote for a death penalty verdict ...." 18 Ohio St. 2d at 170, 248 N.E.2d at
607. The trial court made no such determination. The exclusion of jurors on equally meager
records has been upheld or defended on the same ground in other cases. See, e.g., State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 145 & n.2, 275 A.2d 721, 732 & n.2 (1971) (appellate court will "assume something transpired" to lead trial court to excuse juror who merely stated that he did not believe in the
death penalty); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 524 & n.10, 273 S.E.2d 36, 43 & n.10
(1980) (trial court decision excusing juror who stated that he did not feel the death penalty "helps
any" "will not be disturbed on appeal"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981); see also Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 10, 21, Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (trial court must
have concluded that juror could not vote for the death penalty although she stated she did not
know if she could).
353. E.g., Aiken v. Washington, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), rev'g State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421,
428-29, 452 P.2d 232, 237 (1969) (en banc); Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), rev'g State
v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 25 (1968).
354. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 10, 21, Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S.
947 (1971), rev'g State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (1969) (citing Witherspoon);
Response to the State of Louisiana at 6, Duplessis v. Louisiana, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), rev'g State v.
Duplessis, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969) ("[Ihe trial judge. . . would not have excused any
juror for cause. . . in this capital case unless the judge was convinced that the man would refuse
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances."); Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 1517, Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971), rev'g Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970) (citing Withersvoon); Brief in Opposition at 5, Segura v. Patterson, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), rev'g
402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1968) (quoting court of appeals argument regarding presumed reason
when trial judge excused jurors); Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 19,44, Wheat v. Washington, Aiken v. Washington, 403 U.S. 946 (1971), rey'g State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d
232 (1969). Two of these reversals involved Witherspoon violations considerably less blatant than
Lade/to and Pruett. In Mathis v. New Jersey, the disputed jurors had testified that they did not
"think" they could vote for the death penalty. The state court had upheld their exclusion on the
ground that the judge "who sees and hears the jurors, is better situated than we." 52 N.J. at 248,
245 A.2d at 25; see also Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitions for Writs of Certiorari at 20a,
Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (criticizing "deference to the trial court's interpretation
of a venireman's responses"). In Wheat v. Washington, the petitioner argued that the answers of
the challenged jurors were "equivocal." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Wheat v. Washington,
403 U.S. 946 (1971). The excluded veniremen included those who had stated that they did not
"think" (juror Frewalt), "feel" (juror Muryanna) or "believe" (juror Risvold) they could vote for
death, Aiken v. Washington, 75 Wash. 2d at 438, 452 P.2d at 242, as well as one who had vacillated, id at 439-40, 452 P.2d at 243 (juror Painter). In upholding their exclusion, the Washington
Supreme Court had emphasized the skill and experience of the trial judge and his ability to observe the "attitude, deportment, tone of voice and facial expressions" of the jurors. Brief for
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Supreme Court decisions, appellate courts continue to defer to the role
and decision of the trial judge to overcome deficiences in the actual
voir dires of scrupled jurors. As expounded seriatim by the state
courts, this approach has come to rest on three assumptions: that the
trial judge (1) understood and applied the constitutional standards;
(2) had access to information not contained in the record, yet somehow
sufficient to add to or even rebut the words of the jurors; and (3) made
a tacit factual finding that the Witherspoon requirements were met. On
the basis of these assumptions, the trial judge is said to have made a
decision that is entitled to weight or deference, a decision that an appellate court is not ordinarily in a position to question. These assumptions
are entirely without foundation, however, and are in many cases demonstrably false.
L Knowledge and Application of the Appropriate Standards.Given the widespread disagreement regarding the meaning of Witherspoon, the assertion that trial judges "know" the applicable standards is
nonsensical. A reading of the published transcripts strongly suggests
that few trial judges recognize the legal issues raised by the questions
and answers they hear. There is seldom anything in a specific case to
suggest whether the trial judge understood the most basic Witherspoon
requirements, not because trial judges are necessarily ill-informed, but
because they ordinarily do not articulate the standards they are applying when they excuse a venireman. Although appellate decisions commonly assert that trial judges knew of the applicable principles, 3 55 any
inferences about what those trial judges knew can ordinarily be based
only on the questions that they have asked 356-- often of jurors other
Respondent in Opposition at 19, 44, Wheat v. Washington, 403 U.S. 946 (1971). In the Supreme
Court, the state urged that "it would be completely unreasonable to presume that the trial court
misinterpreted the responses of [the] veniremen ...
" id, while the defendant attacked the suggestion that, notwithstanding the actual words of the veniremen, the "trial judge knew that they
really meant something other than what they said." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Wheat v.
Washington 403 U.S. 946 (1971). The action of the Supreme Court in Mathis and Wheat unambiguously rejected these attempts to salvage the exclusion of uncertain and vacillating jurors by
reliance on the action of the trial judge.
355. E.g., State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 36, 269 A.2d 1, 7 (1970) ("Examination of the voir dire
transcript makes it clear that the trial judge correctly understood the controlling principle."), modified, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972); State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 142, 275 A.2d 721, 729 (1971)
(trial court was "operating under" the correct standard); Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 1920, Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (record "clearly reveals" that the standard applied
by the trial court was to excuse only jurors who would never impose the death penalty); Brief of
Respondent in Opposition at 8, Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) ("The record leaves
no doubt that the trial judge recognized the correct test to be followed."); Sf Mason v. Balkcom,
487 F. Supp. 554, 560 (M.D. Ga. 1980) (trial judge "cognizant of the Witherspoon issues"), rey'd,
669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1260 (1983).
356. See, e.g., State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 170, 248 N.E.2d 605, 607 (1969) ("It is
apparent from questions asked by the trial court that it was very much aware of the limitations on
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than those in dispute.3 57 Some appellate courts have gone to extreme
lengths in imputing knowledge of Witherspoon to trial judges; a few
courts, for example, have asserted that judges in cases tried prior to
1968 somehow were "conscious of"358 or "anticipated 359 the subsequent holdings of Witherspoon. In lieu of directly asserting that the
Witherspoon requirements were understood, some opinions stress the
skill and experience of the trial judge.360 But, however talented the

trial judge, the issue on appeal is ordinarily whether the answers of the
challenged venireman were inadequate as a matter of law under
Witherspoon.36 1 An appellate court leaves that legal question unresolved when by purporting to "defer" to the trial judge's decision, the
court simply assumes that the trial judge recognized the issue and decided it correctly.
2. The Nonverbal Evidence Fiction.-Even

if the remarks of the

trial judge demonstrate that he or she was applying what the appellate
court subsequently holds to be the proper legal principles, the trial
court decision warrants no particular deference unless the judge had
some specific and important information that is not contained in the
transcript. Appellate courts often note that only the trial judge knows
the demeanor and tone of voice of the veniremen,3 62 but no opinion
its authority set forth in the [state] statute.. . and conscientiously tried to and did stay well within
those limitations."), rev'dmen, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
357. Compare id. at 170, 248 N.E.2d at 609 (court's questions reveal trial judge applied correct
standard), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35-39, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (two or
three disputed jurors not questioned by trial judge at all).
358. Marion v. Beto, 302 F. Supp. 913, 920-21 (N.D. Tex. 1969) ("The trial court, at the voir
dire, appeared to be conscious of the Witherspoon guidelines although they had yet to be enunciated by the Supreme Court.
...
), rev'd, 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970).
359. Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 544, 254 N.E.2d 415, 417 (1969), rev'dmet.,
403 U.S. 947 (1971); see also People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 725, 464 P.2d 64, 84, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 628 (1970) (standards imposed by trial court "comported fully with those announced in
Witherspoon"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972); In re Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 708, 456 P.2d 129,
135, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1969) (Burke, J., dissenting) ("The instant trial preceded the decision
in Wi'therspoon . . . which made a material change in the law in this state. . . but here, the
standards the trial court scrupulously imposed comported fully with the subsequently announced
Wi7therspoon standards.").
360. See, e.g., State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 36, 269 A.2d 1, 7 (1970) ("very experienced trial
judge"), modfied, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 452 P.2d
232, 237 (1969) (en banc) ("Tlhe trial judge was one with many years of experience as a lawyer
and a jurist. His learning and wisdom in the field of criminal law generally, as well as his familiarity with our decisional law, is amply demonstrated.
...
), reyldmem, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
361. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 740-41, 464 P.2d 64, 95, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 639
(1970) (Peters, J., dissenting) ("[W]hether the standards imposed by the trial court comported fully
with those announced in Witherspoon is the very point at issue .... "),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972
(1972); Sf.William v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 121-22 (rex. Crim. App. 1981) (Teague, J., dissenting) (trial court decision), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).
362. See, e.g., Mason v. Balkom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 560 (M.D. Ga. 1980), (demeanor, tone),
rev'd, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1260 (1983); Parson v. State, 275 A.2d
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purports to explain how that kind of information could aid in the application of Witherspoon. Demeanor is useful in determining whether a
witness is lying, but there are no reported opinions in which it has been
held or suggested that scrupled jurors were intentionally misrepresenting their views. Although appellate courts occasionally argue that such
nonverbal evidence showed that a juror would never impose the death
penalty,3 63 there are no opinions that explain the manner in which this
is supposed to occur. Perhaps the most revealing opinions are those
which assert that because the trial judge knew the applicable constitutional rules, "one may fairly assume that something transpired to make
it evident ' 364 that the venireman was unqualified. In these cases, the
appellate court infers the existence of evidence necessary to provide a
foundation for the trial court's decision by assuming that the decision
was correct and therefore necessarily based on such evidence. The insufficiency of a juror's actual answers cannot be remedied by resort to
such fictions. Witherspoon requires that very specific information
about a juror's views be communicated in a particularly clear manner.
A juror's position on the death penalty simply cannot be inferred from
a toss of the head or a quiver in the voice. The appellate courts that
purport to defer to trial judges in this way do not assert that nonverbal
evidence could somehow outweigh an express statement by a juror that
he or she would be willing to impose the death penalty. 36 5 A juror's
deliberate choice of the words "I don't think so," for example, is cer777, 785 (Del. 1971) (demeanor); State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 145, 275 A.2d 721, 732 (1971)
(demeanor); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 188, 277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971) (demeanor),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818, 829 ('rex. Crim. App. 1979)
(demeanor, tone); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464, 248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978) ("inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash.
2d 421, 428, 452 P.2d 232, 237 (1969) (en banc) ("deportment, tone of voice and facial expressions"), rev'dmemn, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
363. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539, 224 S.E.2d 386, 390 (1976) ("demeanor plays
an important part" in the "determination of impartiality"); State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St. 2d
249,251, 267 N.E.2d 806, 808 (1971) ("[V]oice inflection might be said to be the clue to the precise
meaning of these prospective jurors' statements ....");Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 10,
Adams v. Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (juror may have "looked and sounded so concerned
about the death penalty" that it seemed she could never impose it); Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 9, Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (trial judge could conclude "[flrom the
attitude of the juror in making his answers" that the juror could not decide guilt question
impartially).
364. State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 142, 275 A.2d 721, 729 (1971); see also Duisen v. State, 441
S.W.2d 688, 691 (Mo. 1969) (when trial court did not state a reason for excusing the disputed
venireman the appellate court "may not assume that the court excused him for a reason not sufficient.... [O]n the contrary, the presumption is that the court excused him for good and sufficient reason."), vacated, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 381 (rex. Crim.
App. 1972) ("[T]he inescapable conclusion based on. . .the court's sustaining of the challenge
... is that the venireman's meaning was clear and unambiguous.").
365. See, e.g., Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 679 (rex. Crim. App.), cert.denied, 430 U.S.
959 (1977); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
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tainly entitled to as much weight as his or her choice of the word "No."
If a trial judge thinks a juror means something different than what he
or she actually has said, the judge's responsibility is to repeat the question, not to force an appellate court to trust the trial judge's judgment
366
regarding what the answer would have been.
3. Tacit Findings.-The third assumption underlying this approach is that the trial judge in fact found or concluded that the disputed venireman would never vote for the death penalty or for
conviction. 367 None of these cases, however, cites any actual trial court
findings; even in the instances where a full transcript of the voir dire is
available, no such finding exists.3 68 The appellate courts also refer to
implicit "findings" on issues about which jurors were never even ques366. But cf State v. Artis, 57 N.J. 24, 36, 269 A.2d 1, 7 (1970) (trial judge "fully realized" how
jurors would have answered questions that were not asked), modfled, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55
(1972).
367. See, e.g., Mason v. Balkom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 560 (M.D. Ga. 1980) ("The trial judge
. found that [the venireman] would vote against the death penalty regardless of the
facts..
"), rev'd, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1260 (1983); Ladetto v.
Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 544, 254 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1969) (trial judge properly concluded
from his observations that excused jurors would be unable to render impartial decision on guilt),
rev'dmen, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Bernard, 288 N.C. 321, 324-25, 218 S.E.2d 327, 329
(1975) ("The judge clearly interpreted the answers to mean that regardless of the evidence neither
juror would vote to convict if conviction meant imposition of the death penalty."); Turner v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 524, 273 S.E.2d 36, 43 (1980) ("[T]he trial judge concluded that [the
juror's] objections to capital punishment were absolute."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981); id.
("[Tjhe trial judge reasonably concluded [the juror] was irrevocably committed against the death
penalty."); see also Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir. 1969) ("From the examination of the veniremen it thus appears that the jurors were not being excused merely for conscientious scruples but because they indicated that such scruples would prevent imposition of the death
penalty in any case."), rev'dmem, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 452
P.2d 232, 236 (1969) (en banc) (court was "satisfied that [the challenged jurors] met this test" of
convincing the trial judge their opposition to the death penalty was irrevocable), rev'd menzm, 403
U.S. 946 (1971); cf Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 21, Adams v.
Washington, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) ("A fair conclusion to make from the record would therefore be
that ... the court had concluded that [the juror] should be excused because her attitude regarding
the death penalty" was that she could never impose it.); Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Writ
of Certiorari at 16, Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1947) ("From the record as a whole, it appears
that the judge, in his discretion and before excusing any juror, determined that the juror would
never vote for death whether he was asked the specific question or not."); Brief of Respondent in
Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 9, Ladetto v. Massachusetts, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) ("The judge
correctly determined that their attitude toward the death penalty would preclude them from making a fair and impartial determination as to guilt.").
368. See, e.g., Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 524 n.10, 273 S.E.2d 36, 43 n.10 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35-39, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S.
946 (1971). InPruett, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a burst of enthusiasm, upheld not one, but two
nonexistent trial court findings:
[T]he court was justified in finding in each instance that the prospective juror's opinions
precluded him from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death. ...
[T]he trial court was fully justified in finding that each of the challenged prospective
jurors would not under any circumstances ever vote for a death penalty verdict. ...
State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 170, 248 N.E.2d 605, 607 (1969), rev'd men., 403 U.S. 946
(1971).
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tioned. 369 These apparently inaccurate references are not necessarily
deliberate misrepresentations; in some cases they may be merely overstated assertions that the trial judge would not have dismissed the juror
unless it was clear that the juror would never vote for the death penalty.370 In other words, the appellate courts conclusively infer the existence of a tacit factual finding because of their automatic assumption
that the trial judge knew what findings were required under Witherspoon. Such fictional findings are entitled to absolutely no deference.
A related group of opinions treats decisions to exclude veniremen
as a matter for the "discretion" of the trial judge.37 1 These opinions
hold that such decisions are to be overturned on appeal only upon a
showing of manifest abuse. But a trial judge is normally accorded discretion of this kind only where the question at issue is not controlled by
any specific and strict legal rules.372 Witherspoon, however, establishes
precisely the kind of specific legal standards that preclude the existence
or exercise of any such discretion; the only question before the trial
3 73
judge is whether Witherspoon's requirements have clearly been met.
The practice of deferring to the decisions of the trial judge is a
tissue of conjecture. Under this approach, appellate courts affirm ficti369. Compare State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 170, 248 N.E.2d 605, 607 (1969) (finding
regarding choice of penalty), rev'dmen., 403 U.S. 946 (1971), with Petition for Writ of Certorari at
37-39, Pruett v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (no questions asked regarding selection of penalty).
370. "Implicit in the trial court's act of excusing the juror in this case is the finding that she
could not levy the death penalty in any case and that this opposition was clearly and unequivocally expressed." State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Mo. 1981) (emphasis added); see also In re
Seiterle, 71 Cal. 2d 698, 708,456 P.2d 129, 135, 78 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1969) (Burke, J., dissenting)
(trial court "impliedly found" juror would never impose the death penalty); State v. Wilson, 29
Ohio St. 2d 203, 211, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1972) (trial court made an "implicit determination"
that the juror would not be capable of applying law to determine punishment).
371. See Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 785 (Del. 1971) (decision to excuse scrupled jurors
within the limits of trial judge's "discretion"); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. 1969)
("[T]he able trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in excluding this juror."), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 801 (1971); State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Mo. 1981) ("[R]ulings on challenges for
cause lie within the sound discretion of the trial court."); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203, 211,
280 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1972) ("[A] ruling on a challenge for cause will not be overturned unless it
appears that the trial court thereby abused its discretion."); Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 679
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) ("ruling of the trial court should not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing of clear abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
372. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 414, 474 P.2d 557, 572 (1970) (Hale, J.,
dissenting) ("Not all rulings rest on the trial court's discretion; discretion is reserved for questions
to which no strict rule of law is applicable.. . . In the very nature of things, there can be no rigid
and explicit rules for the determination of jury challenges.").
373. Prior to Witherspoon, the resolution of challenges for cause at times involved such discretion because state standards were extremely vague. Many of the decisions according discretion to
trial judges in enforcing Witherspoon expressly rely on pre-Witherspoon state court opinions that
concern the disposition of challenges for cause. E.g., State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Mo.
1981) (citing State v. Cuckovich, 485 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1972)); State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 2d 203,
211, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1972) (citing, inter alia, Serviss v. Stockstill, 30 Ohio St. 418 (1876));
Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 414, 474 P.2d 557, 571-72 (1970) (Hale, J., dissenting) (citing
White v. Territory of Wash., 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 19 P. 37 (1888)).
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tious holdings based on presumed evidence, both of which are derived
in turn from assumptions that the trial court "knew" the substance of
legal rules that in all likelihood have not yet been finally decided. It is
ordinarily impossible to ascertain from the record of a voir dire what
standards a trial court applied or why it sustained a particular challenge for cause. Only when the record compels the conclusion that an
excused venireman was not qualified under Witherspoon can a court
hold that the requirement of "unmistakable clarity" has been satisfied.
The deference opinions have worked a harm that reaches beyond the
defendants whose death sentences were improperly upheld. By resorting to this ill-conceived doctrine, appellate courts are frequently able to
avoid resolving the difficult but critical legal and practical issues raised
in the application of Witherspoon to undecided, uncertain, or vacillating jurors. Pretending that trial judges have somehow solved these
problems does not in fact resolve them; it merely postpones the day
when trial judges will receive the necessary appellate guidance.
V.

Conclusion

Fifteen years of litigation since Witherspoon have made painfully
clear that the Witherspoon principles cannot be implemented with a
simple and straightforward explanation of the appropriate standards,
followed by a single readily understood and easily answered question.
The complex issues necessarily implicated by the Witherspoon inquiry
range from the subtleties of criminal procedure and the multifaceted
debate over the morality and wisdom of the death penalty to the perennial tension between the consciences and civil obligations of citizens in
a democratic society. The task of questioning veniremen and evaluating their answers is substantially more difficult than anything that
heretofore has been attempted in the process of jury selection.
These issues are far from being resolved. The courts have only
begun to perceive the problems that will persist as long as prosecutors
seek to death-qualify juries. But one recurring and overarching reality
is apparent: the attitude of individual veniremen toward the death
penalty is often as uncertain, divided, and wavering as that of society
itself. So long as the courts fail to come to grips with that fact, so long
as they persist in assuming that every juror has a precise and firmly
held position, the process of jury selection will be unpredictable, arbitrary, and ultimately lawless.
The evolution of this area of the law has been and will remain a
product of the interaction of two adversarial forces-prosecutors who
seek to exclude all scrupled jurors, and defense counsel anxious to re-
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tain them. The arsenal of tactical devices, questions, arguments, and
explanations available to each side has grown steadily. As trial judges
eliminate patently unconstitutional practices, the interaction of these
techniques spawns ever more complex colloquies and problems. Each
new appellate decision calls into question the generation of voir dires
that preceded it. Neither legal fictions nor judicial indifference can
prevent this escalation from making it increasingly difficult to conduct
a voir dire untainted by arguable constitutional error.
If Witherspoon is to be administered in a manner that is consistent
with its basic holdings, straightforward in application, and relatively
free of the now commonplace trial and appellate wrangling, a fundamentally different approach is essential. The questioning must begin,
not by placing under suspicion a large number of merely scrupled jurors similar to those who were improperly excluded in Witherspoon itself, but by focusing more narrowly on those who, despite receiving a
clear explanation of the role and duties of the jury, accompanied by a
firm admonition to do their duty, nonetheless unequivocally refuse to
obey and apply the law. Such an approach ultimately may reduce the
ability of prosecutors to pick juries of their liking; but without it, the
process of jury selection will remain the constitutional Achilles heel of
every jury-imposed capital sentence.
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APPENDIX
VACILLATING JURORS
Placing complex voir dires into categories suitable for statistical comparison involves making a variety of difficult judgments. This analysis of juror responses unavoidably disregards
differences in the form and even the substance of the questions
asked by counsel and courts. The categories and codes are as
follows:
-

One or more uncertain answers (e.g., "I think")
One or more undecided answers (e.g., "I don't know")
Both uncertain and undecided answers
Neither uncertain nor undecided answers

Type

I
2
3
4

Trend

A - Answers progress consistently toward increased willingness to vote for the
death penalty
B - Answers progress consistently towards increased opposition to the death
penalty
C - Answers change in both directions

Answers

N
UN
U
UY
Y

-

Will vote against death in all cases
Uncertain, but may vote against death in all cases
Undecided
Uncertain, but might vote for death penalty
Would vote for the death penalty

Answers
T
State v. Adams,
76 Wash. 2d 650, 677, 458 P.2d 558, 574 (1969), rev'dmenm, 403
U.S. 947 (1977)
State v. Aiken,
75 Wash. 2d 421, 437-40, 452 P.2d 232, 242-43 (1969) (en banc),
rev'dmemn, 403 U.S. 946 (1971)
Frewaldt
Muryama
Painter
Alderman v. Austin,
663 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1981), affd inpart, rev'd in part on
rehg, 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
State v. Anderson,
30 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 282 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1972)
State v. Avery,
299 N.C. 126, 135-36, 261 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1980)
State v. Avery,
286 N.C. 459, 463, 212 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1975), vacated, 428 U.S.
904 (1976)
Bean v. State,
86 Nev. 80, 99, 465 P.2d 133, 145, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844
(1970)

Trend First Last
I

B

Y

UN

3
4
I
3

B
B
C
B

3

B

U

N

3

B

U

UN

3

B

U

UN

2

C

U

Y
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Case
State v. Belwood,
27 Utah 2d 214, 218-19, 494 P.2d 519, 522 (1972)
People v. Bradford,
70 Cal. 2d 333, 346, 450 P.2d 46, 53, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 733
(1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970)
Brice v. State,
264 Md. 352, 359-60, 286 A.2d 132, 136-37 (1972)
Brown v. State,
48 Ala. App. 304, 318, 264 So. 2d 529, 542 (1971), rev'd, 288
Ala. 680, 264 So. 2d 549 (1971)

Type Trend First Last
N
Y
B
1
4

A

N

UY

4

C

N

Y

I

C

Y

Y

Bums v. Estelle,
592 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1979), aFd on reb'g, 626 F.2d 396
(5th Cir. 1980) (en band)
Bums v. State,
556 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
935 (1977)
Exparte Chambers,
612 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex Crim. App. 1981) (en banc)
Chase
Hamilton
Chambers v. State,
568 S.W.2d 313, 331-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 928 (1979)
Godbolt
Brightman
Clark v. State,
264 Ark. 630, 638-43, 573 S.W.2d 622, 626-28 (1978)
Harris
Young
Lucas
State v. Clark,
423 A.2d 1151, 1156 (R.I. 1981)
North
Zanni
Coppola v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 243, 249-50, 257 S.E.2d 797, 801-02 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1103 (1980)
Henry
Raney
Corn v. State,
240 Ga. 130, 132, 240 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 914 (1978)
Darden v. Wainwright,
513 F. Supp. 947, 960 (M.D. Fla. 1981), vacated, 715 F.2d 502
(1Ith Cir. 1983) (en banc)

1

B

UY

N

4

C

N

N

1

A

N

UN

Davis v. State,
241 Ga. 376, 389, 247 S.E.2d 45, 53, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947
(1978)
People v. Durham,
70 Cal. 2d 171, 199, 449 P.2d 198, 216-17, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262,
280-81 (1969)
Rios
Levin
Durrough v. State,
620 S.W.2d 134, 141-42 (rex. Crim. App. 1981)

4

C

Y

Y

UN
UN
UN

N
N
Y

1080

C
C

UN UN
UN UN

4
1

A
A

N
N

Y
Y

2
3

B
B

U
Y

N
UN

UN N
UN N
UN UN

Answers
Case
Type Trend First Last
People v. Floyd,
1 Cal. 3d 694, 728-31, 464 P.2d 64, 86-89, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608,
630-33 (1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972)
3
C
UN N
Rogers
Willis
1
A
UN Y
Franklin v. State,
606 S.W.2d 818, 829, 842 n.9 (rex. Crim. App. 1979)
Snapka
UN UN
Askey
Y
Y
Fryrear v. Commonwealth,
UN Y
471 S.W.2d 321, 322-23 (Ky. 1971)
Gafford v. State,
387 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1980)
Grady
UN N
Jernigan
UY N
Garcia v. State,
Y
N
501 P.2d 1128, 1136-37 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972)
Garcia v. State,
3
C
UN UN
581 S.W.2d 168, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), vacated, 453 U.S.
902 (1981)
Granviel v. State,
552 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977)
Wallace
Y
N
Vernon
U
N
Grijalva v. State,
UN N
614 S.W.2d 420, 421-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
3
C
U
N
Harris v. State,
352 So. 2d 460, 472-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976), afJ'd, 352 So. 2d
479 (Ala. 1977)
Hill v. State,
3
C
N UN
371 So. 2d 60, 62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)
Hopkinson v. State,
632 P.2d 79, 158-59 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982)
Becker
U N
Anderson
UN N
Hughes v. State,
UN U
563 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979)
Hughes v. State,
562 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 903 (1978)
McClay
Y U
UN U
Bale
N UN
Irving v. Hargett,
518 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (N.D. Miss. 1981)
Jackson v. State,
1
C
UN N
366 So. 2d 752, 755 n.2 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979)
Koonce v. State,
1
B
UY UN
456 P.2d 549, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S.
934 (1972)
Lamar v. State,
266 Ind. 689, 697-98, 366 N.E.2d 652, 656-58 (1977)
Pauley
1
A
N UY
Essig
4
A
N
Y

1081

State v. Lindsay,
404 So. 2d 466, 477 (La. 1981)
People v. Mabry,
71 Cal. 2d. 430, 445 n.6, 455 P.2d 759, 767 n.6, 78 Cal. Rptr.
655, 663 n.6 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972)
Pobor
McRae
Locke
Beard
State v. Mathis,
52 N.J. 238, 248, 245 A.2d 20, 26 (1968), rev'd memz., 403 U.S.
946 (1971)
Matthews v. State,
471 S.W.2d 834, 835-36 ('ex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 940 (1972)
May v. State,
618 S.W.2d 333, 352-57 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en bane), vacated,
454 U.S. 959 (1981)
McCree v. State,
266 Ark. 465, 471-73, 585 S.W.2d 938, 941-42 (1979)
McCorquodale v. Balkcom,
525 F. Supp. 408, 424-25 (N.D. Ga. 1981), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 705 F.2d 1553 (1 lth Cir.), affd in part, rev'd in part on
reh'g, 721 F.2d 1493 (1lth Cir. 1983) (en bane)
Woodlief
Kidd
State v. Noell,
284 N.C. 670, 686, 202 S.E.2d 750, 761 (1974), vacated inpart,
428 U.S. 902 (1975)
O'Bryan v. State,
591 S.W.2d 464, 471-72
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980)
People v. Osuna,
70 Cal. 2d 759, 769,
452 P.2d 678, 683
76 Cal. Rptr. 462, 467 (1969)
State v. Pace,
80 N.M. 364, 366, 456 P.2d 197, 199 (1969)
State v. Patterson,
28 Ohio St. 2d 181, 187-88,
277 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972)
Fulst
Fedrick
Llewellyn
Porter v. State,
623 S.W.2d 374, 378-79
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965
(1982)
Vaughn
Rice
Potts v. State,
241 Ga. 67, 69-70, 243 S.E.2d 510, 514-15 (1978)
People v. Robles,
71 Cal. 2d 924, 930-31, 458 P.2d 67, 71-72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 123,
127-28 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972 (1972)
State v. Royal,
610 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Mo. 1981)
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Answers
Type Trend First Last
I
C
N
N

1

C

UN

N

3

C

Y

N

4

C

N

N

1

B

U

N

3

A

I

A

N

UY

1

B

U

N

1

C

UN

UN

UN UY

Case
Ruiz v. State,
273 Ark. 94, 101, 617 S.W.2d 6, 10, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093
(1981)
Russell v. State,
598 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1003 (1980)

In re Seiterle,
71 Cal. 2d 698, 706-07 nn.2-3, 456 P.2d 129, 134 nn.2-3, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 857, 862 nn.2-3 (1969)
State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 686-88, 213 S.E.2d 280, 284-85
(1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 903 (1976)
State v. Sinclair,
57 N.J. 56, 69, 269 A.2d 161, 168 (1970)
Smith v. State,
236 Ga. 12, 22, 222 S.E.2d 308, 316, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910
(1976)
Smith v. State,
437 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
Smith v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 455, 487-91, 248 S.E.2d 135, 154-56 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979)
Swindler v. State,
267 Ark. 418, 430, 592 S.W.2d 91, 97 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1057 (1980)
Tezeno v. State,

484 S.W.2d 374, 381-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
Thames v. State,
453 S.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), vacated, 408
U.S. 937 (1972)
Horton
Burch
Hunt
State v. Tyner,
273 S.C. 646, 651,
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